A comparison of naïve and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic predictions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We use an extensive form two-person game as the basis for two experiments designed to compare the behavior of two groups of subjects with each other and with the subgame perfect theoretical prediction in an anonymous interaction protocol. The two subject groups are undergraduates and advanced graduate students, the latter having studied economics and game theory. There is no difference in their choice behavior, and both groups depart substantially from game theoretic predictions. We also compare a subsample of the same graduate students with a typical undergraduate sample in an asset trading environment in which inexperienced undergraduates invariably produce substantial departures from the rational expectations prediction. In this way, we examine how robust are the results across two distinct anonymous interactive environments. In the constant sum trading game, the graduate students closely track the predictions of rational theory. Our interpretation is that the graduate student subjects' departure from subgame perfection to achieve cooperative outcomes in the two-person bargaining game is a consequence of a deliberate strategy and is not the result of error or inadequate learning.
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Citations
Cites
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Self-citation
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McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., & Trouard, T. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.211415698 · Cited by 984
Self-citationConstructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 960
Self-citationUsing the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game
Gunnthorsdottir, A., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. (2002) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(01)00067-8 · Cited by 428
Self-citationKrueger, F., McCabe, K., Moll, J., Kriegeskorte, N., Zahn, R., Strenziok, M., Heinecke, A., & Grafman, J. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0710103104 · Cited by 388
Self-citationMultiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0762 · Cited by 158
Metadata
- Authors
- McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2000-03-21
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3777-3781
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2026617951
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 47.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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