Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: As humans, we think not only about what is, but also what could be. These representations of alternative possibilities support many important cognitive functions, such as predicting others’ future actions, assigning responsibility for past events, and making moral judgments. We perform many of these tasks quickly and effortlessly, which suggests access to an implicit, default assumption about what is possible. What are the default features of the possibilities that we consider? Remarkably, we find a default bias toward representing immoral or irrational actions as being impossible. Although this bias is diminished upon deliberative reflection, it is the default judgments that appear to support higher-level cognition.
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Cites
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Cited by
Cushman, F. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001730 · Cited by 260
Self-citationUncertainty about the impact of social decisions increases prosocial behaviour
Kappes, A., Nussberger, A.-M., Faber, N. S., Kahane, G., Savulescu, J., & Crockett, M. J. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0372-x · Cited by 79
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The paucity of morality in everyday talk
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Metadata
- Authors
- Phillips, J., & Cushman, F.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2017-04-18
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 18
- Pages
- 4649-4654
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2605772560
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 6.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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