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A clarification of the conditions under which Large language Models could be conscious

Open access
Overgaard, Morten, Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger · 2024 · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 10 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

With incredible speed Large Language Models (LLMs) are reshaping many aspects of society. This has been met with unease by the public, and public discourse is rife with questions about whether LLMs are or might be conscious. Because there is widespread disagreement about consciousness among scientists, any concrete answers that could be offered the public would be contentious. This paper offers the next best thing: charting the possibility of consciousness in LLMs. So, while it is too early to judge concerning the possibility of LLM consciousness, our charting of the possibility space for this may serve as a temporary guide for theorizing about it.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This comment argues that the question of whether Large Language Models could be conscious is currently unanswerable, because consciousness science lacks both an empirical method to detect consciousness and theoretical consensus on what consciousness is. The authors offer a theory-neutral two-by-two matrix mapping the possibility space for LLM consciousness along biological–functional and simple–complex dimensions.

Key findings

  • No empirical method currently exists to determine whether an LLM is conscious, and any theoretical conclusion rests on an assumption or becomes circular; the authors state it is "premature to draw any conclusions about the possibility of LLM consciousness."
  • The proposed matrix crosses two dimensions — consciousness realized by biological structures vs. functions/computations, and by simple/low-level vs. complex/higher-level phenomena — yielding four positions: if functional and simple, "LLMs Likely are/will be conscious"; if functional and complex, "LLMs will possibly be conscious"; if biological-structural (either simple or complex), "LLMs cannot be conscious."
  • Under biological-structural views, LLMs will never be conscious because they are not instantiated in the "right" material; a biologically instantiated LLM would be conscious in virtue of its material, not in virtue of being an LLM.
  • Under functional views, LLMs can be conscious if they run the "right" software; if consciousness requires only very simple functions, "we may have created consciousness in artificial systems long before LLMs appeared."

Methods

Not stated in the paper (this is a conceptual comment, not an empirical study). The authors' approach is a theory-neutral conceptual mapping of the theoretical landscape into a two-by-two matrix, followed by brief consideration of each dimension (biological–functional; simple–complex) and of example theories (e.g., integrated information theory, higher-order thought theory).

Limitations

The authors state that the matrix is "still underdetermined" and does not make answering the question simple; they note a "difficult and long journey ahead" and that it may be possible to rule out some matrix positions only if future data is serendipitous. They also state that as long as theories rooted in all four positions can explain all or most available scientific data, drawing conclusions about LLM consciousness "will be an unscientific enterprise." Evident from the text: the paper offers no empirical data or novel experiments, and its matrix is a conceptual organizing device rather than a testable prediction.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1057/s41599-024-03553-w

Cites

22 of 22 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

4 Valid · 4 Not valid · 3 Not checked · 9 Own results and interpretations

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 4

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Overgaard, M., & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A.
Affiliations
  • Aarhus University (DK)
  • Lund University (SE)
Venue
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Published
2024-08-12
Volume
11
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2055-1045 (ISSN-L)
  • 2662-9992
OpenAlex
W4401519491
Cited by
12
References
18
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 3
FWCI
4.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
  • Scopus (Elsevier) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
large language models, artificial consciousness, possibility space, philosophy of mind, AI ethics

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How to cite

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A clarification of the conditions under which Large language Models could be conscious. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1057/s41599-024-03553-w
The paper
Overgaard, M., & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2024). A clarification of the conditions under which Large language Models could be conscious. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03553-w

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.