The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Evolving populations are constantly subjected to changing environmental conditions. The environment can determine how the expression of traits affects the individuals possessing them. Just as important, however, is the fact that the expression of traits can also alter the environment. We model this phenomenon by introducing game transitions into classical models of evolutionary dynamics. Interacting individuals receive payoffs from the games that they play, and these games can change based on past actions. We find that game transitions can significantly reduce the critical benefit-to-cost threshold for cooperation to evolve in social dilemmas. This result improves our understanding of when cooperators can thrive in nature, even when classical results predict a high critical threshold.
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Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Self-citationClasses of small-world networks
Amaral, L. A. N., Scala, A., Barthélémy, M., & Stanley, H. E. (2000) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.200327197 · Cited by 3,051
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208
Self-citationSigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570 · cited 1×
“T prosocial act of bearing a cost to provide another individual with a benefit, which is often referred to as “cooperation” (1), reduces the survival advantage of the donor and fosters that of the recipient.”
Strategy selection in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035 · Cited by 281 · cited 1×
“(33) says that there exists σ for which cooperators are favored over defectors if and only if σR +S >T +σP .”
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Cited by
Xia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002 · Cited by 339
Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions
Su, Q., Allen, B., & Plotkin, J. B. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2113468118 · Cited by 104
Self-citationSocial goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2 · Cited by 94
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Su, Q., McAvoy, A., Wang, L., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2019-11-26
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 51
- Pages
- 25398-25404
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2991401196
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 29.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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