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Cited by 3,475Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesLanguage and cultural evolution

The nature of human altruism

Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs·2003·Nature
DOI 10.1038/nature02043
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Abstract

Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.

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Crossref · 10.1038/nature02043

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • A few individuals who free ride in the first round trigger further free riding in subsequent rounds.

    “Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]

    The “Strong reciprocity and multilateral cooperation” section (p. 2) explains that free-riders contribute nothing, disappoint others’ initially optimistic expectations, and thereby contribute to declining cooperation over subsequent rounds. It describes “many total free-riders,” however, rather than the “few individuals” specified in the claim. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games, which shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.

    “The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]

    The Altruistic punishment section (p. 1) describes people punishing unfair offers in ultimatum games at a cost to themselves, and Strong reciprocity and multilateral cooperation (p. 3) discusses punishment of non-cooperators. But the paper’s discussion of trust games is in Altruistic rewarding (p. 2); it does not establish costly punishment in trust games. The inference about discrimination is the citing authors’ own conclusion. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]

  • Altruistic punishment is a prominent solution to the challenge of free riding.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]

  • When the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds.

    “Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. [25]Sober, E. & Wilson, D. S. Unto Others-the Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998).
  2. [34]Messick, D. & Brewer, M. in Review of Personality and Social Psychology (ed. Wheeler, L.) (Sage Publ., Beverly Hills, 1983).
  3. [37]Ledyard, J. in Handbook of Experimental Economics (eds Kagel, J. & Roth, A.) 111-194 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1995).
  4. [49]Thibaut, J. W. & Kelley, H. H. The Social Psychology of Groups (Wiley, New York, 1959).
  5. [58]Fehr, E. & Henrich, J. in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. Dahlem Workshop Report 90 (ed. Hammerstein, P.) 55-82 (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003).
  6. [59]Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. in The Adapted Mind (eds Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J.) (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1992).
  7. [60]Alexander, R. D. The Biology of Moral Systems (Aldine De Gruyter, New York, 1987).
  8. [67]Williams, G. D. Adaption and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1966).
  9. [70]Kelly, R. C. The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System (Univ. Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1985).
  10. [79]Otterbein, K. F. The Evolution of War: A Cross-Cultural Study (Human Relations Area Files Press, New Haven, 1985).

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Authors
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
Affiliations
University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Fehr, Ernst
ORCID
Venue
Nature
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2003-10
Volume
425
Issue
6960
Pages
785-791
ISSN
  • 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4687
DOI
10.1038/nature02043
OpenAlex
W1481402319
Cited by
3,475
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
FWCI
38.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
Keywords
selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
MeSH terms
Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward

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