An analysis of the resident match
Abstract
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) was founded to bring fairness and order to a previously chaotic application process for internships. However, the current computer algorithm that generates the matches treats students and programs differently, in a way that favors programs whenever desires conflict. No statement from the NRMP makes this point clear, and workable alternatives to this biased algorithm have not been considered in public debate.A Controlled ExperimentA controlled way to demonstrate the favored role of programs is to switch the positions of students and programs in the algorithm and then compare the results of matching. Under . . .
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The NRMP Admissions Algorithm systematically favors hospital programs over medical students in cases of conflict.
“One charges that the Admissions Algorithm systematically favors hospital programs over medical students in cases of conflict [Graettinger and Peranson 1981b;Roth 1984;Sudarshan and Zisook 1981;Williams et al. 1981].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Williams et al. 1981
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The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219 · see citing works
Friedman, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (1996) · ACM Transactions on Information Systems · doi:10.1145/230538.230561 · Cited by 1,203 · see citing works
Role of Environmental Contamination in the Transmission of Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococci
Weber, D. J., & Rutala, W. A. (1997) · Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology · doi:10.2307/30141222 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Thomas, H., & Williams, N. F. (2018) · Selecta Mathematica · doi:10.1007/s00029-018-0408-0 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
National resident matching program
(1981) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejm198108273050923 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Stable solutions vs. multiplicative utility solutions for the assignment problem
Mehrez, A., Yuan, Y., & Gafni, A. (1988) · Operations Research Letters · doi:10.1016/0167-6377(88)90079-x · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Complexity and algorithms in matching problems under preferences
Cseh, Á. (2016) · ERef Bayreuth (University of Bayreuth) · doi:10.14279/depositonce-5076 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The Dynamic History of the Ophthalmology Residency Matching Program
Blodi, C. F., & Krueger, R. R. (2022) · Journal of Academic Ophthalmology · doi:10.1055/s-0041-1741468 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
MatchMaker: A DSL for Game-Theoretic Matching
Kumar, P., & Erwig, M. (2023) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38938-2_4
- Authors
- Williams, K. J., Werth, V. P., & Wolff, J. A.
- Venue
- New England Journal of Medicine
- Publisher
- Massachusetts Medical Society
- Published
- 1981-05-07
- Volume
- 304
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 1165-1166
- ISSN
- 0028-4793 (ISSN-L)
- 1533-4406
- OpenAlex
- W2031232003
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 3.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- New England Journal of Medicine (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Medical Education and Admissions
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Diversity and Career in Medicine
- Keywords
- National Resident Matching Program, algorithmic fairness, internships, controlled experiments
- MeSH terms
- Workforce, Career Choice, Computers, Hospitals, Teaching, Internship and Residency, Logic, Personnel Selection, United States
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