Cited by 104Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorAnimal Behavior and Reproduction

From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits

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Lotem, Arnon, Fishman, Michael A., Stone, Lewi·2003·Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals is commonly explained by the potential for future reciprocity or by the risk of being punished by group members. However, unconditional altruism is more difficult to explain. We demonstrate that unconditional altruism can evolve as a costly signal of individual quality (i.e. a handicap) as a consequence of reciprocal altruism. This is because the emergent correlation between altruism and individual quality in reciprocity games can facilitate the use of altruism as a quality indicator in a much wider context, outside the reciprocity game, thus affecting its further evolution through signalling benefits. Our model, based on multitype evolutionary game theory shows that, when the additive signalling benefit of donating help exceeds the cost for only some individuals (of high-quality state) but not for others (of low-quality state), the population possesses an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) profile wherein high-quality individuals cooperate unconditionally while low-quality individuals defect or play tit-for-tat (TfT). Hence, as predicted by Zahavi's handicap model, signalling benefits of altruistic acts can establish a stable generosity by high-quality individuals that no longer depends on the probability of future reciprocation or punishment.

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Crossref · 10.1098/rspb.2002.2225

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39 of 39 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • If players occasionally fail to cooperate although their strategy prescribes it, the situation is altered significantly.

    “The situation is altered in a significant way if players occasionally fail to cooperate although their strategy prescribes it 39,49-52 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [51]

  • If the frequency of undiscriminating co-operators exceeds a certain threshold, defectors can invade and take over.

    “If their frequency exceeds a certain threshold, defectors can invade and take over.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [51]

  • In a population consisting entirely of discriminators, undiscriminating co-operators fare just as well and thus spread by neutral drift.

    “In a population consisting entirely of discriminators, undiscriminating co-operators fare just as well and thus spread by neutral drift.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [51]

  • In this scenario (occasional failure), a population consisting only of conditional and unconditional altruists is not subject to random drift, but selection leads to a well defined, stable mix of the two types.

    “In this scenario, a population consisting only of conditional and unconditional altruists is not subject to random drift, but selection leads to a well defined, stable mix of the two types.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [51]

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Authors
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L.
Affiliations
Tel Aviv University (IL)
Corresponding author
Lotem, Arnon
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
Published
2003-01-22
Volume
270
Issue
1511
Pages
199-205
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2001299649
Cited by
104
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 5
FWCI
24.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • James S. McDonnell Foundation
  • Israel Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
Keywords
reciprocal altruism, costly signaling, evolution of cooperation, evolutionarily stable strategy, tit-for-tat, individual quality
MeSH terms
Altruism, Communication, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Psychological

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