Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 111 of the 111 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The capacity for voluntary action is seen as essential to human nature. Yet neuroscience and behaviourist psychology have traditionally dismissed the topic as unscientific, perhaps because the mechanisms that cause actions have long been unclear. However, new research has identified networks of brain areas, including the pre-supplementary motor area, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex, that underlie voluntary action. These areas generate information for forthcoming actions, and also cause the distinctive conscious experience of intending to act and then controlling one's own actions. Volition consists of a series of decisions regarding whether to act, what action to perform and when to perform it. Neuroscientific accounts of voluntary action may inform debates about the nature of individual responsibility.
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“This capacity is adaptive because it permits flexibility: more abstract representations of a stimulus enable the generation of alternative behaviors, allowing original and creative thoughts to emerge [62].”
From Situating the default-mode network along a principal gradient of macroscale cortical organization (2016) · cites this paper as [62]
In the citing paper
“the cerebellum has been related to several aspects of actions goal-directness and self-attribution, which are the fundamental feature of intentional actions (Haggard, 2008).”
From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Haggard, 2008
In the citing paper
“We know from past studies on free will led us to a roadblock in our understanding (Libet, 1999; Haggard, 2008), because we could not gain insight into why unconscious decisions preceded conscious volition.”
From The collapse of the wave function as the mediator of free will in prime neurons (2025) · cites this paper as Haggard, 2008
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“While we lack awareness of the complexities of the sensorimotor computations of such actions, we possess an unambiguous sense of authorship for voluntary actions that is termed the sense of agency (SoA; Gallagher, 2007; Haggard, 2008; Salomon, 2017).”
BackgroundWhen robots tell you what to do: Sense of agency in human- and robot-guided actions
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“Haggard (Haggard, 2008) has suggested that voluntary actions in humans are a form of ‘decision making’ with two special characteristics: they are exploratory behaviours that are not directly triggered by sensory input but, rather, occur in a random fashion.”
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“When we begin a voluntary movement, the sequence of central motor planning and execution involves networks distributed across prefrontal, pre-motor, motor, and parietal cortical regions as well as subcortical structures such as the cerebellum, thalamus and basal ganglia (Haggard, 2008).”
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Self-citationDefault mode network scaffolds immature frontoparietal network in cognitive development
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Priming determinist beliefs diminishes implicit (but not explicit) components of self-agency
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“…view is that the ‘early-decision’ account is not compatible with the idea of conscious intentions causing our actions, and many have taken this to be evidence that unconscious process causes both motor preparation and conscious intentions (Desmurget and Sirigu 2009; Haggard 2011; Wegner 2003).”
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Similar coding of freely chosen and externally cued intentions in a fronto-parietal network
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Interfacing to the brain’s motor decisions
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“To explain functional significance of the subjective experience of volition, Libet (1993) proposed that such an experience may play a role in the buildup of our free will, because it would allow us to withhold upcoming but undesired actions (see Haggard 2008; Mirabella 2007 for reviews).”
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“…and stimulus – response congruency effects on task choice in VTS studies provide evidence for influences of the environment on voluntary control, because these effects demonstrate that stimuli can influence task selection processes (e.g., Haggard, 2008; Hommel, 2000; Teuchies et al., 2016).”
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“Because the descending CST is a common pathway for spontaneous movement (Haggard, 2008), spontaneous and unspontaneous movement can be detected when muscle activity is driven from the motor cortex via the CST.”
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Stimulus-based priming of task choice during voluntary task switching.
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“Volitional control is not thought to occur in an environmental vacuum; however, it is considered to be less directly, or immediately, determined by external stimuli (Haggard, 2008).”
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“Volition and the sense of agency (Haggard, 2008) have been also shown to play a role in the modulation of neural responses to sensory consequences of self-generated actions.”
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“…cingulate zone (RCZ) of the anterior cingulate cortex is associated with action selection (deciding “what” to do) while activity in a sub-region of the superior medial frontal gyrus (SFG) is associated with action timing (deciding “when” to do it; Mueller et al., 2007; Krieghoff et al., 2009).”
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“Indeed, several works originating from decision-making (Libet, 1985; Haggard, 2008; Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016), memory (Jacoby, 1991) and visual perception (Persaud and Cowey, 2008) pointed to the links between the ability to inhibit a behaviour and consciousness.”
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Watanabe, M., & Munoz, D. P. (2010) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1738-10.2010 · Cited by 53
“Volitional actions are preceded by preparatory processes (Haggard, 2008).”
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Dresler, M., Eibl, L., Fischer, C. F. J., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V. I., Steiger, A., Czisch, M., & Pawlowski, M. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00987 · Cited by 52
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Bozzacchi, C., Giusti, M. A., Pitzalis, S., Spinelli, D., & Russo, F. D. (2012) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2011.12.020 · Cited by 56
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“These aspects involve specific processes that often unfold successively and that may influence performance in quite different ways (Deecke, 1996; Haggard, 2008; see also Gollwitzer, 1990).”
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Maldonado, I. L., de Matos, V. P., Cuesta, T. A. C., Herbet, G., & Destrieux, C. (2020) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2020.107487 · Cited by 53
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“Despite intense interest in this phenomenon (Lau et al., 2004; Sirigu et al., 2004; Haggard, 2008; Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al., 2011), the neurobiological underpinning of conscious intention remains elusive.”
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“This finding is consistent with the proposed role of the SMA in the control and ownership of movements (Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Grafton, Mazziotta, Woods, & Phelps, 1992; Haggard, 2008; Haggard & Magno, 1999; Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008; Penfield & Welch, 1951).”
Decoding Intention at Sensorimotor Timescales
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“The SMA receives inputs from the striatum, through the pre-SMA, and projects to the primary motor cortex, leading to action (Haggard, 2008, 2009).”
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“Indeed, the SMA bridges the PFC (where goals and needs are represented) to the PMC/MC (responsible for action preparation and execution) and so plays a crucial role in generating actions with an internal origin (Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008; Haggard, 2008).”
BackgroundMethodThe Experience of Pleasure: A Perspective Between Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis
Moccia, L., Mazza, M., Nicola, M. D., & Janiri, L. (2018) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2018.00359 · Cited by 59
“, supplementary motor area, pre-supplementary motor area, precentral gyrus, and postcentral gyrus) are related to the execution, observation, or imagination of self-generated behavior (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard, 2008; Nachev et al., 2008).”
BackgroundResolving alignment conflicts: A competing motivations approach
Malchukov, A. L. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709848.003.0002 · Cited by 49
Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis
Lush, P., & Dienes, Z. P. (2019) · PsyCh Journal · doi:10.1002/pchj.276 · Cited by 51
“…can be measured by common time perception methods; for example, duration estimate of interval between action and outcome (e.g., Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008), dichotomous judgments of synchrony (e.g., Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009), or interval reproduction (Humphreys & Buehner, 2010).”
BackgroundMethodNeural Dynamics of the Intention to Speak
Carota, F., Posada, A., Harquel, S., Delpuech, C., Bertrand, O., & Sirigu, A. (2009) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp255 · Cited by 52
“…temporal difference of a similar magnitude between intention and movement was also reported in the context of hand gestures when subjects focused on their intention to move as compared with when they paid attention to movement execution (Libet et al. 1983; Sirigu et al. 2004; Haggard 2005, 2008).”
BackgroundWhy we may not find intentions in the brain
Uithol, S., Burnston, D. C., & Haselager, P. (2014) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.01.010 · Cited by 52
“…to each other, with the higher more futureoriented intentions being the cause of the contextual influences and motor states, forming a hierarchy of action control (see also Grafton and Hamilton (2007), Haggard (2008) for the virtually identical ‘action hierarchy’; Hamilton and Grafton (2007)).”
BackgroundReinhart, R. M. G., Zhu, J. X., Park, S., & Woodman, G. F. (2015) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1717-15.2015 · Cited by 54
“Theories of learning and goal-directed behavior seek to explain how success and failure are used to improve future decisions (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Haggard, 2008).”
BackgroundThe Agent Brain: A Review of Non-invasive Brain Stimulation Studies on Sensing Agency
Crivelli, D., & Balconi, M. (2017) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00229 · Cited by 51
“Assuming that agency is core feature for human experience (Metzinger, 2003; Haggard, 2008; Smith, 2016), it has also been suggested that in the very moment we sense ourselves as intentional agents and we consciously self-attribute an agentive stance, we have to assume that other individuals might share the same capabi…”
BackgroundSocial exclusion reduces the sense of agency: Evidence from intentional binding
Malik, R. A., & Obhi, S. S. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.03.004 · Cited by 54
Effects of acupuncture on the brain hemodynamics
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“Previous studies reported that the SMC was implicated in intentional or voluntary action (see reviews by Haggard, 2008; Nachev et al., 2009; Tanji et al., 2009).”
THE STRENGTH OF WEAK ARTIFICIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Seth, A. K. (2009) · International Journal of Machine Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s1793843009000086 · Cited by 58
Fixational saccades reflect volitional action preparation
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“VOLITIONAL ACTIONS ARE PRECEDED by preparatory processes that preset neural circuits based on the knowledge of current situations and/or environment to guide future behavior (Haggard 2008).”
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Iso‐Ahola, S. E. (2012) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0030657 · Cited by 56
“There is evidence that neurological preparation for an action begins before a person consciously makes the decision to act (Haggard, 2008; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), in some cases even eight seconds before the action (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008).”
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“In its dual role, the SMA has been implicated in the multiple functions of error detection, decision uncertainty, and feedback regarding unfavourable outcomes, as well as in motor initiation, motor inhibition, and the subjective urge to move (Fried et al., 1991; Nachev et al., 2008; Haggard, 2008; Zhang et al., 2012).”
Free Will, Physics, Biology, and the Brain
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Politeness distinctions in personal pronouns: A case study on competing motivations
Helmbrecht, J. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709848.003.0019 · Cited by 50
Walsh, E., Kühn, S., Braß, M., Wenke, D., & Haggard, P. (2009) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.026 · Cited by 52
“Respectively, these have been called " early " and " late " decisions about whether to act (Haggard, 2008).”
InfluentialSelf-citationSauppe, S. (2017) · Language · doi:10.1353/lan.2017.0015 · Cited by 49
“Agents are general cognitive attractors that may be related to seeing the self as an acting agent capable of voluntary control (Haggard 2008); (awareness of ) agency also plays an important role in the conceptualization of the self and the distinction between self and other (Decety & Sommerville…”
BackgroundGarbarini, F., D’Agata, F., Piedimonte, A., Sacco, K., Rabuffetti, M., Tam, F., Cauda, F., Pia, L., Geminiani, G. C., Duca, S., et al. (2013) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.10.061 · Cited by 46
“Taken together with the pre-SMA activity, the PPC activity (particularly in the IPL) supports the hypothesis that real and imagined Non-congruent movements activate common circuits related to intentional and predictive operation (Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009; Haggard, 2008), generating bimanual coupling.”
InfluentialAction-Dependent Processing of Touch in the Human Parietal Operculum and Posterior Insula
Limanowski, J., Lopes, P., Keck, J., Baudisch, P., Friston, K. J., & Blankenburg, F. (2019) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhz111 · Cited by 48
“during self-generated than during FES-induced movements, which is in line with its previously described role in the initiation of actions (Deecke and Kornhuber 1978; Fried et al. 1991; Haggard and Whitford 2004; Haggard 2008; Nachev et al. 2008; Nguyen et al. 2014; Limanowski, Sarasso et al. 2018).”
ResultThe Strength of Alpha–Beta Oscillatory Coupling Predicts Motor Timing Precision
Grabot, L., Kononowicz, T. W., la Tour, T. D., Gramfort, A., Doyère, V., & van Wassenhove, V. (2019) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2473-18.2018 · Cited by 46
“Our time production paradigm relied on the anticipation of internally generated temporal codes (and volitional goals; Haggard, 2008, 2017) for duration production and PAC has also been reported during externally driven anticipatory states (Cohen et al., 2009; Cravo et al., 2011).”
MethodBreathing is coupled with voluntary initiation of mental imagery
Park, H.-D., Piton, T., Kannape, O. A., Duncan, N. W., Lee, K., Lane, T. J., & Blanke, O. (2022) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119685 · Cited by 44
“Voluntary actions have been roposed to comprise three distinctive stages ( Haggard, 2019 , 2008 ). irst, the intention of the action is formulated, believed to recruit the refrontal cortex and basal ganglia.”
BackgroundInfluentialLibet’s legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition
Dominik, T., Mele, A. R., Schurger, A., & Maoz, U. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105503 · Cited by 53
Activating memories of depression alters the experience of voluntary action
Obhi, S. S., Swiderski, K. M., & Farquhar, R. (2012) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-012-3372-5 · Cited by 47
“1 3 Keywords Agency · Depression · Volitional action · Sense of agency · Authorship over action · Priming · Interval estimation”
BackgroundPreparation time modulates pro-active control and enhances task conflict in task switching
Kalanthroff, E., & Henik, A. (2013) · Psychological Research · doi:10.1007/s00426-013-0495-7 · Cited by 43
“In recent years, task conflict has drawn increased attention from researchers (e.g., Braverman & Meiran, 2010; Haggard, 2008; La Heij & Boelens, 2011; La-Heij, Boelens, & Kuipers, 2010; Steinhauser & Hubner, 2009).”
BackgroundSelf-paced movement intention detection from human brain signals: Invasive and non-invasive EEG
Lew, E. Y. L., Chavarriaga, R., Zhang, H., Seeck, M., & Millán, J. D. R. (2012) · Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC) · doi:10.1109/embc.2012.6346665 · Cited by 43
“These protocols pose further challenges in the understanding of human volition [1].”
BackgroundWorkshops of the Fifth International Brain-Computer Interface Meeting: Defining the Future
Huggins, J. E., Guger, C., Allison, B. Z., Anderson, C. W., Batista, A. P., Brouwer, A.-M., Brunner, C., Chavarriaga, R., Fried-Oken, M. B., Gunduz, A., et al. (2014) · Brain-Computer Interfaces · doi:10.1080/2326263x.2013.876724 · Cited by 46
“[83] For example, it can improve motor neuroprostheses by providing a tighter coupling of the intention-related brain activity and movement execution with a prosthesis or robotic device.”
Pyasik, M. M., Ronga, I., Burin, D., Salatino, A., Sarasso, P., Garbarini, F., Ricci, R., & Pia, L. (2021) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.117727 · Cited by 46
Cieslik, E. C., Zilles, K., Grefkes, C., & Eickhoff, S. B. (2011) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.089 · Cited by 44
“Controlling motor output: top-down influences of the preSMA The preSMA is part of a frontal cognitive-motor network including the (pre)-motor and prefrontal cortices (Haggard, 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialJo, H., Wittmann, M., Borghardt, T. L., Hinterberger, T., & Schmidt, S. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.03.004 · Cited by 49
“veto experiments (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Libet et al., 1983b). Haggard (2008) presented a naturalized model of human volition.”
BackgroundManifold reaching paradigm: how do we handle target redundancy?
Berret, B., Chiovetto, E., Nori, F., & Pozzo, T. (2011) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.01063.2010 · Cited by 45
“2007) and little has been done on the complementary problem of “where” to reach (Haggard 2008).”
BackgroundEKSTROM, L. W. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0018 · Cited by 44
Consciousness science: where are we, where are we going, and what if we get there?
Cleeremans, A., Mudrik, L., & Seth, A. K. (2025) · Frontiers in Science · doi:10.3389/fsci.2025.1546279 · Cited by 50
“Different regions of the cortex are associated with different aspects of conscious content, whether these are distinct perceptual modalities (56), experiences of volition or agency (34), emotions (57), or other aspects of the sense of “ self ” (58).”
The language of music: Common neural codes for structured sequences in music and natural language
Chiang, J. N., Rosenberg, M., Bufford, C. A., Stephens, D., Lysy, A., & Monti, M. M. (2018) · Brain and Language · doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2018.07.003 · Cited by 41
The role of action prediction and inhibitory control for joint action coordination in toddlers
Meyer, M., Bekkering, H., Haartsen, R., Stapel, J., & Hunnius, S. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2015.06.005 · Cited by 45
Ticini, L. F., Schütz‐Bosbach, S., Weiß, C., Casile, A., & Waszak, F. (2011) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00134 · Cited by 43
“Haggard, 2008 ). This association may be used in the reverse direction when a movement can be induced by anticipating or perceiving sensory effects (Herwig et al., 2007; Schutz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; James, 1890).”
BackgroundHabit and Nonhabit Systems for Unconscious and Conscious Behavior: Implications for Multitasking
Lisman, J. E., & Sternberg, E. J. (2012) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00319 · Cited by 41
“Experiments in humans implicate this same area in the control of willed actions (Haggard, 2008; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006).”
BackgroundDo readiness potentials happen all the time?
Travers, E., Khalighinejad, N., Schurger, A., & Haggard, P. (2019) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.116286 · Cited by 45
“Voluntary actions – those caused by internal processes within the agent themselves and not an external stimulus – have a neural signature distinct from that of actions in response to the environment (Fried et al., 2017; Haggard, 2008).”
Self-citationConsciousness, decision making, and volition: freedom beyond chance and necessity
Liljenström, H. (2021) · Theory in Biosciences · doi:10.1007/s12064-021-00346-6 · Cited by 44
“There are different views on the temporal and causal relationship between intentions and decisions, and to what degree intentions are conscious (see e.g., Haggard 2008, 2019; Mele 2009, 2019; Block 2021), but the difference partly depends on the context.”
BackgroundLibet and the case for free will scepticism1
Bayne, T. (2011) · British Academy eBooks · doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0003 · Cited by 54
“are provided by Banks and Pockett (2007), Gomes (1999), Haggard (2008), Levy (2005), Mele (2009) and the chapters in Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel (2011).”
BackgroundRaij, T. T., & Riekki, T. J. J. (2012) · NeuroImage Clinical · doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2012.09.007 · Cited by 45
“, 1996), and it is possible that a trace of such an SMA function is required for the sense of ownership of one's own action (Haggard, 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialHughes, G., Schütz‐Bosbach, S., & Waszak, F. (2011) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2256-11.2011 · Cited by 44
“, 2000) suggest that while voluntary actions involve the fronto-median cortex, stimulus-driven actions are controlled via parietal and premotor cortices (Haggard, 2008).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNew perspectives on self-control development: Highlighting the role of intentional inhibition
Schel, M. A., Scheres, A., & Crone, E. A. (2014) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.08.022 · Cited by 43
“Intentional inhibition has been defined as a late ‘veto’ mechanism (Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012; Haggard, 2008).”
InfluentialA matter of matching: How goals and primes affect self-agency experiences.
van der Weiden, A., Ruys, K. I., & Aarts, H. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0030079 · Cited by 39
Qiu, L., Yan, H., Zhu, R., Yan, J., Yuan, H., Han, Y., Yue, W., Tian, L., & Zhang, D. (2018) · BMC Psychiatry · doi:10.1186/s12888-018-1806-8 · Cited by 39
Splitting Motivation: Unilateral Effects of Subliminal Incentives
Schmidt, L., Palminteri, S., Lafargue, G., & Pessiglione, M. (2010) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797610372636 · Cited by 32
“In the field of psychology, it is generally assumed that what is motivated by incentives is the person, who may experience a conscious desire for the expected reward and therefore voluntarily engage more effort on the imposed task (Haggard, 2008; Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004; Wright & Brehm, 1989).”
BackgroundIshikuro, K., Urakawa, S., Takamoto, K., Ishikawa, A., Ono, T., & Nishijo, H. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00292 · Cited by 40
The neuroimaging evidence of brain abnormalities in functional movement disorders
Sasikumar, S., & Strafella, A. P. (2021) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awab131 · Cited by 38
“This implies that individuals perceive their actions as involuntary, despite the distractibility and entertainability of movements on clinical exam.(26,27) It appears to be secondary to impaired sensorimotor feedback integration in FMDs, because of the reduced functional connectivity between the right temporo-parietal…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Haggard, P.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Haggard, Patrick
- ORCID
- Haggard, Patrick
- Venue
- Nature Reviews Neuroscience
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 934-946
- ISSN
- 1471-003X (ISSN-L)
- 1471-0048
- OpenAlex
- W2015447804
- Cited by
- 1,134
- References
- 111
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 53 · 2021: 59 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 82 · 2018: 53 · 2017: 74 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 107 · 2013: 77 · 2012: 101
- FWCI
- 4.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature reviews. Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Leverhulme Trust
- Royal Society
- Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-23-1571)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- volition, voluntary action, decision-making, pre-supplementary motor area, anterior prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, subjective experience, intention, self-control, personal responsibility, free will
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Brain, Brain Mapping, Decision Making, Humans, Models, Biological, Nerve Net, Neural Pathways, Neurosciences, Volition, Intention
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