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Cited by 281Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolution and Genetic DynamicsGame Theory and Applications

Strategy selection in structured populations

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Tarnita, Corina E., Ohtsuki, Hisashi, Antal, Tibor, Fu, Feng, Nowak, Martin A.·2009·Journal of Theoretical Biology
DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035PMC PMC2710410
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Abstract

Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd). We study a mutation and selection process. For weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if sigma a+b>c+sigma d. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, sigma. We present the values of sigma for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs, games in phenotype space and games on sets. We give a proof for the existence of such a sigma, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between sigma and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, sigma, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Treating communities individually and independently may lead to erroneous conclusions about behavioral dynamics in the population as a whole.

    “Broadly speaking, our work highlights the significance of integrating multiple communities into one system, since treating communities individually and independently may lead to erroneous conclusions about behavioral dynamics in the population as a whole [53].”

    From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [53]

    The Conclusion (page unavailable) says population structure affects which strategy is selected, supporting the general importance of modeling interactions across a population. But the paper does not establish that analyzing communities individually and independently leads to erroneous conclusions about the population as a whole. (LLM, conf=0.77)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Fudenberg D Tirole J Game Theory 1991 MIT Press Cambridge, MA
  2. Nowak MA Evolutionary Dynamics 2006a Harvard University Press

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Authors
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Tokyo Institute of Technology (JP)
Corresponding author
Tarnita, Corina E.
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2009-08
Volume
259
Issue
3
Pages
570-581
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035
PMC
PMC2710410
OpenAlex
W2103207495
Cited by
281
References
128
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 16
FWCI
45.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
structured populations, evolutionary game theory, frequency-dependent selection, weak selection, evolution of cooperation, coordination games, graph games, phenotype space, sets, mutation and selection, well-mixed populations
MeSH terms
Animals, Computer Simulation, Game Theory, Models, Genetic, Mutation, Population Density, Population Dynamics, Selection, Genetic

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