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Cited by 697Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesCognitive Science and Education Research

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Open access
LeDoux, Joseph E., Brown, Richard·2017·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.1619316114PMC PMC5347624
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Abstract

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper proposes a higher-order account of emotional consciousness, arguing that feelings are not produced by dedicated subcortical emotion circuits but by the same cortical cognitive networks that support other conscious experiences. Subcortical defensive survival circuits, such as amygdala-centered circuits, supply nonconscious inputs that shape but do not constitute emotional feelings.

Key findings

  • Conscious emotional experiences, including fear, are proposed to arise from higher-order representations in a cortical general network of cognition involving lateral and medial prefrontal, posterior parietal, and insular cortex; subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for feelings.
  • The theory modifies higher-order thought into HOROR and self-HOROR: a nonconscious higher-order representation is re-represented, and when self-information is included, an autonoetic, self-aware emotional experience results. The authors argue that self-involvement is necessary for emotion.
  • Evidence cited includes weak correlations between fear feelings and behavioral/physiological threat responses; subliminal threat studies showing amygdala activation and bodily responses without reported fear; blindsight patients showing threat responses without fear; and amygdala damage disrupting threat responses but not fear experience.
  • The paper notes that English has over three dozen words for fear-related experiences, and proposes that emotion schemas and language shape emotional experience. It also claims emotions cannot be unconscious and that one cannot be mistaken about which emotion one is feeling.

Methods

  • Theoretical/conceptual paper: develops and defends a modified higher-order theory of consciousness and extends it to emotion, using fear as the primary illustrative case.
  • Synthesizes prior philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience findings on consciousness, amygdala function, defensive survival circuits, memory, self, and emotion; no new experimental data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
  • Main analysis is argumentative: contrasts first-order versus higher-order theories, reviews evidence for nonconscious threat processing, and derives predictions, such as that damage to first-order subcortical circuits should mute but not eliminate fear.

Limitations

  • The authors state that their conclusions may not apply equally to all emotions and that fear is used as a starting point; they also state that whether fear experiences differ quantitatively or qualitatively when amygdala inputs are absent is unknown.
  • The paper is theoretical and relies on interpretation of existing evidence; it does not directly test HOTEC or self-HOROR, and the text acknowledges that consciousness in animals cannot be measured directly.
  • The text makes evident that the account depends on contested claims about nonconscious working memory and introspection, and that the evidence for subcortical phenomenal feelings is considered unconvincing by the authors rather than definitively settled.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1619316114

Cites

214 of 214 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

20 of 86 cited sources checked · 7 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation
    § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

    Damage to the amygdala disrupts the ability of animals and people to respond to threats behaviorally and physiologically.

    “A great deal of research has shown that damage to the amygdala disrupts the ability of animals and people to respond to threats behaviorally and physiologically (13-15, 17, 19, 20).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [13] 13. Davis M (1992) The role of the amygdala in conditioned fear. The Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory, and Mental Dysfunction, ed Aggleton JP (Wiley-Liss, New York), pp 255-306.
    • cites [14] 14. Fanselow MS, Poulos AM (2005) The neuroscience of mammalian associative learn- ing. Annu Rev Psychol 56:207-234. source
    • cites [15] 15. Maren S (2005) Synaptic mechanisms of associative memory in the amygdala. Neuron 47(6):783-786. source
    • cites [17] 17. Adolphs R (2013) The biology of fear. Curr Biol 23(2):R79-R93. source

      In “Fear and the Amygdala” (page not available), the paper describes the amygdala as regulating fear responses, including freezing and cortical arousal, and says its role in fear processing is conserved across humans and other animals. It also implicates the human amygdala in the expression of fear. These passages support its role in behavioral and physiological responses, but do not establish that damage disrupts both kinds of threat response in animals and people. (LLM, conf=0.79)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [19] 19. Gross CT, Canteras NS (2012) The many paths to fear. Nat Rev Neurosci 13(9): 651-658. source
  • Premisecitation

    The GNC have been implicated in attention, working memory, and metacognition.

    “These GNC have been implicated in attention, working memory, and metacognition (72-75), which-as discussed-are viewed as essential to consciousness in most cognitive theories.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [72] 72. Miller EK, Cohen JD (2001) An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annu Rev Neurosci 24:167-202. source
    • cites [73] 73. Goldman-Rakic PS (1999) Working memory, neural basis. MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds Wilson RA, Keil FC (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [74] 74. Fuster JM (2003) Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [75] 75. Fleming SM, Huijgen J, Dolan RJ (2012) Prefrontal contributions to metacognition in perceptual decision making. J Neurosci 32(18):6117-6125. source

      The Introduction reports that prefrontal regions are implicated in metacognitive accuracy, and the Results identify right rostrolateral prefrontal activity associated with metacognitive reports. The cited paper does not establish the sentence’s additional claims about attention or working memory. Section labels are available in our copy, but page numbers are not. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    Cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness.

    “However, because not all cognitive processing leads to conscious experience (52, 58-62), cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source
    • cites [58] 58. Kihlstrom JF (1987) The cognitive unconscious. Science 237(4821):1445-1452. source
    • cites [59] 59. Jacobs C, Silvanto J (2015) How is working memory content consciously experienced? The 'conscious copy' model of WM introspection. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 55:510-519. source
    • cites [60] 60. Jacob J, Jacobs C, Silvanto J (2015) Attention, working memory, and phenomenal experience of WM content: memory levels determined by different types of top- down modulation. Front Psychol 6:1603. source
    • cites [61] 61. Bergström F, Eriksson J (2014) Maintenance of non-consciously presented in- formation engages the prefrontal cortex. Front Hum Neurosci 8:938. source
    • cites [62] 62. Kiefer M (2012) Executive control over unconscious cognition: Attentional sensiti- zation of unconscious information processing. Front Hum Neurosci 6:61. source
  • Premisecitation

    Nonconscious processing within working memory is more robust than previously observed.

    “the plausibility of our hypothesis is supported by results from recent studies indicating that nonconscious processing within working memory is more robust than previously observed (79, 101, 108, 127)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [79] 79. Del Cul A, Dehaene S, Reyes P, Bravo E, Slachevsky A (2009) Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain 132(Pt 9):2531-2540. source
    • cites [101] 101. Baddeley A (2000) The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends Cogn Sci 4(11):417-423. 104. Schacter DL (1989) On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience. Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving, eds Roediger HLI, Craik FIM (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ), pp 355-389. 105. Prinz JJ (2012) The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 106. source
    • cites [108] 108. Ergorul C, Eichenbaum H (2004) The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when". Learn Mem 11(4):397-405. 141. Block N (2009) Comparing the major theories of consciousness. The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, ed Gazzaniga MS (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 4th Ed, pp 1111-1122. 142. source

      The Discussion addresses hippocampal and parahippocampal contributions to object memory, not nonconscious processing within working memory. Searches for that phrase and for implicit or unconscious working-memory processing found no passage assessing whether such processing is more robust than previously observed. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Panksepp's emotion theory can be reconceived as a first-order emotion theory.

    “Panksepp's (5, 114) emotion theory described above can be reconceived as a first-order emotion theory.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [5] 5. Panksepp J (1998) Affective Neuroscience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). source
    • cites [114] 114. Sui J, Humphreys GW (2015) The integrative self: How self-reference integrates perception and memory. Trends Cogn Sci 19(12):719-728. 157. Frith U, Happé F (1999) Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic? Mind Lang 14(1):82-89. 158. Frith CD (2012) The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 367(1599):2213-2223. 159. source

      The paper’s Conclusion discusses how self-reference integrates perception and memory, not Panksepp’s emotion theory. Searches for “Panksepp” and “first-order emotion theory” found no passage in our copy addressing the claimed reconception. The available passages have no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims. 22
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 20

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Defensive survival circuits are evolutionarily wired to detect and respond to innate threats and to respond to novel threats that have been learned about in the past.

    “Defensive survival circuits are evolutionarily wired to detect and respond to innate threats and to respond to novel threats that have been learned about in the past (35,36).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [35] 35. LeDoux JE (2014) Coming to terms with fear. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 111(8): 2871-2878. source
    • cites [36] 36. LeDoux J (2012) Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 73(4):653-676. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Damage to the amygdala interferes with bodily responses to threats but does not interfere with conscious experience of emotions such as fear.

    “Fourth, although damage to the amygdala interferes with bodily responses to threats, it does not interfere with conscious experience of emotions such as fear (43,44).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [43] 43. Feinstein JS, et al. (2013) Fear and panic in humans with bilateral amygdala damage. Nat Neurosci 16(3):270-272. source

      The paper (section labeled Abstract; page not available) reports deficient anticipatory heart-rate and skin-conductance responses in patients with amygdala lesions, while those patients consciously experienced fear and panic during CO2 inhalation. The claim is too broad: the paper also reports a marked absence of fear in response to external threats and heightened physiological responses after CO2 inhalation. (LLM, conf=0.90)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [44] 44. Anderson AK, Phelps EA (2002) Is the human amygdala critical for the subjective experience of emotion? Evidence of intact dispositional affect in patients with amygdala lesions. J Cogn Neurosci 14(5):709-720. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In blindsight patients, when the stimulus is in the part of space they can see and report on, cortical areas of the GNC are activated, but when it is in the blind area these areas are not activated.

    “When the stimulus is in the part of space they can see and report on, cortical areas of the GNC are activated, but when it is in the blind area these areas are not activated (65,77).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [65] 65. Lau HC, Passingham RE (2006) Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103(49):18763-18768. source

      The Discussion (page not provided) reports significant activation in Brodmann’s area 46 when stimuli were presented to one blindsight subject’s unimpaired field, and no significant activation for slow, unseen stimuli in his blind field. But it also reports significant area 46 activation for faster stimuli in that blind field when he reported awareness. The evidence concerns one cortical area in one subject, not cortical areas generally across blindsight patients. (LLM, conf=0.88)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [77] 77. Persaud N, et al. (2011) Awareness-related activity in prefrontal and parietal cortices in blindsight reflects more than superior visual performance. Neuroimage 58(2): 605-611. source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The nonconscious HOR and the HOROR that instantiates awareness of ourselves as being in the HOR both occur within working memory.

    “Our hypothesis is that the nonconscious HOR, and the HOROR that instantiates the awareness of ourselves as being in the HOR, both occur within working memory.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [79] 79. Del Cul A, Dehaene S, Reyes P, Bravo E, Slachevsky A (2009) Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain 132(Pt 9):2531-2540. source
    • cites [101] 101. Baddeley A (2000) The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends Cogn Sci 4(11):417-423. 104. Schacter DL (1989) On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience. Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving, eds Roediger HLI, Craik FIM (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ), pp 355-389. 105. Prinz JJ (2012) The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 106. source
    • cites [108] 108. Ergorul C, Eichenbaum H (2004) The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when". Learn Mem 11(4):397-405. 141. Block N (2009) Comparing the major theories of consciousness. The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, ed Gazzaniga MS (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 4th Ed, pp 1111-1122. 142. source

      The paper’s Discussion addresses hippocampal memory for episodes and stimulus familiarity, while its introductory passage discusses the difficulty of assessing subjective consciousness in animals. Neither addresses nonconscious HORs, HORORs, or whether they occur in working memory (searched those terms and awareness in working memory). The citing sentence also presents this as the citing authors’ own hypothesis. (LLM, conf=0.78)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Findings from patients with autonomic failure and alexithymia primarily show quantitative changes in subjective experience, more consistent with a modulatory role of body feedback.

    “Findings from patients with autonomic failure and alexithymia (119), although superficially supportive, primarily show quantitative changes in subjective experience, more consistent with a modulatory role of body feedback.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [119] 119. Schiller D, Delgado MR (2010) Overlapping neural systems mediating extinction, reversal and regulation of fear. Trends Cogn Sci 14(6):268-276. 169. Rolls ET (2008) Emotion, higher-order syntactic thoughts, and consciousness. Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele Lectures, eds Weiskrantz L, Davies M (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp 131-167. 170. Berridge KC, Kringelbach ML (2011) Building a neuroscience of pleasure and well- being. Psychol Well Being 1(1):1-3. 171. Schachter S (1975) Cognition and centralist-peripheralist controversies in motivation and emotion. Handbook of Psychobiology, ed source

      The Regulation of fear section discusses cognitive strategies and changes in emotional responses, while the Fear reversal section mentions physiological measures of fear. Neither addresses patients with autonomic failure or alexithymia, quantitative changes in their subjective experience, or a modulatory role for body feedback. Searches for those terms found no relevant passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.75)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    To account for the possibility of higher-order awareness without a first-order representation, a revised HOT that does not depend on a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory representation has been proposed.

    “To account for this limitation a version that does not depend on a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory representation has been proposed (96,124).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [96] 96. Brown R (2012) The brain and its states. Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, eds Edelman S, Fekete T, Zach N (John Benjamins, Philadelphia), pp 211-238. source
    • cites [124] 124. Forsyth JP, Eifert GH (1996) The language of feeling and the feeling of anxiety: Contributions of the behaviorisms toward understanding the function-altering ef- fects of language. Psychol Rec 46:607-649. 182. Schacter DL, Buckner RL, Koutstaal W (1998) Memory, consciousness and neuro- imaging. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 353(1377):1861-1878. 183. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

    Subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings; they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences.

    “Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences.”
    • Also stated in: § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness · plain
      “Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

    Both emotional and perceptual conscious experiences involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lower-order information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC).

    “Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The most consistently implicated cortical areas in conscious visual experience are lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, with activations also in parietal and insular cortex.

    “Most consistently implicated are various areas of the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, but activations are also reported in the parietal cortex and insular cortex (Fig. 2).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Defensive survival circuits indirectly contribute to the feeling of fear, but their activity does not constitute fear.

    “As viewed here, defensive survival circuits indirectly contribute to the feeling of fear, but their activity does not constitute fear.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Subliminal stimulus presentation methods show that visual threats activate the amygdala and elicit body responses despite participants denying seeing the stimulus.

    “Second, studies using subliminal stimulus presentation methods (e.g., backward masking or continuous flash suppression) to prevent or reduce awareness of visual stimuli show that visual threats activate the amygdala and elicit body responses despite the fact that participants deny seeing the stimulus (21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [21] 21. Phelps EA (2006) Emotion and cognition: Insights from studies of the human amygdala. Annu Rev Psychol 57:27-53. source
    • cites [22] 22. Dolan RJ, Vuilleumier P (2003) Amygdala automaticity in emotional processing. Ann N Y Acad Sci 985:348-355. source
    • cites [23] 23. Taylor JM, Whalen PJ (2015) Neuroimaging and anxiety: The neural substrates of pathological and non-pathological anxiety. Curr Psychiatry Rep 17(6):49. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    When self-reports of a visual stimulus are compromised by subliminal stimulation, visual cortex areas are active, but when participants can consciously report seeing the stimulus, additional cortical areas become active.

    “For example, when self-reports of the stimulus are compromised by using subliminal stimulation procedures, such as masking (63), areas of the visual cortex (including primary and secondary areas) are functionally active, but when participants are able to consciously report seeing a visual stimulus, additional cortical areas become active (47,54,(64)(65)(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [63] 63. Breitmeyer BG, Ogmen H (2006) Visual Masking: Time Slices Through Conscious and Unconscious Vision (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford). source
    • cites [47] 47. Frith C, Perry R, Lumer E (1999) The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends Cogn Sci 3(3):105-114. source
    • cites [54] 54. Dehaene S (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (Penguin, New York).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Introspection is believed to involve such cognitive processes as attention, working memory, and metacognition.

    “Introspection, in turn, is believed to involve such cognitive processes as attention, working memory, and metacognition (51-53), processes that are called upon in cognitive theories of consciousness (47,(54)(55)(56)(57).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [51] 51. Terrace H, Metcalfe J (2004) The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness (Oxford Univ Press, New York). source
    • cites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source
    • cites [53] 53. Overgaard M, Sandberg K (2014) Kinds of access: Different methods for report re- veal different kinds of metacognitive access. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition, eds Fleming SM, Frith CD (Springer, Berlin), pp 67-86. source
    • cites [47] 47. Frith C, Perry R, Lumer E (1999) The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends Cogn Sci 3(3):105-114. source
    • cites [54] 54. Dehaene S (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (Penguin, New York).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Nonverbal behavior is satisfactory for demonstrating that a human or other animal is conscious in the sense of being awake and responsive to stimuli, and for demonstrating cognitive capacities underlying working memory, attention, metacognition, problem-solving ability, and other indicators of intelligent behavior.

    “Nonverbal behavior is satisfactory for demonstrating that a human or other animal is conscious in the sense of being awake and responsive to stimuli, and for demonstrating cognitive capacities underlying working memory, attention, metacognition, problemsolving ability, and other indicators of intelligent behavior (52).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Defensive survival circuits modulate the experience of fear but are not directly responsible for the conscious experience itself.

    “This does not mean that defensive survival circuits play no role in conscious fear: they modulate the experience of fear, but are not directly responsible for the conscious experience itself.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    These circuits process different inputs in emotional vs. nonemotional conscious experiences, and in different kinds of emotional experiences.

    “However, these circuits process different inputs in emotional vs. nonemotional conscious experiences, and in different kinds of emotional experiences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Traditional HOT needs to be modified before using it as the foundation for a theory of emotional consciousness.

    “Traditional HOT needs to be modified before using it as the foundation for a theory of emotional consciousness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Rosenthal uses introspection to refer to situations when one is attentively and deliberately focused on one's conscious experiences.

    “For example, Rosenthal uses introspection to refer to situations when one is attentively and deliberately focused on one's conscious experiences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In traditional HOT, the self is implied to be represented by the reference to 'I' but this representation is not of the conscious self and can be implicit or nonconscious.

    “However, this representation is not of the conscious self (113) and can be construed as being implicit or nonconscious (134).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [113] 113. Conway MA (2005) Memory and the self. J Mem Lang 53(4):594-628. 150. Marsh EJ, Roediger HL (2013) Episodic and autobiographical memory. Handbook of Psychology: Volume 4, Experimental Psychology, eds Healy AF, Proctor RW (John Wiley & Sons, New York), 2nd Ed, pp 472-494. 151. Piaget J (1971) Biology and Knowledge (Edinburgh Univ Press, Edinburgh). 152. Mandler JM (1984) Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ). 153. O'Sullivan CS, Durso FT (1984) Effect of schema-incongruent information on memory for stereotypical attributes. J Per source
    • cites [134] source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The authors propose a more inclusive view of introspection, in which the term indicates the process by which phenomenally experienced states result.

    “We propose a more inclusive view of introspection, in which the term indicates the process by which phenomenally experienced states result.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    Only when the self is explicitly integrated into the episode does autonoetic awareness occur.

    “Only when the self is explicitly integrated into the episode does autonoetic awareness occur.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    According to HOT, one is not typically conscious of the higher-order state itself, but instead is conscious of the first-order state by virtue of the HOR of it.

    “According to HOT, one is not typically conscious of the higher-order state itself, but instead is conscious of the first-order state by virtue of the HOR of it.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning

    To be aware of the higher-order state (to be conscious that you are in that state) requires yet another HOR.

    “To be aware of the higher-order state (to be conscious that you are in that state) requires yet another HOR.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The needed modifications to HOT concern its treatment of introspection, of higher-order states that lack an external source, and of the self.

    “Specifically needed are changes to its treatment of introspection, of higherorder states that lack an external source, and of the self.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Both passive noticing and active scrutinizing lead to phenomenal experience.

    “Both kinds of introspection, in our view, lead to phenomenal experience.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Animals may have episodic (what, where, when) memory, and maybe even noetic awareness, but may nevertheless lack autonoetic awareness.

    “In this sense, animals may have episodic (what, where, when) memory, and maybe even noetic awareness, but may nevertheless lack autonoetic awareness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    A distinction between self and other that includes body sensations or mental states, but does not explicitly represent the conscious self, is not a state of self-awareness.

    “Thus, a distinction between self and other that includes body sensations or mental states, but that does not explicitly represent the conscious self, is not a state of self-awareness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    If HOROR is correct, the nonconscious events that contribute to consciousness are HORs of sensory events (the first HOR), not sensory cortex events.

    “If HOROR is correct, the nonconscious events that contribute to consciousness are not sensory cortex events but instead are HORs of sensory events (the first HOR).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents.

    “A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents (121).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [121] 121. Gentner D, Goldin-Meadow S, eds (2003) Language in Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Thought (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). 177. Marks I (1987) Fears, Phobias, and Rituals: Panic, Anxiety and Their Disorders (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 178.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    The self is a set of autobiographical memories about who you are, what has happened to you, and how you think, act, and feel in particular situations.

    “We view the self as a set of autobiographical memories about who you are and what has happened to you in your life, and how you think, act, and feel in particular situations (149, 150).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [149] source
    • cites [150] source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    HOROR posits that phenomenal consciousness consists of having the appropriate HOR of lower-order information, where lower-order refers to a prior higher-order state that is rerepresented.

    “HOROR posits that phenomenal consciousness consists of having the appropriate HOR of lower-order information, where lower-order does not necessarily mean sensory, but instead refers to a prior higher-order state that is rerepresented (Fig. 4A).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Emotional states of consciousness depend on the same fundamental neural mechanisms as any other state of consciousness, but the inputs processed are different.

    “One of us (J.E.L.) has long argued that emotional states of consciousness depend on the same fundamental neural mechanisms as any other state of consciousness, but that the inputs processed are different (8,9,20,165,166).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [8] 8. LeDoux JE (1996) The Emotional Brain (Simon and Schuster, New York).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [9] 9. LeDoux JE (2002) Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (Viking, New York).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [20] 20. LeDoux JE (2015) Anxious: Using the Brain to Understand and Treat Fear and Anxiety (Viking, New York).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Fear can occur when the defensive survival circuit is damaged.

    “However, as noted earlier, fear can occur when the defensive survival circuit is damaged.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    If some event is not affecting you, then it is not producing an emotion.

    “If some event is not affecting you, then it is not producing an emotion.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Although self-HOROR is necessary, it is not sufficient for an emotional experience.

    “However, although self-HOROR is necessary it is not sufficient for an emotional experience.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    An emotion is the conscious experience that occurs when you are aware that you are in a particular kind of situation that you have come, through your experiences, to think of as a fearful situation.

    “An emotion is the conscious experience that occurs when you are aware that you are in particular kind of situation that you have come, through your experiences, to think of as a fearful situation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    In HOTEC the amygdala represents an additional lower-order circuit that can be activated in parallel with, and even independent of, the GNC.

    “Unlike in traditional HOT, where there is somewhat of a hierarchical, or serial, relation between lower-and higher-order cortical circuits, in HOTEC the amygdala represents an additional lower-order circuit that can be activated in parallel with, and even independent of, the GNC.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    HOTEC extends HOT and HORROR theory to account for the self.

    “HOTEC extends HOT and HORROR theory to account for the self.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    A key aspect of HOTEC is the HOR of the self; no self, no emotion.

    “A key aspect of our HOTEC is the HOR of the self; simply put, no self, no emotion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The basic principles involved can be leveraged to understand other emotions as well.

    “Although we have focused on fear, we believe that the basic principles involved can be leveraged to understand other emotions as well.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
40 of 40

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.

    “Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is possible to have the experience as of seeing something without it being there to be seen, as in hallucinations or dreams.

    “However, it is possible to have the experience as of seeing something without it being there to be seen, as in the case of hallucinations or in dreams.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The subcortical representations proposed by Panksepp and Damasio occur in humans and other mammals.

    “The subcortical representations proposed by Pankesepp and Damasio clearly occur in humans and other mammals.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Nonconscious HORs exist.

    “HOROR thus depends on the existence of nonconscious HORs.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The amygdala has direct connections with the GNC.

    “In addition, the amygdala has direct connections with the sensory cortex, allowing bottom-up attentional control over sensory processing and memory retrieval, and also has direct connections with the GNC.”
5 of 5

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Recent accounts of higher-order theories have suggested that the ACC, like the OFC, contributes to more complex aspects of phenomenal consciousness, either independently or via interactions with the lateral PFC.

    “Recent accounts of higher-order theories (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;Brown et al., 2019;LeDoux, 2020a) have suggested that the ACC (like the OFC) contributes to more complex aspects of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., emotions, memories, sense of self, and so on), either independently or via interactions with the lateral PFC (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;Brown et al., 2019;LeDoux, 2020a).”

    From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017

    The Medial Cortex figure caption identifies the ACC and OFC among circuits contributing to conscious experience, and the paper proposes that different subcircuits may contribute to different aspects of consciousness (Fig. 3 discussion; pages not supplied). It does not specifically assign emotions, memories, or the sense of self to the ACC, or say that the ACC acts independently or through interactions with lateral PFC. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • While the specificity of effects in the OFC and ACC does not suggest a general role for these regions in consciousness, stimulation of these regions results in reproducible changes in emotional experience and may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness.

    “While the specificity of the effects in the OFC and ACC does not suggest a general role for these regions in consciousness, stimulation of these regions does result in reproducible changes in emotional experience and may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;LeDoux, 2020a).”

    From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • This evidence may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness, which postulate that subcortical circuits generate unconscious emotional content that is then rendered conscious in cortical networks involved in higher cognitive processing.

    “Importantly, this evidence may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;LeDoux, 2020a), which postulate that subcortical circuits generate unconscious emotional content that is then rendered conscious in cortical networks involved in “higher” cognitive processing.”

    From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017

  • In theoretical work on emotional consciousness, LeDoux and colleagues argue that lower-order responses can contribute to, but are not necessary for, the conscious experience of any emotional cognitive state.

    “In theoretical work on emotional consciousness, LeDoux and colleagues argue that lower-order responses can contribute to, but are not necessary for, the conscious experience of any emotional cognitive state (LeDoux & Brown, 2017;LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018).”

    From Responding to uncertain threat: A potential mediator for the effect of mindfulness on anxiety (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux & Brown, 2017

  • Subcortical memory traces cannot be retrieved as images because they do not consist in cortical mappings of sensory-motor surface organs.

    “subcortical memory traces cannot be retrieved in the form of images, for the simple reason that they do not consist in cortical mappings of the sensory-motor surface organs47.”

    From The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle (2019) · cites this paper as [47]

    The paper’s “A B” section describes subcortical representations as nonconscious inputs to cortical processing, while “Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory” discusses retrieving memories into working memory; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. Neither section says subcortical memory traces cannot be retrieved as images or gives the proposed reason involving cortical mappings of sensory-motor surface organs. Searches for those terms and for mental imagery found no passage addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

7 of the 221 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. SS Tomkins Affect, Imagery, Consciousness (Springer, New York, 1962).
  2. VAF Lamme, Independent neural definitions of visual awareness and attention. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints, ed A Raftopoulos (Nova Science, New York), pp. 171–191 (2005).
  3. C Koch The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approcah (Roberts and Co., Denver, 2004).
  4. DM Armstrong What Is Consciousness? The Nature of Mind, ed J Heil (Cornell Univ Press, Ithaca, New York, 1981).
  5. L Squire Memory and Brain (Oxford Univ Press, New York, 1987).
  6. J Bennett, Thoughtful brutes. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 62, 197–210 (1988).
  7. D Rosenthal, Awareness and identification of self. Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, eds J Liu, J Perry (Cambridge Univ Press, New York), pp. 22–50 (2012).
  8. JA Russell, Natural language concepts of emotion. Perspectives in Personality, eds R Hogan, WH Jones, AJ Stewart, JM Healy, DJ Ozer (Jessica Kingsley, London) Vol 3 (1991).
  9. JR Averill, A constructivist view of emotion. Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience, Volume I. Theories of Emotiojn, eds R Plutchik, H Kellerman (Academic, New York), pp. 305–339 (1980).

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R.
Affiliations
  • Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research (US)
  • LaGuardia Community College (US)
Corresponding author
LeDoux, Joseph E.
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2017-02-15
Volume
114
Issue
10
Pages
E2016-E2025
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.1619316114
PMC
PMC5347624
OpenAlex
W2588736771
Semantic Scholar
22592777ca31ac5db435214f6aef65bc88cabc9c
Cited by
690
References
221
Citations by year
2026: 43 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 97 · 2023: 96 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 63 · 2017: 21
FWCI
84.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
emotional awareness, feelings, subjective experience, subcortical circuits, cortical networks, theory of mind
MeSH terms
Amygdala, Awareness, Cognition, Consciousness, Fear, Humans, Memory, Short-Term, Visual Cortex

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

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