CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 169Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolution and Genetic DynamicsMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models

The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Open access
Bergstrom, Carl T., Lachmann, Michael·2003·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.0134966100PMC PMC141041
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Mutualisms provide benefits to those who participate in them. As a mutualism evolves, how will these benefits come to be allocated among the participants? We approach this question by using evolutionary game theory and explore the ways in which the coevolutionary process determines the allocation of benefits in mutualistic interactions. Motivated by the Red Queen theory, which states that coevolutionary processes favor rapid rates of evolution, we pay particular attention to the role of evolutionary rates in the establishment of mutualism and the partitioning of benefits among mutualist partners. We find that, contrary to the Red Queen, in mutualism evolution the slowly evolving species is likely to gain a disproportionate share of the benefits. Moreover, population structure serves to magnify the advantage to the slower species.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0134966100

Cites

49 of 49 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Although experts disagree on the timescales and the degree of risk involved, the potential of superhuman artificial general intelligence poses a possible existential threat to the human species.

    “Although experts disagree on the timescales and the degree of risk involved, the potential of superhuman artificial general intelligence poses a possible existential threat to the human species 192 .”

    From Machine culture (2023) · cites this paper as [192]

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. [1]Côté I M. Oceanogr Marine Biol. 2000;38:311–355. [Google Scholar]
  2. [2]Bshary R, Schäffer D. Anim Behav. 2002;63:557–564. [Google Scholar]
  3. [3]Bshary R, Grutter A S. Anim Behav. 2002;63:547–555. [Google Scholar]
  4. [4]Grutter A. Nature. 1999;398:672–673. [Google Scholar]
  5. [6]Pierce N E, Easteal S. J Anim Ecol. 1986;55:451–462. [Google Scholar]
  6. [7]Baylis M, Pierce N E. Physiol Entomol. 1992;17:107–114. [Google Scholar]
  7. [8]Pierce N E, Kitching R L, Buckley R C, Taylor M F J, Benbow K. Behav Ecol Sociobiol. 1987;21:237–248. [Google Scholar]
  8. [13]Van Valen L. Evol Theor. 1973;1:1–30. [Google Scholar]
  9. [19]Mesterton-Gibbons M, Dugatkin L E. Q Rev Biol. 1992;67:267–281. [Google Scholar]
  10. [22]Noë R, Hammerstein P. Behav Ecol Sociobiol. 1994;35:1–11. [Google Scholar]
  11. [24]Connor R C. Anim Behav. 1986;34:1562–1584. [Google Scholar]
  12. [25]Connor R C. Biol Rev. 1995;70:427–457. [Google Scholar]
  13. [28]Rubinstein A. Econometrica. 1982;50:97–109. [Google Scholar]
  14. [30]Nash J F. Econometrica. 1950;18:155–162. [Google Scholar]
  15. [33]Maynard Smith J. Nature. 1964;201:1145–1147. [Google Scholar]
  16. [35]Bergstrom T C. J Econ Perspect. 2002;16:67–88. [Google Scholar]

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M.
Affiliations
University of Washington (US)
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2003-01-13
Volume
100
Issue
2
Pages
593-598
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.0134966100
PMC
PMC141041
OpenAlex
W2169372256
Cited by
169
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 7
FWCI
27.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • ResearchWorks at the University of Washington (University of Washington) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Santa Fe Institute
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
Keywords
mutualism, coevolution, benefit distribution, Red Queen hypothesis, evolutionary rates, evolutionary game theory, population structure
MeSH terms
Animals, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Population Dynamics

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review