New Essays on Belief
Abstract
Belief is a fundamental concept within many branches of contemporary philosophy and an important subject in its own right. This volume comprises 11 original essays on belief written by a range of the
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This attitude may still fall short of full belief, understood as a relatively stable, normally evidence-responsive, and involuntary state or disposition to take p to be true across contexts and judgment and decision-making instances.
“Yet, this attitude may still fall short of full belief, understood as a relatively stable, normallyfoot_6 evidenceresponsive, and involuntary state or disposition to take p to be true across contexts and judgment and decision-making instances (Nottelmann, 2013).”
From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Nottelmann, 2013
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Johnson, G. M. (2020) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa011 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
The Ethics of Delusional Belief
Bortolotti, L., & Miyazono, K. (2015) · Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9739-9 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Implicit racial bias and epistemic pessimism
Lassiter, C., & Ballantyne, N. (2017) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1265103 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND
Audi, R. (2019) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.53 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Chatting with bots: AI, speech acts, and the edge of assertion
Williams, I., & Bayne, T. (2024) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2434874 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?
Coleman, T. J., III, Jong, J., & van Mulukom, V. (2018) · Contemporary Pragmatism · doi:10.1163/18758185-01503001 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Koziolek, N. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9614-9 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
What are delusions? Examining the typology problem
López‐Silva, P., de Prado‐Gordillo, M. N., & Castro, V. F. (2024) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1674 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Brons, L. L. (2019) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p19 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent?
Peters, U. (2026) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-026-09795-8
Chaudhuri, P. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009240970.014
Belief and Experience in Antiquity
Anderson, R., & Chaudhuri, P. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009240970.010
- Authors
- Nottelmann, N.
- Affiliations
- University of Southern Denmark (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Nikolaj Nottelmann
- ORCID
- Nikolaj Nottelmann
- Venue
- Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Published
- 2013
- OpenAlex
- W419796764
- Cited by
- 12
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 0.46
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks (publishedVersion)
- University of Southern Denmark Research Portal (University of Southern Denmark) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- belief, epistemology of belief, philosophy of mind, mental states, propositional attitudes
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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