The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Expert Knowledge Elicitation: Subjective but Scientific
Open accessAbstract
Expert opinion and judgment enter into the practice of statistical inference and decision-making in numerous ways. Indeed, there is essentially no aspect of scientific investigation in which judgment is not required. Judgment is necessarily subjective, but should be made as carefully, as objectively, and as scientifically as possible.Elicitation of expert knowledge concerning an uncertain quantity expresses that knowledge in the form of a (subjective) probability distribution for the quantity. Such distributions play an important role in statistical inference (for example as prior distributions in a Bayesian analysis) and in evidence-based decision-making (for example as expressions of uncertainty regarding inputs to a decision model). This article sets out a number of practices through which elicitation can be made as rigorous and scientific as possible.One such practice is to follow a recognized protocol that is designed to address and minimize the cognitive biases that experts are prone to when making probabilistic judgments. We review the leading protocols in the field, and contrast their different approaches to dealing with these biases through the medium of a detailed case study employing the SHELF protocol.The article ends with discussion of how to elicit a joint probability distribution for multiple uncertain quantities, which is a challenge for all the leading protocols. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.
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Cites
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Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2019) · The American Statistician · doi:10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913 · Cited by 2,976
Bayesian networks for supply chain risk, resilience and ripple effect analysis: A literature review
Hosseini, S., & Ivanov, D. (2020) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2020.113649 · Cited by 314
Lienert, J., Andersson, J. C. M., Hofmann, D., Silva Pinto, F., & Kuller, M. (2022) · Hydrology and Earth System Sciences · doi:10.5194/hess-26-2899-2022 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- O’Hagan, A.
- Venue
- The American Statistician
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2019-03-20
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- sup1
- Pages
- 69-81
- ISSN
- 0003-1305 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-2731
- OpenAlex
- W2924337219
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 31.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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