Defining consciousness: The importance of non-reflective self-awareness
Open accessAbstract
I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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Millière, R. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.48 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
“…consciousness as far as I can see” (Damasio, 1999, p. 19); “If a mental state is conscious, that mental state will involve a non-reflective self-awareness” (Gallagher, 2010, p. 567); “self-consciousness is a constitutive feature of phenomenal consciousness” (Zahavi, 2014, p. 17);…”
BackgroundInstrumental Gesture in Chopin’s Étude in A-Flat Major, Op. 25, No. 1
Montague, E. (2012) · Music Theory Online · doi:10.30535/mto.18.4.4 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Deane, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab024 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
“…self-modelling aligns the current account with many other approaches across psychology, neuroscience and philosophy that cast self-consciousness as necessary or constitutive of consciousness itself (Damasio 1999; Metzinger 2003; Gallagher 2010, 2013; Zahavi 2014; Lou et al. 2017; Millière 2017).”
BackgroundTowards a Phenomenology of the Unconscious: Husserl and Fink on Versunkenheit
Geniušas, S. (2020) · Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/00071773.2020.1834334 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“Thus, presentational consciousness is characterized by self-awareness-inthe-now; re-presentational consciousness – by a split self-awareness, i.e. self-awarenessin-the-now and self-awareness-in-the-then; finally, “the third life of subjectivity” (i.e. hallucinations, visions and [day]dreams) – by self-awareness-in-the…”
BackgroundModes of Self-Awareness: Perception, Dreams, Memory
Geniušas, S. (2022) · Husserl Studies · doi:10.1007/s10743-022-09301-9 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Millière, R., & Newen, A. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00562-6 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“A number of authors answer these questions in the affirmative (e.g., Damasio, 1999; Zahavi, 1999, 2005, 2014; Gallagher, 2010; Duncan, 1 3 2019).”
Towards landscape conscience: a geographical perspective
Pavlis, E. S., & Terkenli, T. S. (2023) · Landscape Research · doi:10.1080/01426397.2023.2238639 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Equivocating on unconsciousness
LaValley, D. (2022) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/09593543221092708 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“…the term “consciousness” is associated with a plethora of distinct, often exclusive, meanings (e.g., Block, 1995; Dennett, 1991; Facco et al., 2019; Gallagher, 2010; Rosenthal, 1986; Sara & Pistoia, 2010; Tassi & Muzet, 2001; by some estimates, consciousness has as many as 40 associated…”
BackgroundThe Nested States Model: An Empirical Framework for Integrating Brain and Mind
Denfield, G. H., & Kyzar, E. J. (2024) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.31.3.028 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_9 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Complexity
Onoda, K. (2022) · Japanese Journal of Physiological Psychology and Psychophysiology · doi:10.5674/jjppp.2204si · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Prolegomena to a phenomenology of mind-wandering
Geniušas, S. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09866-y · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Without such a minimal sense of prereflective self-awareness, no constitution of sense would be possible (see especially Zahavi, 1999; 2005, Strawson, 2009; Gallagher, 2010).”
Challenges in Current Philosophy of Self-Consciousness – The Heidelberg School
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_2
A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Self-Consciousness
Kreuch, G. (2019) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30789-9_1
The Nested States Model: An Empirical Framework for Integrating the Brain and the MindPreprint
Denfield, G. H., & Kyzar, E. J. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/dgzqf
The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness
Ludwig, D. (2021) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217321000196
“On higher-order views, this seems to amount to a second-order self-representation at the core of all phenomenal contents (e.g., Gallagher, 2010; Gennaro, 2012; Kriegel, 2009).”
BackgroundHerausforderungen in der aktuellen Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins – Die Heidelberger Schule
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_2
Ein kurzer Überblick über die Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_1
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_9
- Authors
- Gallagher, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Central Florida (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gallagher, Shaun
- ORCID
- Gallagher, Shaun
- Venue
- Pragmatics & Cognition
- Publisher
- John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Published
- 2010-12-31
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561-569
- ISSN
- 0929-0907 (ISSN-L)
- 1569-9943
- OpenAlex
- W2006969519
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 0.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Pragmatics & Cognition (publishedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
- University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- consciousness, definition of consciousness, phenomenology, intentionality, phenomenality, self-awareness, blindsight, motor control, qualia
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