INFORMATION WITHOUT TRUTH

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007).

“The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”

• cites Floridi 2005 sourceSupported
• cites Floridi 2007Supported

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Floridi gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false nonnatural information is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss.

“The most articulate defense of VTNN has been offered by Floridi (2005, 2007), who gives two main arguments in support of the thesis that false ''nonnatural information'' is not really information: the argument from splitting and the argument from semantic loss .”

• cites Floridi 2005 sourceSupported
• cites Floridi 2007Partly supported

  Section 2.4 argues that adding a false statement can cause semantic loss of informative content, and the Conclusion says false information does not qualify as information. But the Introduction describes this paper as offering one argument in five steps; our copy does not present an argument from splitting or identify these as two main arguments. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

That the earth has two moons is both nonnatural information and false.

“As far as we are concerned, that the earth has two moons is both nonnatural information and false.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Signals carry natural information about anything they reliably correlate with.

“The core idea of a probabilistic theory of information is that signals carry natural information about anything they reliably correlate with.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The content of this intuition is nothing but an instance of the general thesis to be established.

“The content of this intuition is nothing but an instance of the general thesis to be established.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Reliable correlations are the sorts of correlations information users can count on to hold in some range of future and counterfactual circumstances.

“Reliable correlations are the sorts of correlations information users can count on to hold in some range of future and counterfactual circumstances.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

We need a theory of the conditions under which signals carry natural information.

“We need a theory of the conditions under which signals carry natural information.”

May combine two claims.

Instructions are neither true nor false, because they are not truth-evaluable at all.

“But instructions are neither true nor false, because they are not truth-evaluable at all.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

If we accept VTNN, we should endorse an error theory according to which cognitive scientists are mistaken about the nature of cognition, and the view that cognition involves information processing is at best incomplete.

“If we accept VTNN, we should endorse an error theory to make sense of this way of talking. According to such a theory, cognitive scientists are mistaken about the nature of cognition. Since false nonnatural information is not really information (as per VTNN), the view that cognition involves information processing is at best incomplete.”

May combine two claims.

Computer scientists usually assign computer data a semantic interpretation, so data can have semantic content and thus can carry information.

“Computer scientists usually assign computer data a semantic interpretation-data can have semantic content. Thus data can carry information.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Our rejection of VT is consistent with the pluralism we advocated in section 2.

“In other words, our rejection of VT is consistent with the pluralism we advocated in section 2.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Nonnatural information is in need of naturalistic explication just as much as intentional content.

“We agree that nonnatural information is in need of naturalistic explication just as much as intentional content.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

A recent study on aging found that older adults were more likely than young adults to believe false information and their dispositional ratings were reliably biased by the valence of false information.

“For instance, a recent study on how aging affects belief found that ''[o]lder adults were more likely than young adults to believe false information and their dispositional ratings were reliably biased by the valence of false information'' (Chen 2002, 217).”

• cites Chen 2002 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

When we worry about information loss, we are generally concerned with whether an information repository carries the same information it originally carried, and whether new information has the same epistemic value as the original.

“When we worry about information loss, we are not primarily-if at all-concerned with the quantity of information contained in a repository. Rather, we are generally concerned with whether an information repository carries the same information it originally carried.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The relata of the natural information relation are events, understood as property exemplifications at a time.

“Following Dretske (1981), we take the relata of the natural information relation to be events , understood as property exemplifications at a time (cf. Kim 1976).”

• cites Dretske 1981Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Kim 1976 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Defining a specialized notion of information that entails some version of the Veridicality Thesis may still be useful for some specific purposes.

“We have emphasized that defining a specialized notion of information that entails some version of the Veridicality Thesis may still be useful for some specific purposes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The notion of (declarative) nonnatural information is best understood as the notion of representation, which by definition can be false.

“The notion of (declarative) nonnatural information is best understood as the notion of representation, which by definition can be false.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

If o being G is much more probable given the signal s being F than without it, s being F carries a lot of probabilistic natural information about o being G; if the probability increases only marginally, it carries a limited amount.

“For instance, if o being G is much more probable given the signal constituted by s being F than it would have been without the signal, s being F carries a lot of probabilistic natural information about o being G . If, instead, the probability of o being G increases only marginally given the signal, s being F carries a limited amount of probabilistic natural information about o being G .”

May combine two claims.

In the first two cases (physical and syntactic information loss), information is destroyed but not replaced with any new nonnatural information; there is information loss in the quantitative, qualitative, and epistemic-value senses.

“In the first two cases, information is destroyed but not replaced with any new nonnatural information. There is information loss in the quantitative sense, in the qualitative sense, and in the epistemic-value sense.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Under a quantitative reading of 'loss of information,' if all true propositions in a repository are transformed into false propositions and VTNN is rejected, the total amount of information does not change.

“On this construal, if all the manuscript's true propositions are transformed into false propositions, and VTNN is rejected, there is no loss of information, because the total amount of information does not change.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The amount of true information carried by a true proposition is equal to the amount of false information carried by its negation.

May combine two claims.

In the third case (semantic information loss), information is destroyed and replaced with new false, epistemically inferior nonnatural information; there is information loss in the qualitative and epistemic-value senses, though not in the quantitative sense.

“In the third case, information is destroyed and replaced with new (false, and thus epistemically inferior) nonnatural information. There is information loss in the qualitative sense and in the epistemic-value sense, though not in the quantitative sense.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

When we say that something is a false impression or a false testimony, we do not mean that they are, respectively, not an impression and not a testimony.

“Similarly, when we say that something is a false impression or a false testimony, we do not mean that they are, respectively, not an impression and not a testimony.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In the case of natural information, the need to capture the explanatory power of the notion of information requires positing the notion of probabilistic information.

“In the case of natural information , the need to capture the explanatory power of the notion of information requires positing the notion of probabilistic information .”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The notion of nonnatural information used in cognitive science is best interpreted as the notion of representation, where a representation is by definition something that can get things wrong.

“The notion of nonnatural information used in cognitive science is best interpreted as the notion of representation , where a representation is by definition something that can get things wrong.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

False information may be analogous to false propositions, impressions, and testimonies.

“False information may be analogous to false propositions, impressions, and testimonies.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Such a specialized notion should not be understood as germane to the main notions of information used in cognitive science and computer science.

“Our point is that such a specialized notion should not be understood as germane to the main notions of information used in cognitive science and computer science.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Since false information is epistemically inferior to true information, negating true propositions is a way to incur information loss by semantic means.

“Since false information is epistemically inferior to true information, negating true propositions is a way to incur information loss by semantic means.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: False information is epistemically inferior to true information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Nonnatural information as used in cognitive science has the capacity to get things wrong, so it can be false.

“Nonnatural information as used in cognitive science has the capacity to get things wrong, so it can be false.”

May combine two claims.

There is no intrinsic difference between instructions and data, and both have semantic content.

“Yet, there is no intrinsic difference between instructions and data. In addition, both have semantic content.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

If you tell someone to buckle up, you give them information on what to do, but what you say is not true-not because it's false, but because it's not truth-evaluable.

“Consider giving people information on what to do. If you tell us to buckle up, you give us information. You inform us on what to do. But what you say is not true-not because it's false, but because it's not truth-evaluable.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The three rings on the bell of the bus carry nonnatural information about the bus being full by virtue of a convention.

“By contrast, the three rings on the bell of the bus carry nonnatural information about the bus being full by virtue of a convention.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Our main reason to maintain that nonnatural false information is information too mirrors our reason to posit nonnatural information in the first place: it allows us to capture important uses of the term 'information.'

“Our main reason to maintain that nonnatural false information is information too mirrors our reason to posit nonnatural information in the first place: it allows us to capture important uses of the term ''information.''”

May combine two claims.

Paradigmatic signals do not guarantee the occurrence of measles, fire, and visitors; they simply make such occurrences significantly more likely.

“It follows that these paradigmatic signals do not guarantee the occurrence of, respectively, measles , fire , and visitors . They simply make such occurrences significantly more likely.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Correlations are rarely perfect; spots are occasionally produced by mumps, smoke by smoke machines, and doorbell rings by naughty kids.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The argument from splitting requires the brute intuition that that the earth has two moons is not information.

“But it requires the brute intuition that that the earth has two moons is not information.”

May combine two claims.

Given that non-truth-evaluable information carried by computer instructions and nondeclarative speech acts is information, and that the information carried by true data and true declarative information is information, it's hard to see why the information carried by false data and false declarative sentences should not be information too.

“Given that non-truth-evaluable information carried by computer instructions and nondeclarative speech acts is information, and that the information carried by true data and true declarative information is information, it's hard to see why the information carried by false data and false declarative sentences should not be information too.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Our distinctions allow us to distinguish between physical and syntactic information loss on the one hand and semantic information loss on the other.

“Moreover, our distinctions allow us to neatly distinguish between physical and syntactic information loss on the one hand and semantic information loss on the other.”

May combine two claims.

It is clear that computer scientists include both true and false information under the rubric of (nonnatural) information, which is yet another reason to conclude that false information is information too.

“It is clear that computer scientists include both true and false information under the rubric of (nonnatural) information. This is yet another reason to conclude that false information is information too.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Computer scientists include both true and false information under the rubric of (nonnatural) information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

We need a theory of the conditions under which signals carry nonnatural information.

“We also need a theory of the conditions under which signals carry nonnatural information.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

When we say of x that it is a false proposition, we do not mean that x is not a proposition.

“As Floridi acknowledges, when we say of x that it is a false proposition, we do not mean that x is not a proposition.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

If we accept VTNN, we should conclude that computer scientists are mistaken: computers are more than information processors-they are misinformation processors as well.

“If we accept VTNN, we should conclude that computer scientists are also mistaken: computers are more than information processors-they are misinformation processors as well.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Computer scientists include both true and false information under the rubric of (nonnatural) information.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The goal of an information-based account of knowledge has led many to neglect cases of probabilistic natural information that do not yield knowledge, yet fully qualify as information.

“The goal of an information-based account of knowledge has led many to neglect cases of probabilistic natural information that do not yield knowledge, yet fully qualify as information.”

May combine two claims.

Nonnatural information need not be truth-evaluable at all-the information contained in nondeclarative speech acts and computer instructions is neither true nor false, because it is not truth-evaluable.

“Finally, we have argued that nonnatural information need not be truth-evaluable at all-the information contained in nondeclarative speech acts and computer instructions is neither true nor false, because it is not truth-evaluable.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Spots carry natural information about measles by virtue of a reliable physical correlation between measles and spots.

“Spots carry natural information about measles by virtue of a reliable physical correlation between measles and spots.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The true thesis that information is capable of yielding knowledge gets confusedly mixed with the false thesis that information yields knowledge in all cases.

“In other words, the true thesis that information is capable of yielding knowledge gets confusedly mixed with the false thesis that information yields knowledge in all cases .”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

If we reject VTNN, we can say that after negating a proposition we have new information instead of the original, but we can also say without inconsistency that we have lost the original information.

“If we reject VTNN, we can say that after negating a proposition, we now have some new information instead of the original information. But we can also say, without inconsistency, that we have lost the original information-the information carried by the original proposition.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

As long as there are legitimate theoretical objectives fulfilled by the theory, endorsing a truth requirement on information need not be a liability.

“As long as there are legitimate theoretical objectives fulfilled by the theory-from the naturalization of knowledge to the solution of certain puzzles 18 -endorsing a truth requirement on information need not be a liability.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The sentence 'Water is not H2O' gets things wrong with respect to the chemical composition of water, but it does not fail to represent that water is not H2O.

“The sentence ''Water is not H2O'' gets things wrong with respect to the chemical composition of water, but it does not fail to represent that water is not H2O.”

May combine two claims.

A signal must carry the natural information that o is G only if o is G, but o need not be G for a signal to carry natural information about o being G.

“In summary, we think that o must be G in order for a signal to carry the natural information that o is G , but that o need not be G in order for a signal to carry natural information about o being G .”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.

When we say that x is a false duck or a false policeman, in effect we are saying that x is not a duck or x is not a policeman.

“When we say that x is a false duck, or a false policeman, in effect we are saying that x is not a duck, or x is not a policeman.”