Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice
Open accessAbstract
Miranda Fricker has characterized epistemic injustice as “a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007, Epistemic injustice: Power & the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20). Gaslighting, where one agent seeks to gain control over another by undermining the other’s conception of herself as an independent locus of judgment and deliberation, would thus seem to be a paradigm example. Yet, in the most thorough analysis of gaslighting to date (Abramson, K. 2014. “Turning up the lights on gaslighting.” Philosophical Perspectives 28, Ethics: 1–30), the idea that gaslighting has crucial epistemic dimensions is rather roundly rejected on grounds that gaslighting works by means of a strategy of assertion and manipulation that is not properly understood in epistemic terms. I argue that Abramson’s focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim, for whom the experience of gaslighting has substantial and essential epistemic features. Taking these features into account reveals that all gaslighting has epistemic dimensions and helps to clarify what resistance to gaslighting might look like.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Spear argues that gaslighting has essential epistemic dimensions that Kate Abramson’s manipulation-focused account downplays, especially the gaslighter’s tacit claim to epistemic superiority and the victim’s challenged epistemic self-trust. From the victim’s standpoint, gaslighting becomes a peer-disagreement about her own cognitive reliability, and resistance is grounded in a norm that global self-trust should be defeated only for epistemic reasons.
Key findings
- Against Abramson, Spear argues that all gaslighting has an epistemic dimension: by asserting that the victim fails to grasp the situation, the gaslighter tacitly claims to see it better and thus claims epistemic status or authority.
- The victim experiences gaslighting as epistemic peer-disagreement “with a twist”: the disputed proposition is the reliability of her own cognitive faculties, so she must weigh trust in herself against trust in the gaslighter as a sincere peer or authority.
- Spear proposes a basic epistemic norm: “It is rational for an agent to accept that her epistemic agency is globally undermined only for epistemic reasons.” Capitulating to gaslighting for merely prudential or moral reasons violates this norm.
- Resistance can be grounded in this norm and in the value of self-trust; Spear cites Pasnau’s argument that self-trust may permissibly override conciliationist demands in peer disagreement, though some victims may be unable to resist due to manipulation or social conditions.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis rather than empirical study, developed through close engagement with Abramson’s 2014 account of gaslighting and Fricker’s epistemic injustice.
- Uses two paradigm film examples: Paula and Gregory in *Gas Light* (1944) and Pat and Collier in *Pat and Mike* (1952).
- Main analysis distinguishes epistemic from prudential reasons, discusses defeaters, draws on Zagzebski on self-trust and the epistemology of peer disagreement, and proposes a norm governing defeat of epistemic self-trust.
Limitations
- The author states that limitations of space prevent addressing two further issues: that an agent with cognitive defects may be unable to appreciate evidence of them, and the paradox of rationally judging one’s own cognitive faculties untrustworthy (footnote 4).
- The author also says resolving whether prudential and epistemic rationality align is beyond the essay’s scope (footnote 3).
- Evident from the text: the argument is normative and conceptual, with no empirical sample or data; the author explicitly notes that who gaslights whom predominantly is an empirical question depending on social and cultural factors.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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0 of 11 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationcitation§ Thus,
Gaslighter and victim typically stand in a significant relationship of trust or authority, such that the gaslighter can leverage specific interests of his victim to motivate her compliance.
“While Abramson does not stress the point, her analysis makes it clear that gaslighter and victim will typically stand in a signi fi cant relationship of trust or authority, such that the gaslighter is able to leverage speci fi c interests of his victim either in him, in their relationship, or in her social or economic situation that can motivate her compliance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abramson 2014 source
- Interpretationnone given§ ABSTRACT
Every gaslighter makes at least a tacit claim to a position of epistemic superiority relative to his victim, one that plays a role in the victim's experience of gaslighting.
“every gaslighter makes at least a tacit claim to a position of epistemic superiority relative to his victim, one that plays a role in the victim ' s experience of gaslighting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
In typical cases of gaslighting, the gaslighter attempts to convince the victim that she should not trust herself: that she is crazy or oversensitive, that her grasp of the situation is too defective for reliable judgments, or that her judgments themselves cannot be trusted.
“First and foremost, he is attempting to convince her that she should not trust herself: that she is ' crazy ' or ' oversensitive ' , that her grasp of the situation is too defective for her to make reliable judgments about it, or that her judgments themselves can ' t be trusted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ ABSTRACT
The conditions under which it is reasonable for someone to accept defeat for their own epistemic self-trust (and so to conciliate in the disagreement with the gaslighter) are particularly pertinent to understanding the situation of the victim of gaslighting as well as what well-grounded resistance to gaslighting might look like.
“I discuss the conditions under which it is reasonable for someone to accept defeat for their own epistemic self-trust (and so to conciliate in the disagreement with the gaslighter), and argue that these conditions are particularly pertinent to understanding the situation of the victim of gaslighting as well as what well-grounded resistance to gaslighting might look like.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
To say to someone that they fail to see a situation correctly is to tacitly claim to see that same situation at least somewhat better.
“to say to someone that they fail to see a situation correctly, whether calmly and quietly, or abruptly and unpleasantly (as the gaslighter frequently does: ' that ' s crazy ' or ' that ' s just what you would think ' ) is to tacitly claim to see that same situation at least somewhat better.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
The victim only has motivation to assent to change her beliefs about her own grasp of the situation if she takes the gaslighter to have an epistemically credible grasp of the situation.
“the victim only has motivation to assent to change her beliefs about her own grasp of the situation if she takes the gaslighter to have an epistemically credible grasp of the situation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
The gaslighter's assertions do involve claims to epistemic status relative to his victim, at least tacit ones.
“I think the gaslighter ' s assertions do involve claims to epistemic status relative to his victim, at least tacit ones.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ ABSTRACT
Gaslighting has essential epistemic dimensions.
“In this essay I argue that gaslighting has essential epistemic dimensions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ ABSTRACT
From the victim's standpoint, gaslighting calls into question her epistemic self-trust, not just her moral or psychological self-trust.
“From the victim ' s standpoint, gaslighting calls into question not just her moral or psychological, but also her epistemic self-trust”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
Were the victim to seriously doubt the epistemic status (the credibility) of her gaslighter, this fact would itself render his gaslighting project unworkable.
“were the victim to seriously doubt the epistemic status (the credibility) of her gaslighter, this fact would itself render his gaslighting project unworkable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
All gaslighting involves issues of epistemic status and trust.
“all gaslighting involves issues of epistemic status and trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
The credibility assessment itself plays a crucial part in the gaslighting process.
“in both cases the credibility assessment itself plays a crucial part in the gaslighting process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ ABSTRACT
Gaslighters can offer their victims straightforward (if fabricated) epistemic reasons as part of the gaslighting process.
“Gaslighters can o ff er their victims straightforward (if fabricated) epistemic reasons as part of the gaslighting process”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
Abramson's insistence that issues of epistemic reasons, credibility assessments, and testimony play little or no role in gaslighting seems mistaken.
“her insistence that issues of epistemic reasons, credibility assessments, and testimony play little or no role in gaslighting seems mistaken.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abramson 2014 source
- Premisecitation§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
A necessary condition for gaslighting is that the gaslighter have the goal of destroying his or her target's standing to issue challenges.
“I agree that a necessary condition for gaslighting is that the gaslighter have the goal of '… destroying his or her target ' s standing to issue challenges …' (2014, 11).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [2014]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites [11] source
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
By making the assertions that he does concerning his victim's grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is laying claim to a special or privileged epistemic status relative to his victim.
“by making the assertions that he does concerning his victim ' s grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is, contra Abramson, by this very fact laying claim to a special or privileged epistemic status relative to his victim.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
In typical cases of gaslighting, there is typically also a specific further claim that the victim is supposed to accept (e.g., that she has been moving things around and then forgetting, or that Pat should give up her career and marry Collier).
“Second, there is typically also a speci fi c further claim that the victim is supposed to accept: that she has been moving things around in the apartment and then forgetting, or that Pat should give up her career and marry Collier.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
Even when viewed solely from the standpoint of the gaslighter, gaslighting can have an epistemic dimension insofar as the gaslighter's strategy may be overtly epistemic.
“Even when viewed solely from the standpoint of the gaslighter, gaslighting can have an epistemic dimension insofar as the gaslighter ' s strategy may be overtly epistemic (as in the case of Gregory in Gas Light )”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
The gaslighter is specifically out to achieve a change of attitude in his victim towards herself.
“he is speci fi cally out to achieve a change of attitude in his victim towards herself.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
Even in the case where objective assessment requires accepting defeat, capitulation may not be required, for reasons accessible from the subject's point of view.
“Second, even in such a case, capitulation may not be required, and also for reasons accessible from the subject ' s point of view.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust
It is not possible to form any rational beliefs for any reasons whatsoever if one does not first believe in one's basic ability to evaluate reasons and form beliefs in response to them.
“one ' s epistemic agency and so epistemic self-trust are distinctive in relation to all of the cases discussed so far in that it is not possible to form any rational beliefs for any reasons whatsoever if one does not fi rst believe in one ' s basic ability to evaluate reasons and form beliefs in response to them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust
It can be rational to concede that one's epistemic agency is compromised, for example when confronted with diagnoses from credentialed doctors corroborated by trusted friends or family.
“None of this implies that it can never be rational to concede that one ' s epistemic agency is compromised. It is typical for patients su ff ering from certain kinds of neurological or cognitive disorders not to be fully aware of this fact about themselves (Hirstein 2009, introduction). However, if such a person is confronted with diagnoses (e.g. of the early stages of Alzheimer ' s disease) from”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hirstein 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
If the goal of the gaslighter is to undermine his victim's self-trust in a global way, then the victim's experience of gaslighting must be one in which the default and even reflective rationality of her self-trust is meaningfully and quite globally challenged.
“If the goal of the gaslighter is to undermine his victim ' s self-trust in a global way (so as to undermine her ability to meaningfully criticize him and/or to gain control over her), then the victim ' s experience of gaslighting must be one in which the default and even re fl ective rationality of her self-trust is meaningfully and quite globally challenged.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
Whether the victim who capitulates bears responsibility or not does not diminish the responsibility of the gaslighter for the wrong he commits against her.
“Further, whether the victim who capitulates bears some type of responsibility or not, this in no way diminishes the responsibility of the gaslighter for the wrong that he is committing against her.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
The victim of gaslighting is confronted with a challenge to her epistemic self-trust lodged by a person she views as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority.
“what the victim fi nds herself confronted with is a challenge to her epistemic self-trust being lodged by a person she views as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
For the victim of gaslighting, the fundamental issue she confronts when experiencing gaslighting has to do with self-trust.
“For the victim of gaslighting, the fundamental issue she confronts when experiencing gaslighting has to do with self-trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
In cases where at least one of the two responsibility conditions is not satisfied, the victim who capitulates is not responsible (or not fully responsible).
“However, such cases will be cases where at least one of the two conditions I have identi fi ed is not satis fi ed, and so where the victim who capitulates is not responsible (or is not fully responsible, depending on the case).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2
All gaslighting has an essential epistemic dimension insofar as the overt assertion that someone else does not grasp a situation properly always involves the tacit assertion that the speaker does see the situation at least somewhat better, and so should be trusted.
“all gaslighting has an essential epistemic dimension insofar as the overt assertion that someone else does not grasp a situation properly always involves the tacit assertion that the speaker (the gaslighter in this case) does see the situation at least somewhat better, and so should be trusted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions
First epistemic dimension: the gaslighter himself may use a strategy of providing false or fabricated evidence to his victim in order to undermine her self-trust.
“The fi rst is that the gaslighter himself may use a strategy of providing false or fabricated evidence to his victim in order to undermine her self-trust, as Gregory does to Paula in the fi lm Gas Light .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
Social conditions are such that some (and perhaps many) agents are systematically prevented from developing or having the epistemic self-trust that they are rightfully entitled to.
“This doesn ' t show that gaslighting is not an epistemic phenomenon or that agents are never responsible for capitulating to gaslighting, but rather that social conditions are such that some (and perhaps many) agents are systematically prevented from developing or having the epistemic self-trust that they are rightfully entitled to.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
The victim cannot both revoke her epistemic self-trust and retain her view of the gaslighter as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority.
“If she revokes her epistemic self-trust, then she can maintain her view of the gaslighter as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority. If she revokes her view of the gaslighter as a typically sincere epistemic peer or authority, then she can retain her epistemic self-trust. Yet, the cognitive dissonance created by the gaslighter means that she can ' t do both”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
It is default rational to have self-trust concerning one's own cognitive faculties and judgments.
“The fi rst is that it is default rational to have self-trust concerning one ' s own cognitive faculties and judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zagzebski 2012 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions
The agent who capitulates to gaslighting for merely prudential or moral reasons violates a fundamental epistemic norm.
“The agent who capitulates to gaslighting for merely prudential or moral reasons thus violates a fundamental epistemic norm.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
From the victim's standpoint, gaslighting often mimics cases where it is rational for a subject to take the word of a trusted friend, acquaintance, or authority as grounds that her cognitive faculties are malfunctioning.
“For instance, a close friend might inform one that one has been misremembering things often lately, and that this may well be a sign of approaching Alzheimer ' s. From the victim ' s standpoint, I suggest, gaslighting often mimics such cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust
There is nothing epistemically problematic in preferring the deliverances of someone else's cognitive faculties over one's own on particular topics or in well-circumscribed areas.
“There is nothing epistemically problematic in preferring the deliverances of someone else ' s cognitive faculties over one ' s own on particular topics or in well-circumscribed areas (Zagzebski 2012, Ch. 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zagzebski 2012 source
- Premisecitation§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
Self-trust is defeasible.
“The second is that self-trust is nevertheless defeasible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zagzebski 2012 source
- Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
What the gaslighter does is make the question of the reliability of his victim's cognitive faculties itself the proposition about which they disagree.
“what the gaslighter does is make the question of the reliability of his victim ' s cognitive faculties (her ability to grasp, interpret, and correctly judge the situation) itself the proposition about which they disagree.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
Gaslighting behavior should typically count as defeating evidence for the credibility of the person engaging in it, except when the gaslighter is so skilled at providing fabricated epistemic reasons that an objective assessment from the victim's point of view requires accepting defeat.
“It implies that gaslighting behavior should typically count as defeating evidence for the credibility of the person engaging in it, excepting only the case where the gaslighter is so skilled at providing his victim with (fabricated) epistemic reasons for doubting her epistemic self-trust that an objective assessment of the situation, from her own point of view (considering the epistemic reasons”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement
From the standpoint of the victim of gaslighting, the experience is that of epistemic peer-disagreement of the sort dealt with in recent discussions in epistemology, but with a twist.
“from the standpoint of the victim of gaslighting, the experience is that of epistemic peer-disagreement of the sort dealt with in recent discussions in epistemology, but with a twist.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust
In typical cases where gaslighting occurs, accepting defeat for one's self-trust violates the epistemic norm at issue.
“It is in such cases, the typical cases where gaslighting occurs, where accepting defeat for one ' s self-trust violates the epistemic norm at issue.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust
Basic epistemic norm: It is rational for an agent to accept that her epistemic agency is globally undermined only for epistemic reasons.
“It is rational for an agent to accept that her epistemic agency is globally undermined only for epistemic reasons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1. Epistemic reasons and prudential reasons
Epistemic reasons and prudential reasons can come apart or conflict for a given subject.
“Thus, there are many ways in which epistemic reasons and prudential reasons might come apart or come into con fl ict for a given subject.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance
Recognition of the principle that the victim ought not concede self-trust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons provides significant grounds for resistance.
“While the victim ' s personal investment in the gaslighter and the gaslighter ' s deployment of manipulative threats may present obstacles to its consistent application, recognition of this principle itself provides signi fi cant grounds for resistance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions
Gaslighting involves the strategy specifically relying upon the victim's trust in the gaslighter as a peer or authority in some relevant sense.
“that (iv) speci fi cally relies upon his victim ' s trust in him as a peer or authority in some relevant sense.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 19
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 20
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2Gaslighting efforts can gain purchase only if the victim trusts the gaslighter, and an essential part of this trust must be epistemic.
“his gaslighting e ff orts can gain purchase only if the victim trusts him, and an essential part of this trust must, I argue, be epistemic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ ABSTRACTAbramson's focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim.
“I argue that Abramson ' s focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abramson 2014 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ ABSTRACTBecause the victim trusts both herself and her gaslighter, his challenge to her self-trust generates, from her standpoint, a situation of epistemic peer-disagreement where what she and her gaslighter disagree about is specifically her own epistemic standing, and so her entitlement to epistemic self-trust.
“Because the victim trusts both herself and her gaslighter, his challenge to her self-trust generates, from her standpoint, a situation of epistemic peerdisagreement where what she and her gaslighter disagree about is speci fi cally her own epistemic standing, and so her entitlement to epistemic selftrust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2If the victim interprets the gaslighter's abrupt and aggressive behavior as indicative of some epistemic failure to properly see the situation on his part, rather than as arising from a failing of her own, then he may still be able to manipulate her behavior, but he will not be successful in actually changing her own assessment of herself, in gaslighting her.
“If the victim interprets the gaslighter ' s abrupt and aggressive behavior as indicative of some (ultimately epistemic) failure to properly see the situation on his part, rather than as arising from a failing of her own, then he may still be able to manipulate her behavior, but he will not be successful in actually changing her own assessment of herself , in gaslighting her.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 1. The gaslighting phenomenon and Abramson ' s analysisEpistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons are equally essential to a complete understanding of gaslighting.
“I think, however, that these latter are equally essential to a complete understanding of the phenomenon.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2The gaslighter has a twofold project: an ongoing project of getting his victim to accept that she is not competent to make certain (or most) kinds of judgments and so should not trust herself, and an appeal to the results of this project as a premise to compel compliance or ward off critique on particular occasions.
“The gaslighter thus, arguably, has a twofold project. There is the ongoing project of getting his victim to accept that she is, in general, not competent to make certain (or most) kinds of judgments and so should not trust herself, and then there is the appeal to the results of this project as a sort of premise to compel compliance or ward o ff critique from the victim on particular occasions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2In gaslighting, destroying another person's standing to issue challenges specifically means bringing it about that the other person views herself as deficient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret situations, think, and choose for herself.
“what it means to ' destroy ' another person ' s standing to issue challenges, in the context of gaslighting, is speci fi cally to bring it about that the other person views herself as de fi cient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret situations, think, and choose for herself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2In the Gas Light example, it is because Paula trusts Gregory as a reliable judge of how things are, and because he then systematically manufactures plausible evidence that her faculties are untrustworthy, that she is brought to the point where she is no longer confident in her own judgments.
“It is because Paula trusts Gregory as a reliable judge of how things are, and because he then systematically manufactures plausible evidence that her faculties are untrustworthy, that she is brought to the point where she is no longer con fi dent in her own judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 1. The gaslighting phenomenon and Abramson ' s analysisAbramson's account focuses on the role of manipulation in gaslighting while downplaying epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons.
“Abramson ' s account focuses on the role of manipulation in gaslighting while downplaying epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Abramson 2014 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2The gaslighter's attempt to undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent is an attempt to wrong her specifically in her capacity as a knower, and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker's sense.
“his attempt to undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent surely is an attempt to wrong her ' speci fi cally in her capacity as a knower ' , and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker ' s sense of this term (Fricker 2007, 20).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fricker 2007, 20 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2Gaslighting at least can be about the epistemic status of the gaslighter and about giving the victim primarily epistemic reasons to distrust her own experience and judgment.
“it seems clear that gaslighting at least can be about the epistemic status of the gaslighter and about giving the victim primarily epistemic reasons to distrust her own experience and judgment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trustAn agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust for prudential reasons, such as desiring to avoid negative personal or professional consequences, or the desire to maintain an intimate relationship or friendship.
“In particular, an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust for prudential reasons, such as desiring to avoid negative personal or professional consequences, or the desire to maintain an intimate relationship or friendship.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistanceThe account implies that at least some victims of gaslighting who capitulate to their gaslighters are to some degree responsible for this capitulation when two conditions are met: the victim must possess sufficient reasons that the epistemically reasonable thing is to retain self-trust, and the victim must be psychologically able to correctly recognize and process the reasons available to her.
“The account I have o ff ered here does imply that at least some victims of gaslighting who capitulate to their gaslighters are to some degree responsible for this capitulation. This will be so when two conditions are met. First, the victim must in fact be in possession of su ffi cient reasons concerning herself, her gaslighter, and their situation that the epistemically reasonable thing to do when”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreementFrom the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting is a profoundly epistemic phenomenon having to do both with questions of epistemic self-trust and with the issue of epistemic peer- or even authority-disagreement.
“Thus, from the standpoint of the victim of gaslighting, gaslighting is a profoundly epistemic phenomenon having to do both with questions of epistemic self-trust and with the issue of epistemic peer- or even authoritydisagreement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsFourth epistemic dimension: self-trust is a fundamental epistemic value and the condition of all other meaningful epistemic agency, thus an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust on anything but epistemic grounds.
“Fourth, and fi nally, self-trust is a fundamental epistemic value and the condition of all other meaningful epistemic agency, thus an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust on anything but epistemic grounds.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trustEpistemic self-trust is default and reflectively rational to have, but it is subject to defeat.
“Epistemic self-trust is, as discussed above, default and re fl ectively rational to have, but it is subject to defeat.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsGaslighting is distinct from mere silencing, from creating an environment where everyone else believes the victim is wrong, and from creating a situation where the victim has no choice but to acquiesce, even while not agreeing.
“Thus, gaslighting is distinct from mere silencing, from creating an environment where everyone else believes the victim is wrong, and also from creating a situation where the victim has no choice but to acquiesce, even while not agreeing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsSecond epistemic dimension: in asserting that his victim lacks a clear grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is always at least tacitly asserting that he has a better grasp, which is a kind of claim to epistemic status or authority.
“Second, in asserting that his victim lacks a clear grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is always at least tacitly asserting that he has a better grasp, and this is a kind of claim to epistemic status or authority.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreementThe gaslighter begins the process of gaslighting by introducing cognitive dissonance into the relationship with his victim, dissonance that specifically requires the victim to decide between her own way of viewing things and that of the gaslighter, and the gaslighter then works directly or indirectly to ensure that the victim resolves the dissonance in his favor, specifically by downgrading hercon
“the gaslighter begins the process of gaslighting by introducing cognitive dissonance, often quite emotionally charged cognitive dissonance, into the relationship with his victim, dissonance that speci fi cally requires the victim to decide between her own way of viewing things and that of the gaslighter, and the gaslighter then works directly or indirectly to ensure that the victim resolves the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistanceThe victim ought not concede her epistemic self-trust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons.
“First, I have argued that the victim ought not concede her epistemic selftrust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trustThe proposed epistemic norm applies primarily to a subject's global or total epistemic self-trust.
“An additional point to be noted here is that the epistemic norm I am proposing applies primarily to a subject ' s ' global ' or ' total ' epistemic selftrust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsGaslighting involves the gaslighter pursuing this goal by means of a strategy of manipulation, fabrication, and deception.
“that the gaslighter (iii) pursues this goal by means of a strategy of manipulation, fabrication, and deception”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistanceThe gaslighter's goal is to completely neutralize his victim's conception of herself as an independent locus of thought and criticism.
“The gaslighter ' s goal is to completely neutralize his victim ' s conception of herself as an independent locus of thought and criticism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsThird epistemic dimension: from the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting always places her in a situation of epistemic peer disagreement with her gaslighter, where the point of disagreement is specifically whether her own cognitive faculties are reliable or not, and she must weigh her trust in the gaslighter and associated evidence against her own self-trust.
“Third, from the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting always places her in a situation of epistemic peer disagreement with her gaslighter, where the point of disagreement is speci fi cally whether her own cognitive faculties are reliable or not, and she must weigh her trust in the gaslighter and associated evidence for this against her own self-trust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trustIf an agent accepts that her cognitive faculties, perceptions, judgments, and overall grasp of her own situation are all substantially deficient, then she is no longer in a position to endorse as rational her judgments and is no longer able to meaningfully go forward as an agent.
“If an agent accepts that her cognitive faculties, perceptions, judgments, and overall grasp of her own situation are all substantially de fi cient, then she is no longer in a position to endorse as rational, under any understanding of ' rational ' , the judgements she arrives at, and so is no longer able to meaningfully go forward as an agent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5. The victim of gaslighting: reasons and self-trust-undermining reasonsThe victim who capitulates to the gaslighter and cedes her self-trust for any reasons other than legitimate epistemic ones, when not doing so is within her power, is violating a basic epistemic norm.
“Namely, the victim who capitulates to the gaslighter and cedes her self-trust for any reasons other than legitimate epistemic ones, when not doing so is within her power, is violating what I suggest is a basic epistemic norm.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreementThe gaslighter's goal is to convince his victim that her thoughts, perceptions, memories, judgments, and evaluations of the situation are so unreliable that she should put little or no credence in their deliverances, and should instead see things as he sees them.
“The gaslighter ' s goal is to convince his victim that her thoughts, perceptions, memories, judgments, and evaluations of the situation are so unreliable that she should put little or no credence in their deliverances, and should instead see things as he sees them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsGaslighting involves the attempt by one person, the gaslighter, to undermine his victim's self-trust: her conception of herself as an autonomous locus of experience, thought, and judgment.
“The account on o ff er here suggests that Gaslighting involves (i) the attempt by one person, the gaslighter, to undermine his victim ' s self-trust: her conception of herself as an autonomous locus of experience, thought, and judgment;”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsThe most distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it is not enough for the gaslighter simply to control his victim or have things go his way: it is essential to him that the victim herself actually come to agree with him.
“The most distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it is not enough for the gaslighter simply to control his victim or have things go his way: it is essential to him that the victim herself actually come to agree with him.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensionsGaslighting involves the gaslighter's motivation to gain or maintain control of his victim specifically by means of getting her to internalize a view of herself that both neutralizes her ability to criticize him and ensures her consent to his way of viewing things.
“that the gaslighter ' s (ii) motivation is to gain or maintain control of his victim speci fi cally by means of getting her to internalize a view of herself that both neutralizes her ability to criticize him and ensures her consent to his way of viewing things (speci fi cally with regard to issues relevant to the relationship, perhaps in general);”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistanceThere are cases of gaslighting where rational resistance of the sort described is simply not an option for the victim, and such cases are possible and likely quite frequent.
“Nor do I deny that there are cases of gaslighting where rational resistance of the sort I have been describing here is simply not an option for the victim. Indeed, I think such cases are possible and likely quite frequent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreementGaslighting centrally involves the gaslighter attempting to gain concessions from his victim by reducing her, by her own lights, to an epistemic inferior or dependent.
“I take this move to be a central element in gas-lighting: the gas-lighter attempts to gain concessions from his victim by reducing her, by her own lights, to an epistemic inferior or dependent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trustOur epistemic agency, while fundamental, is fragile such that we are all, in principle, susceptible to gaslighting.
“but this just highlights the point that our epistemic agency, while fundamental, is also fragile such that we are all, in principle, susceptible to gaslighting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
“Abramson begins her discussion by introducing a variety of cases that are plausibly considered gaslighting. I ' ll consider two of these here in order to frame the discussion.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Gaslighting is possible in many interpersonal contexts involving trust or authority, such as employee-employer relationships and relationships amongst peers of various sorts.
“Gaslighting is not limited to intimate partners in a relationship. As characterized here, gaslighting is possible in many interpersonal contexts involving trust or authority, such as employee-employer relationships and relationships amongst peers of various sorts (friends, co-workers, fellow students, etc.).”
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BackgroundEpistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Zagzebski, L. T. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001 · Cited by 489 · see citing works
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BackgroundTURNING UP THE LIGHTS ON GASLIGHTING
Abramson, K. (2014) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12046 · Cited by 422 · cited 6× · see citing works
“…involve credibility assessments into a situation in which credibility assessments are not at issue, because there is no credibility to be assessed’ (Abramson 2014, 17), so long as this means specifically getting the victim to change her mind about her assessment of her own credibility, her…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEpistemic authority: a theory of trust, authority, and autonomy in belief
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Epistemic justification: internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues
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BackgroundImplicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence
Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.006 · Cited by 72 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Whatever account of well-being is accepted, phenomena such as confabulation and self-deception seem to point rather clearly to ways in which epistemic rationality and prudential rationality of belief can come apart (Mele 2002; Hirstein 2009; Sullivan-Bissett 2015).”
BackgroundGaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence
Spear, A. D. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9611-z · Cited by 53 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Versions of the arguments of Sections 3 and 4 first appeared in a briefer form in (Spear 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationConfabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy
Hirstein, W. (2009) · doi:10.4135/9781452257044.n70 · Cited by 35
Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy
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“The first is that an individual who suffers from cognitive defects, vices, or malfunction may, for this very reason, be unable to appreciate and rationally respond to even the most significant evidence that this is the case bout her (see, e.g. Kornblith 1998).”
BackgroundHirstein, W. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208913.001.0001 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Disagreement and the value of self-trust
Pasnau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0413-x · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Well-being and Prudential Value
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Cotter, K. (2023) · Information, Communication & Society · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2021.1994624 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
Dupuis, D. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.730031 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
“The infestation diagnosis, at first received with circumspection by Adrien, provokes indeed, in a dynamic evoking a form of “epistemic gaslighting”25 (Spear, 2019), a process of (self)-doubt and epistemic destabilization, eventually leading the participant to verify in an embodied fashion the…”
BackgroundBoult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.001.0001 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Peels, R. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.001.0001 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’
Barnes, E. (2023) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqad035 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice
McGlynn, A. (2020) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10078-z · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
Houlders, J. W., Bortolotti, L., & Broome, M. R. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03133-4 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
“Indeed, in paradigmatic cases of gaslighting (Spear, 2019), attributing mental illness or mental instability to a person is a means of discrediting their testimony and creates an opportunity to take advantage of them (as in George Cukor’s 1944 film, Gaslight).”
BackgroundA qualitative analysis of gaslighting in romantic relationships
Klein, W., Li, S., & Wood, S. C. (2023) · Personal Relationships · doi:10.1111/pere.12510 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order
Podosky, P. C. (2020) · Hypatia · doi:10.1017/hyp.2020.54 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Gaslighting in nursing academia: A new or established covert form of bullying?
Christensen, M., & Evans-Murray, A. (2021) · Nursing Forum · doi:10.1111/nuf.12588 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Côté, C. I. (2024) · Medicine Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-024-10210-1 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
“Part-nership also aims to support the development of patients’ autonomy and knowledge and to consider the biopsycho-social aspects of illness in care, particularly patients’ life projects (Pomey et al. 2015; Spear 2023).”
Hailes, H. P., & Goodman, L. A. (2023) · Journal of Family Violence · doi:10.1007/s10896-023-00652-1 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Kirk‐Giannini, C. D. (2022) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-022-01872-9 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
“…and seeks to understand gaslighting as a species of testimonial injustice involving disregard for the victim’s first-person authority.4 More recent authors remain divided between the two camps: Stark (2019) and Spear (2019, 2020) are intentionalists; Podosky (2021) is an antiintentionalist.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPost-truth Politics and Collective Gaslighting
Rietdijk, N. (2021) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2021.24 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
“According to Zagzebski (2012) and Spear (2019), this is the basic belief that my cognitive faculties are overall reliable, that they generally deliver accurate data and that I am able to correctly form true beliefs on the basis of them.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLookism as Epistemic Injustice
Spiegel, T. J. (2022) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2022.2076629 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“Gaslighting is a form of manipulation that aims at undermining the epistemic selftrust of the person being gaslit (Spear 2019, 10ff.); the purpose of gaslighting is to ‘induce in someone the sense that her reactions, perceptions, memories and/or beliefs’ are mistaken (Abramson 2014, 2).”
BackgroundEmotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy
Sodoma, K. A. (2022) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2022.2121894 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
“2021), and discussed the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting (Spear 2019) as well as its relation to testimonial injustice (McKinnon 2017).”
BackgroundInfluentialMoffitt, U., & Syed, M. (2020) · Identity · doi:10.1080/15283488.2020.1838804 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Racial gaslighting as affective injustice: a conceptual framework for education
Zembylas, M. (2024) · Race Ethnicity and Education · doi:10.1080/13613324.2024.2306680 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
“For example, this literature has discussed the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting (Spear, 2023), its relation to testimonial injustice (McKinnon 2017), and how it functions as epistemic violence (Graves and Spencer 2022).”
BackgroundFabry, R. E. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2024.2373284 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“This stands in conflict with Abramson’s (2014) view, according to which “[. . . ] gaslighting puts questions of credibility deficits and excesses off the table entirely” (p. 17; for a critical discussion, see Spear, 2023).”
Badenes-Sastre, M., Acosta, M. L., Beltrán-Morillas, A. M., et al. (2023) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-023-05101-2 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“…destructive for IPVAW victims, with the aggressor trying to persuade the victim that her perceptions, judgments, memories, thoughts, and assessments of the situation are highly flawed, to the extent that she should adopt the aggressor’s perspective and discredit her own (Spear, 2019; Sweet, 2019).”
Illuminating Gaslighting: A Comprehensive Interdisciplinary Review of Gaslighting Literature
Darke, L., Paterson, H. M., & van Golde, C. (2025) · Journal of Family Violence · doi:10.1007/s10896-025-00805-4 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
“The con-trol, threat, and leverage identified by Abramson ( 2014) and Stark (2019) may then exacerbate this epistemic dilemma as the manipulative pressure may prevent victims from properly assessing the credibility and misleading evidence put towards them by their partner (Spear 2023).”
A Theoretical Framework for Studying the Phenomenon of Gaslighting
Klein, W., Wood, S. C., & Bartz, J. A. (2025) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/10888683251342291 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Badenes-Sastre, M., Medinilla-Tena, P., Spencer, C. M., & Expósito, F. (2025) · Psychosocial Intervention · doi:10.5093/pi2025a3 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Defining Gaslighting in Gender-Based Violence: A Mixed-Methods Systematic Review
Adair, J. (2025) · Trauma Violence & Abuse · doi:10.1177/15248380251344316 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Furthermore, while the term gaslighting has recently gained significant attention, its definition is still highly debated in both social and academic contexts (Hailes & Goodman, 2023; Paul-Mikhail, 2021; Spear, 2023).”
InfluentialSocial Exclusion, Epistemic Injustice, and Intellectual Self-Trust
Leefmann, J. (2021) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2021.2004620 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“For a discussions of the epistemic dimensions of gaslighting see also (Spear 2019).”
BackgroundNormative Isolation: The Dynamics of Power and Authority in Gaslighting
Bagnoli, C. (2023) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/arisup/akad002 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The politeness of criticism speech acts in Japanese and Minangkabau films
Haristiani, N., Septiana, A., Nor, N. F. M., et al. (2023) · Indonesian Journal of Applied Linguistics · doi:10.17509/ijal.v13i1.58272 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“By employing this sub-strategy, the speaker aims to reach a solution or mediation for the issues at hand while avoiding offense to the speech partner (Spear, 2019; Tawilapakul, 2022).”
BackgroundMethodGASLIGHTING: A ARTE DE ENLOUQUECER GRUPOS MINORITÁRIOS NO AMBIENTE DE TRABALHO
Irigaray, H. A. R., Stocker, F., & Mancebo, R. C. (2022) · Revista de Administração de Empresas · doi:10.1590/s0034-759020230105 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Esses agressores aniquilam a possibilidade de existência de um locus autônomo de pensamento, julgamento e ação de suas vítimas (Spear, 2019) , num jogo de manipulação, principal elemento constitutivo das diferentes estratégias de gaslighting (Fordon, 2019) , apresentadas a seguir.”
BackgroundGASLIGHTING: THE ART OF DRIVING MINORITY GROUPS MAD AT WORK
Irigaray, H. A. R., Stocker, F., & Mancebo, R. C. (2022) · Revista de Administração de Empresas · doi:10.1590/s0034-759020230105x · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Tightlacing and Abusive Normative Address
Edlich, A., & Archer, A. (2023) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.4644 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
McDonald, L. (2024) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2024.2379264 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Côté, C. I. (2025) · Social Theory & Health · doi:10.1057/s41285-025-00218-9 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Misgendering is recognized as a harmful microaggression (Freeman and Stewart 2018; Spear 2023).”
The Epistemic Harms of Botched Apologies for Past Wrongs
Tobi, A. (2025) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.70050 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Côte, C. I. (2026) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhag003 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Moussawi, G., & Reyes, V. (2024) · Critical Sociology · doi:10.1177/08969205241292752 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Vulnerability is not a checklist: Grounded Normative Theory in global deliberation
Veloso, L. H. N., Curato, N., Ross, M., & Morán, A. (2025) · Qualitative Research · doi:10.1177/14687941251341997 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Decades of research have demonstrated that women and people from racialised and minoritised backgrounds are more susceptible to humiliation, gaslighting and silencing compared to actors from more privileged backgrounds (Abramson and Baram, 2024; Spear, 2023).”
Toxic Positivity and Epistemic Injustice
de Rijk, S. J. (2025) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2025.7 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“After hearing this (or similar sentiments) over and over, Joe begins to doubt the accuracy of his appraisal (and the perceptions on which this appraisal is based) of his grandmother ’ s passing as an event worthy of grief (Ivy 2017; Spear 2023).”
InfluentialSengkey, M. M., & Illahibaccus-Sona, S. B. (2024) · INSPIRA Indonesian Journal of Psychological Research · doi:10.32505/inspira.v5i1.7277 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“The victim will question his knowledge of himself and his surroundings (Spear, 2023).”
BackgroundGaslighting jako forma przemocy psychicznej w ujęciu kryminologicznym
Romańczuk-Grącka, M. (2021) · Studia Prawnoustrojowe · doi:10.31648/sp.6614 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Trusting Traumatic Memory: Considerations from Memory Science
Springle, A. A., Dreier, R., & Goldwasser, S. (2023) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2023.31 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Medical gaslighting as a threat to beneficence and patient autonomy: a qualitative study
Bokek‐Cohen, Y., & Gabay, G. (2025) · BMC Medical Ethics · doi:10.1186/s12910-025-01324-z · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Bùi, T. H. T., Nguyen, T. N. N., Hoang, M. A., & Tran, T. T. H. (2025) · International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling · doi:10.1007/s10447-025-09619-x · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“In contrast, relationships marked by gaslighting undermine this process by inducing victims to question their perceptions of reality, thereby eroding self-trust (Spear, 2023).”
Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice
Lee, J. Y. (2022) · The Journal of Value Inquiry · doi:10.1007/s10790-021-09842-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Trächtler, J. (2022) · Nordic Wittgenstein Review · doi:10.15845/nwr.v11.3632 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Do Political Convictions Infect Every Fibre of Our Being?
Ulatowski, J. W., & Lumsden, D. P. (2023) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2023.2186752 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Garrick, J., & Buck, M. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-19055-1_3 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0001 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
New theoretical approaches to the study of the phenomenon of gaslighting
Ermolova, T. V., Litvinov, A. V., Balygina, E. A., et al. (2024) · Journal of Modern Foreign Psychology · doi:10.17759/jmfp.2024130112 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.003.0002 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Fallis, D. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190949945.013.11 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Christiansen, M. L. (2021) · Griot Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“El epistemicidio destruye el bien cognoscitivo más básico, natural y prerreflexivo, sin el cual una persona no sería un sujeto epistémico: la credibilidad, y con ello la confianza en sí mismo y en otros argumentadores (ZAGZEBSKI, 2012; SPEAR, 2019, 2020; FRICKER, 2017; SHKLAR, 2013).”
BackgroundRobertson, S. (2022) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2021.13
Christiansen, M. L. (2021) · Griot Revista de Filosofia · doi:10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2407
Tom Sawyer as Philosopher: Lying and Deception on the Mississippi
Fallis, D. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97134-6_110-1
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0005
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0006
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.002.0006
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0012
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.002.0004
The Nature of Propositional Ignorance
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0003
Varieties of Propositional Ignorance
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0004
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0010
The Roots of Culpable Ignorance
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0011
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0002
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0008
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0007
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.003.0009
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.002.0013
Peels, R. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197654514.002.0003
Una autoetnografía sobre el estigma y la opresión médica en el Síndrome de Fatiga Crónica
Castro, J. P. B. (2023) · LATAM Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades · doi:10.56712/latam.v4i2.664
Tom Sawyer as Philosopher: Lying and Deception on the Mississippi
Fallis, D. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97134-6_110-2
A Moving Image of Scepticism: Cavell on Film, Gender, and Gaslighting
Havercroft, J. (2024) · Journal of Social and Political Philosophy · doi:10.3366/jspp.2024.0069
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.002.0004
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.002.0003
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.003.0008
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.003.0007
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.002.0006
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.003.0001
Boult, C. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192890580.003.0009
Tom Sawyer as Philosopher: Lying and Deception on the Mississippi
Fallis, D. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24685-2_110
Self-inflicted epistemic injustice
Kotsonis, A. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2025.2505497 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Okray, Z., Köroğlu, B., & Öke, D. (2025) · Cyprus Turkish Journal of Psychiatry and Psychology · doi:10.35365/ctjpp.25.3.02
Moral Wrongs, Epistemic Wrongs: Epistemic Injustice as a Global Failure of Recognition
Álvarez, A. G. (2025) · Philosophy & Social Criticism · doi:10.1177/01914537251407968 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Racial Gaslighting in Britain: Politics and Power
Burnett, J., & Hanks, S. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-02242-4_23
Hailes, H. P., & Goodman, L. A. (2026) · Gezinstherapie Wereldwijd · doi:10.1007/s12440-026-00273-2
“De term verwijst naar een specifieke vorm van mishandeling waarbij de ene persoon de andere manipuleert, waardoor deze laatste gaat twijfelen aan zijn eigen fundamentele herinneringen, percepties of overtuigingen (Spear 2019).”
Modelling Collective Epistemic Trust
McCraw, B. W. (2026) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-026-00686-2
An Interdisciplinary Review of the Gaslighting Literature and Future Research Agenda
Kincaid, P. A., & Stalion, S. C. O. (2026) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.70103
Stroud, R. (2026) · Hypatia · doi:10.1017/hyp.2026.10085
Agricultural gaslighting: extractive logics in agrarian governance in Malawi
Moyo, D. Z., & Murrey, A. (2026) · African Geographical Review · doi:10.1080/19376812.2026.2703668
Hidden Harm in Young Relationships: Sociodemographic and Temporal Patterns of Gaslighting Exposure
Vančová, Z., & Martonyik, J. (2026) · Psychological Reports · doi:10.1177/00332941261481778
Psychological Manipulation and Gaslighting in Relationships: A Review
ÖZÇAĞLI, M., Karaaziz, M., & Balkır, F. (2026) · European Archives of Social Sciences · doi:10.35365/eass.26.1.18
Belonging, Self-Trust, and Epistemic Repair
Catala, A. (2026) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2026.10142
- Authors
- Spear, A. D.
- Affiliations
- Grand Valley State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Spear, Andrew D.
- ORCID
- Spear, Andrew D.
- Venue
- Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2019-04-25
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 68-91
- ISSN
- 0020-174X (ISSN-L)
- 1502-3923
- OpenAlex
- W2940633879
- Semantic Scholar
- 03e8086148cbae7aa5116b1a729b04c76349fb42
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 3
- FWCI
- 11.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Inquiry (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- ScholarWorks - GVSU (Grand Valley State University) (submittedVersion)
- Language arts journal of Michigan (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- gaslighting, epistemic injustice, peer disagreement, self-trust, Miranda Fricker
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