Transaction attributes and software outsourcing success: an empirical investigation of transaction cost theory
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent years, an increasing amount of attention has been paid to information systems (IS) outsourcing by practitioners as well as academics. However, our understanding of the factors that affect outsourcing success is hardly complete. By adopting transaction cost theory (TCT) as the theoretical foundation, this study analyses the implications of transaction attributes on the consequences of customized software outsourcing practice. The research model includes three exogenous variables (contractor reputation, asset specificity and uncertainty) and two endogenous variables (post‐contractual opportunism and outsourcing success). The moderating effects of asset specificity on the relationships between uncertainty and the endogenous variables are also examined. Based on data collected in Taiwan, a research model is constructed to test the hypotheses derived from the theory. The empirical evidence is generally supportive of the theory but with some important exceptions. In particular, contractor reputation and uncertainty have the predicted effects on the contractor’s post‐contractual opportunism perceived by the client and outsourcing success, but asset specificity shows a negative effect on post‐contractual opportunism and a positive effect on outsourcing success, which are opposite to the typical predictions of TCT. Thus, in addition to the supportive findings of the theory, this study also raises an important research question regarding the effects of asset specificity on outsourcing for future research to explore.
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Citations
Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships
Ganesan, S. (1994) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299405800201 · Cited by 6,741 · cited 1×
“…three items as the extent to which the client felt that the contractor had developed a reputation for honesty, fairness and trustworthiness in dealing with its client firms (Ganesan, 1994; Dyer, 1996 on dedicated and human assets, which were thought to be most relevant for software out-sourcing.”
BackgroundThe Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“In addition to the three basic dimensions of transactions, transactor reputation has often been related to the transaction cost reasoning because of its ability to limit opportunism and to assure contractual performance (Klein & Leffler, 1981; Joskow, 1985; Klein, 1988).”
BackgroundThe impact of information systems on organizations and markets
Gurbaxani, V., & Whang, S. (1991) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/99977.99990 · Cited by 960 · cited 2×
“These costs include operational costs (e.g. search costs) and contractual costs (e.g. costs of writing, monitoring and enforcing a contract) (Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991).”
BackgroundThe Nature of the Firm: Influence
Coase, R. H. (1991) · The Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195065909.003.0005 · Cited by 107
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Ågerfalk, P. J., & Fitzgerald, B. (2008) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148845 · Cited by 441
Gao, L., & Waechter, K. A. (2017) · Information Systems Frontiers · doi:10.1007/s10796-015-9611-0 · Cited by 367
The economics of energy service contracts
Sorrell, S. (2007) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2005.12.009 · Cited by 303
The sociology of a market analysis tool: How industry analysts sort vendors and organize markets
Pollock, N., & Williams, R. (2009) · Information and Organization · doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2009.01.001 · Cited by 63
“They are what Williamson (1985) has described as ‘informational products’, meaning it is extremely hard to assess their properties since these cannot be readily disclosed by inspection (but are only verified in their organisational implementation and use) (Fincham et al. 1994; Wang 2002).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, E. T. G.
- Venue
- Information Systems Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-04
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 153-181
- ISSN
- 1350-1917 (ISSN-L)
- 1365-2575
- OpenAlex
- W2070415291
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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