Minds, brains, and programs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 85 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4. “Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
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“This impacts the interpretation of our findings on trust, ethics and ownership (Section 8), as the discrepancy between how AI functions (Section 6) and how users perceive its intentionality [17, 145] influences responsibility alignment and bias perception [148, 176] in ways our current framework only partially addresses.”
From Exploring Collaboration Patterns and Strategies in Human-AI Co-creation through the Lens of Agency: A Scoping Review of the Top-tier HCI Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [145]
In the citing paper
“Searle had argued that performing syntactic operations by manipulating symbols does not constitute a plausible form of understanding, and hence, that artificial systems cannot reproduce the characteristics of brains nor exhibit their intentionality.”
From Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1980
In the citing paper
“Searle had argued that performing syntactic operations by manipulating symbols does not constitute a plausible form of understanding, and hence, that artificial systems cannot reproduce the characteristics of brains nor exhibit their intentionality.”
From Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1980
In the citing paper
“This implies that a computer's ability to transition between states by executing formal rules does not demonstrate that it can generate meaningful representations.”
From Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1980
In the citing paper
“Whether or not Searle's thought experiment applies directly to them, the sheer complexity of their operations weakens the force of the assumption that machines have "only syntax but no semantics" (Searle, 1980: 422).”
From Are Large Language Models Intentional? The Limits of Referential Grounding (2026) · cites this paper as Searle, 1980: 422
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Cited by
Barsalou, L. W. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002149 · Cited by 6,887
Barsalou, L. W. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 · Cited by 5,936
Dwivedi, Y. K., Hughes, L., Ismagilova, E., Aarts, G., Coombs, C., Crick, T., Duan, Y., Dwivedi, R., Edwards, J., Eirug, A., et al. (2021) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2019.08.002 · Cited by 4,611
“For the “elderly” AI generation, AI has nothing to do with what is now portrayed as AI, as “true” good ol’ fashioned AI (GOFAI) is based on different techniques and methodologies; also has different purposes (for these and other debates on weak/strong AI see Brooks, 2002; Pickering, 2009; Searle, 1980).”
Dwivedi, Y. K., Kshetri, N., Hughes, L., Slade, E. L., Jeyaraj, A., Kar, A. K., Baabdullah, A. M., Koohang, A., Raghavan, V., Ahuja, M., et al. (2023) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2023.102642 · Cited by 4,584
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Jackendoff, R. (2002) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198270126.001.0001 · Cited by 3,244
Metadata
- Authors
- Searle, J. R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Searle, John R.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1980-09
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 417-424
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2251410821
- Cited by
- 6,954
- References
- 86
- Citations by year
- 2026: 469 · 2025: 499 · 2024: 444 · 2023: 376 · 2022: 292 · 2021: 307 · 2020: 316 · 2019: 402 · 2018: 244 · 2017: 167 · 2016: 132 · 2015: 146 · 2014: 152 · 2013: 147 · 2012: 147
- FWCI
- 89.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- intentionality, computer program, artificial general intelligence, machine thinking, philosophy of mind, computational theory of mind
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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