An objective counterfactual theory of information
Abstract
We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Cohen and Meskin's (2006) theory entails VTN.
“Thus, Cohen and Meskin's (2006) theory entails VTN.”
From INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH (2010) · cites this paper as Cohen and Meskin 2006
Cited by
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SCARANTINO, A., & PICCININI, G. (2010) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01632.x · Cited by 119 · see citing works
- Authors
- Cohen, J., & Meskin, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Leeds (GB)
- Venue
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2006-09
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 333-352
- ISSN
- 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6828
- OpenAlex
- W2047843202
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 10.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
- Keywords
- information theory, counterfactuals, conditional probability, reductive explanation, epistemology, philosophy of mind, doxastic states
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