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Cited by 541

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice

Morris, Richard D.·1987·Accounting and Business Research
DOI 10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347
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Abstract

Signalling and agency theories appear in the accounting literature to be competing theories. This article demonstrates that they are actually consistent theories, in that one set of sufficient conditions of signalling theory is at least consistent with one set of sufficient conditions of agency theory. Indeed, a considerable overlap exists between the two theories: rational behaviour is common to both; information asymmetry in signalling theory is implied by positive monitoring costs in agency theory; ‘quality' in signalling theory can be defined in terms of agency theory variables; and signalling costs are implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory. Examples are given where both theories’ predictions about lobbying, accounting choices, and voluntary auditor selection are added together.

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Research works printed but not linked: 47

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Metadata

Authors
Morris, R. D.
Venue
Accounting and Business Research
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
1987-12
Volume
18
Issue
69
Pages
47-56
ISSN
  • 0001-4788 (ISSN-L)
  • 2159-4260
DOI
10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347
OpenAlex
W2067060814
Cited by
541
References
2
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347
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Morris, R. D. (1987). Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice. Accounting and Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347

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