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Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans

Dionne, Georges, Rothschild, Casey·2014·The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
DOI 10.1057/grir.2014.15
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Research works printed but not linked: 66

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Metadata

Authors
Dionne, G., & Rothschild, C.
Venue
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2014-09
Volume
39
Issue
2
Pages
184-221
ISSN
  • 1554-964X
  • 1554-9658
DOI
10.1057/grir.2014.15
Cited by
52
References
0
Language
en
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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