How Natural Selection Can Create Both Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences and Networked Minds
Open accessAbstract
Biological competition is widely believed to result in the evolution of selfish preferences. The related concept of the 'homo economicus' is at the core of mainstream economics. However, there is also experimental and empirical evidence for other-regarding preferences. Here we present a theory that explains both, self-regarding and other-regarding preferences. Assuming conditions promoting non-cooperative behaviour, we demonstrate that intergenerational migration determines whether evolutionary competition results in a 'homo economicus' (showing self-regarding preferences) or a 'homo socialis' (having other-regarding preferences). Our model assumes spatially interacting agents playing prisoner's dilemmas, who inherit a trait determining 'friendliness', but mutations tend to undermine it. Reproduction is ruled by fitness-based selection without a cultural modification of reproduction rates. Our model calls for a complementary economic theory for 'networked minds' (the 'homo socialis') and lays the foundations for an evolutionarily grounded theory of other-regarding agents, explaining individually different utility functions as well as conditional cooperation.
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In a study on the evolution of self- and other-regarding preferences, Grund et al. considered cultural socialization, but did not take intergroup conflict into account.
“In a study on the evolution of self-and other-regarding preferences, Grund et al. (2013) considered cultural socialization, but did not take intergroup conflict into account.”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Grund et al., 2013
The Abstract (page unavailable) confirms that Grund et al. study the evolution of self- and other-regarding preferences. It mentions a cultural mechanism proposed by another researcher, but says their own model uses fitness-based reproduction without a cultural modification of reproduction rates; it does not establish that they considered cultural socialization in their model. The model description (Results > Model, page unavailable) describes individual interactions and reproduction, not intergroup conflict. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThese studies did not simultaneously combine the effect of violent intergroup conflict or competition with more or less efficient cultural transmission.
“These studies did not simultaneously combine the effect of violent intergroup conflict or competition with more or less efficient cultural transmission.”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Grund et al., 2013
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Sorted by citations
Globally networked risks and how to respond
Helbing, D. (2013) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature12047 · Cited by 1,281 · see citing works
Self-citationDurkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality
Windzio, M. (2026) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-026-09531-2
- Authors
- Grund, T., Waloszek, C., & Helbing, D.
- Affiliations
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Helbing, Dirk
- ORCID
- Helbing, Dirk
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2013-03-19
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1480-1480
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3601368
- OpenAlex
- W2166969007
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 9
- FWCI
- 28.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission (324247, 231200)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- self-regarding preferences, social preferences, homo economicus, intergenerational migration, evolution of cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, spatial interaction, fitness-based selection, conditional cooperation, evolutionary game theory
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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