Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

Abstract

Quantum key distribution promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach—measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution—has been proposed to solve this problem. However, so far its security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory, specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate the feasibility of long-distance implementations of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission. In theory, quantum key distribution is unconditionally secure but, in reality, practical devices are prone to attacks. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution promises to overcome these limitations, as Curty et al. show here with their rigorous security proof for practical systems.