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Cited by 14Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural dynamics and brain functionEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The brain and its states

Open access
Brown, Richard·2012·Advances in Consciousness Research
DOI 10.1075/aicr.88.10bro
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Abstract

In recent times we have seen an explosion in the amount of attention paid to the conscious brain from scientists and philosophers alike. One message that has emerged loud and clear from scientific work is that the brain is a dynamical system whose operations unfold in time. Any theory of consciousness that is going to be physically realistic must take account of the intrinsic nature of neurons and brain activity. At the same time a long discussion on consciousness among philosophers has resulted in our distinguishing several kinds of consciousness. So when we ask where the place of consciousness is in nature we may mean several different things. In this chapter I will argue that it is plausible that all of the kinds of consciousness turn out to be nothing but patterns of synchronized neural activity in various frequencies against a dynamically changing chemical background.

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  • In cases like Charles Bonnet Syndrome and inattentional inflation, there is more that is phenomenally experienced than can be accounted for in terms of first-order representations.

    “Specifically, these cases suggest that there is more that is phenomenally experienced than can be accounted for in terms of first-order representations.”

    From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [96]

    Section 6 argues that the unattended-stimulus experiments suggest differences in conscious phenomenology without differences in first-order representations. But it says the Charles Bonnet syndrome case rules out only a particular account of first-order representations; representations in other brain areas remain possible. The claim therefore overextends what the paper says about that case. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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  • To account for the possibility of higher-order awareness without a first-order representation, a revised HOT that does not depend on a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory representation has been proposed.

    “To account for this limitation a version that does not depend on a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory representation has been proposed (96,124).”

    From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [96]

  • HOROR theory is supported by empirical cases where phenomenal consciousness plausibly outstrips first-order representations.

    “HOROR theory is supported by empirical cases where phenomenal consciousness plausibly outstrips first-order representations.”

    From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [96]

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Cited by 14

Research works printed but not linked: 31

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Authors
Brown, R.
Affiliations
LaGuardia Community College (US)
Corresponding author
Brown, Richard
ORCID
Brown, Richard
Venue
Advances in Consciousness Research
Publisher
John Benjamins Publishing Company
Published
2012-06-25
Pages
211-230
ISSN
1381-589X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1075/aicr.88.10bro
OpenAlex
W103149079
Cited by
14
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
5.22
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Advances in consciousness research (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
consciousness, brain dynamics, neuronal synchronization, neural oscillations, dynamical systems, brain states

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