Safety and security risk assessment in cyber-physical systems
Open accessAbstract
The term cyber physical systems (CPS) refers to a new generation of systems with integrated computational and physical capabilities through computation, communication, and control. In the past decades, related techniques for CPS have been well studied and developed, and are widely applied in the fields such as industrial automation, smart transportation, aerospace, environment monitoring, and smart grids. However, with the expansion of CPS complexity and the enhancement of the system openness, most of CPS become not only safety‐critical but also security‐critical since deeply involving both physical objects and computer networks. In the last decade, it is no longer rare to see safety incidents and security attacks happening in industries. Safety and security issues are increasingly converging on CPS, leading to new situations in which these two closely interdependent issues should now be considered together, rather than separately or in sequence. This paper reviews the existing approaches of risk assessment and management from the perspective of safety, security, and their integration. The comparisons of these approaches are summarised with their pros and cons before the technical gaps between the demand and the current situation of safety and security issues in CPS are identified.
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Distributed SCADA systems were confined to proprietary hardware, software, network protocols and peripheral devices supplied by the vendor.
“Similar to the monolithic SCADA, distributed SCADA systems were also confined to proprietary hardware, software, network protocols and peripheral devices that were supplied by the vendor [10,11].”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [10]
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Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review
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- Authors
- Lyu, X., Ding, Y., & Yang, S.
- Affiliations
- Southern University of Science and Technology (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Yang, Shuang‐Hua
- Venue
- IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications
- Published
- 2019-04-30
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 221-232
- ISSN
- 2398-3396 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2919523599
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 18.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IET Cyber-Physical Systems Theory & Applications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61873119)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Keywords
- cyber-physical systems, risk assessment, risk management, safety-critical systems, security-critical systems, safety and security integration, security attacks, smart grid, industrial automation
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