Cited by 97Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice

Open access
Spear, Andrew D.·2023·Inquiry

Abstract

Miranda Fricker has characterized epistemic injustice as “a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007, Epistemic injustice: Power & the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20). Gaslighting, where one agent seeks to gain control over another by undermining the other’s conception of herself as an independent locus of judgment and deliberation, would thus seem to be a paradigm example. Yet, in the most thorough analysis of gaslighting to date (Abramson, K. 2014. “Turning up the lights on gaslighting.” Philosophical Perspectives 28, Ethics: 1–30), the idea that gaslighting has crucial epistemic dimensions is rather roundly rejected on grounds that gaslighting works by means of a strategy of assertion and manipulation that is not properly understood in epistemic terms. I argue that Abramson’s focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim, for whom the experience of gaslighting has substantial and essential epistemic features. Taking these features into account reveals that all gaslighting has epistemic dimensions and helps to clarify what resistance to gaslighting might look like.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Spear argues that gaslighting has essential epistemic dimensions that Kate Abramson’s manipulation-focused account downplays, especially the gaslighter’s tacit claim to epistemic superiority and the victim’s challenged epistemic self-trust. From the victim’s standpoint, gaslighting becomes a peer-disagreement about her own cognitive reliability, and resistance is grounded in a norm that global self-trust should be defeated only for epistemic reasons.

Key findings

  • Against Abramson, Spear argues that all gaslighting has an epistemic dimension: by asserting that the victim fails to grasp the situation, the gaslighter tacitly claims to see it better and thus claims epistemic status or authority.
  • The victim experiences gaslighting as epistemic peer-disagreement “with a twist”: the disputed proposition is the reliability of her own cognitive faculties, so she must weigh trust in herself against trust in the gaslighter as a sincere peer or authority.
  • Spear proposes a basic epistemic norm: “It is rational for an agent to accept that her epistemic agency is globally undermined only for epistemic reasons.” Capitulating to gaslighting for merely prudential or moral reasons violates this norm.
  • Resistance can be grounded in this norm and in the value of self-trust; Spear cites Pasnau’s argument that self-trust may permissibly override conciliationist demands in peer disagreement, though some victims may be unable to resist due to manipulation or social conditions.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis rather than empirical study, developed through close engagement with Abramson’s 2014 account of gaslighting and Fricker’s epistemic injustice.
  • Uses two paradigm film examples: Paula and Gregory in *Gas Light* (1944) and Pat and Collier in *Pat and Mike* (1952).
  • Main analysis distinguishes epistemic from prudential reasons, discusses defeaters, draws on Zagzebski on self-trust and the epistemology of peer disagreement, and proposes a norm governing defeat of epistemic self-trust.

Limitations

  • The author states that limitations of space prevent addressing two further issues: that an agent with cognitive defects may be unable to appreciate evidence of them, and the paradox of rationally judging one’s own cognitive faculties untrustworthy (footnote 4).
  • The author also says resolving whether prudential and epistemic rationality align is beyond the essay’s scope (footnote 3).
  • Evident from the text: the argument is normative and conceptual, with no empirical sample or data; the author explicitly notes that who gaslights whom predominantly is an empirical question depending on social and cultural factors.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610051

Cites

25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Claims the paper makes

0 of 11 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Interpretationcitation
    § Thus,

    Gaslighter and victim typically stand in a significant relationship of trust or authority, such that the gaslighter can leverage specific interests of his victim to motivate her compliance.

    “While Abramson does not stress the point, her analysis makes it clear that gaslighter and victim will typically stand in a signi fi cant relationship of trust or authority, such that the gaslighter is able to leverage speci fi c interests of his victim either in him, in their relationship, or in her social or economic situation that can motivate her compliance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Abramson 2014 source
  • Interpretationnone given
    § ABSTRACT

    Every gaslighter makes at least a tacit claim to a position of epistemic superiority relative to his victim, one that plays a role in the victim's experience of gaslighting.

    “every gaslighter makes at least a tacit claim to a position of epistemic superiority relative to his victim, one that plays a role in the victim ' s experience of gaslighting.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    In typical cases of gaslighting, the gaslighter attempts to convince the victim that she should not trust herself: that she is crazy or oversensitive, that her grasp of the situation is too defective for reliable judgments, or that her judgments themselves cannot be trusted.

    “First and foremost, he is attempting to convince her that she should not trust herself: that she is ' crazy ' or ' oversensitive ' , that her grasp of the situation is too defective for her to make reliable judgments about it, or that her judgments themselves can ' t be trusted.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § ABSTRACT

    The conditions under which it is reasonable for someone to accept defeat for their own epistemic self-trust (and so to conciliate in the disagreement with the gaslighter) are particularly pertinent to understanding the situation of the victim of gaslighting as well as what well-grounded resistance to gaslighting might look like.

    “I discuss the conditions under which it is reasonable for someone to accept defeat for their own epistemic self-trust (and so to conciliate in the disagreement with the gaslighter), and argue that these conditions are particularly pertinent to understanding the situation of the victim of gaslighting as well as what well-grounded resistance to gaslighting might look like.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    To say to someone that they fail to see a situation correctly is to tacitly claim to see that same situation at least somewhat better.

    “to say to someone that they fail to see a situation correctly, whether calmly and quietly, or abruptly and unpleasantly (as the gaslighter frequently does: ' that ' s crazy ' or ' that ' s just what you would think ' ) is to tacitly claim to see that same situation at least somewhat better.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 19
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 20
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    Gaslighting efforts can gain purchase only if the victim trusts the gaslighter, and an essential part of this trust must be epistemic.

    “his gaslighting e ff orts can gain purchase only if the victim trusts him, and an essential part of this trust must, I argue, be epistemic.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § ABSTRACT

    Abramson's focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim.

    “I argue that Abramson ' s focus on the gaslighter and on the moral wrongness of his actions leads her to downplay ways in which gaslighters nevertheless deploy genuinely epistemic strategies, and to devote less attention to the standpoint and reasoning processes of the victim”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Abramson 2014 source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § ABSTRACT

    Because the victim trusts both herself and her gaslighter, his challenge to her self-trust generates, from her standpoint, a situation of epistemic peer-disagreement where what she and her gaslighter disagree about is specifically her own epistemic standing, and so her entitlement to epistemic self-trust.

    “Because the victim trusts both herself and her gaslighter, his challenge to her self-trust generates, from her standpoint, a situation of epistemic peerdisagreement where what she and her gaslighter disagree about is speci fi cally her own epistemic standing, and so her entitlement to epistemic selftrust.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    If the victim interprets the gaslighter's abrupt and aggressive behavior as indicative of some epistemic failure to properly see the situation on his part, rather than as arising from a failing of her own, then he may still be able to manipulate her behavior, but he will not be successful in actually changing her own assessment of herself, in gaslighting her.

    “If the victim interprets the gaslighter ' s abrupt and aggressive behavior as indicative of some (ultimately epistemic) failure to properly see the situation on his part, rather than as arising from a failing of her own, then he may still be able to manipulate her behavior, but he will not be successful in actually changing her own assessment of herself , in gaslighting her.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 1. The gaslighting phenomenon and Abramson ' s analysis

    Epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons are equally essential to a complete understanding of gaslighting.

    “I think, however, that these latter are equally essential to a complete understanding of the phenomenon.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    The gaslighter has a twofold project: an ongoing project of getting his victim to accept that she is not competent to make certain (or most) kinds of judgments and so should not trust herself, and an appeal to the results of this project as a premise to compel compliance or ward off critique on particular occasions.

    “The gaslighter thus, arguably, has a twofold project. There is the ongoing project of getting his victim to accept that she is, in general, not competent to make certain (or most) kinds of judgments and so should not trust herself, and then there is the appeal to the results of this project as a sort of premise to compel compliance or ward o ff critique from the victim on particular occasions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    In gaslighting, destroying another person's standing to issue challenges specifically means bringing it about that the other person views herself as deficient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret situations, think, and choose for herself.

    “what it means to ' destroy ' another person ' s standing to issue challenges, in the context of gaslighting, is speci fi cally to bring it about that the other person views herself as de fi cient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret situations, think, and choose for herself.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    In the Gas Light example, it is because Paula trusts Gregory as a reliable judge of how things are, and because he then systematically manufactures plausible evidence that her faculties are untrustworthy, that she is brought to the point where she is no longer confident in her own judgments.

    “It is because Paula trusts Gregory as a reliable judge of how things are, and because he then systematically manufactures plausible evidence that her faculties are untrustworthy, that she is brought to the point where she is no longer con fi dent in her own judgments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 1. The gaslighting phenomenon and Abramson ' s analysis

    Abramson's account focuses on the role of manipulation in gaslighting while downplaying epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons.

    “Abramson ' s account focuses on the role of manipulation in gaslighting while downplaying epistemic factors such as testimony, evidence, and reasons.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Abramson 2014 source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    The gaslighter's attempt to undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent is an attempt to wrong her specifically in her capacity as a knower, and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker's sense.

    “his attempt to undermine her own assessment of herself as a credible epistemic agent surely is an attempt to wrong her ' speci fi cally in her capacity as a knower ' , and so is an epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker ' s sense of this term (Fricker 2007, 20).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fricker 2007, 20 source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3. Epistemic dimensions of the gaslighter ' s gaslighting 2

    Gaslighting at least can be about the epistemic status of the gaslighter and about giving the victim primarily epistemic reasons to distrust her own experience and judgment.

    “it seems clear that gaslighting at least can be about the epistemic status of the gaslighter and about giving the victim primarily epistemic reasons to distrust her own experience and judgment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust

    An agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust for prudential reasons, such as desiring to avoid negative personal or professional consequences, or the desire to maintain an intimate relationship or friendship.

    “In particular, an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust for prudential reasons, such as desiring to avoid negative personal or professional consequences, or the desire to maintain an intimate relationship or friendship.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance

    The account implies that at least some victims of gaslighting who capitulate to their gaslighters are to some degree responsible for this capitulation when two conditions are met: the victim must possess sufficient reasons that the epistemically reasonable thing is to retain self-trust, and the victim must be psychologically able to correctly recognize and process the reasons available to her.

    “The account I have o ff ered here does imply that at least some victims of gaslighting who capitulate to their gaslighters are to some degree responsible for this capitulation. This will be so when two conditions are met. First, the victim must in fact be in possession of su ffi cient reasons concerning herself, her gaslighter, and their situation that the epistemically reasonable thing to do when”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement

    From the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting is a profoundly epistemic phenomenon having to do both with questions of epistemic self-trust and with the issue of epistemic peer- or even authority-disagreement.

    “Thus, from the standpoint of the victim of gaslighting, gaslighting is a profoundly epistemic phenomenon having to do both with questions of epistemic self-trust and with the issue of epistemic peer- or even authoritydisagreement.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Fourth epistemic dimension: self-trust is a fundamental epistemic value and the condition of all other meaningful epistemic agency, thus an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust on anything but epistemic grounds.

    “Fourth, and fi nally, self-trust is a fundamental epistemic value and the condition of all other meaningful epistemic agency, thus an agent should not accept defeat for her self-trust on anything but epistemic grounds.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust

    Epistemic self-trust is default and reflectively rational to have, but it is subject to defeat.

    “Epistemic self-trust is, as discussed above, default and re fl ectively rational to have, but it is subject to defeat.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Gaslighting is distinct from mere silencing, from creating an environment where everyone else believes the victim is wrong, and from creating a situation where the victim has no choice but to acquiesce, even while not agreeing.

    “Thus, gaslighting is distinct from mere silencing, from creating an environment where everyone else believes the victim is wrong, and also from creating a situation where the victim has no choice but to acquiesce, even while not agreeing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Second epistemic dimension: in asserting that his victim lacks a clear grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is always at least tacitly asserting that he has a better grasp, which is a kind of claim to epistemic status or authority.

    “Second, in asserting that his victim lacks a clear grasp of the situation, the gaslighter is always at least tacitly asserting that he has a better grasp, and this is a kind of claim to epistemic status or authority.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement

    The gaslighter begins the process of gaslighting by introducing cognitive dissonance into the relationship with his victim, dissonance that specifically requires the victim to decide between her own way of viewing things and that of the gaslighter, and the gaslighter then works directly or indirectly to ensure that the victim resolves the dissonance in his favor, specifically by downgrading hercon

    “the gaslighter begins the process of gaslighting by introducing cognitive dissonance, often quite emotionally charged cognitive dissonance, into the relationship with his victim, dissonance that speci fi cally requires the victim to decide between her own way of viewing things and that of the gaslighter, and the gaslighter then works directly or indirectly to ensure that the victim resolves the”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance

    The victim ought not concede her epistemic self-trust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons.

    “First, I have argued that the victim ought not concede her epistemic selftrust for anything but well-credentialed epistemic reasons.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust

    The proposed epistemic norm applies primarily to a subject's global or total epistemic self-trust.

    “An additional point to be noted here is that the epistemic norm I am proposing applies primarily to a subject ' s ' global ' or ' total ' epistemic selftrust.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Gaslighting involves the gaslighter pursuing this goal by means of a strategy of manipulation, fabrication, and deception.

    “that the gaslighter (iii) pursues this goal by means of a strategy of manipulation, fabrication, and deception”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance

    The gaslighter's goal is to completely neutralize his victim's conception of herself as an independent locus of thought and criticism.

    “The gaslighter ' s goal is to completely neutralize his victim ' s conception of herself as an independent locus of thought and criticism.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Third epistemic dimension: from the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting always places her in a situation of epistemic peer disagreement with her gaslighter, where the point of disagreement is specifically whether her own cognitive faculties are reliable or not, and she must weigh her trust in the gaslighter and associated evidence against her own self-trust.

    “Third, from the standpoint of the victim, gaslighting always places her in a situation of epistemic peer disagreement with her gaslighter, where the point of disagreement is speci fi cally whether her own cognitive faculties are reliable or not, and she must weigh her trust in the gaslighter and associated evidence for this against her own self-trust.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust

    If an agent accepts that her cognitive faculties, perceptions, judgments, and overall grasp of her own situation are all substantially deficient, then she is no longer in a position to endorse as rational her judgments and is no longer able to meaningfully go forward as an agent.

    “If an agent accepts that her cognitive faculties, perceptions, judgments, and overall grasp of her own situation are all substantially de fi cient, then she is no longer in a position to endorse as rational, under any understanding of ' rational ' , the judgements she arrives at, and so is no longer able to meaningfully go forward as an agent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 5. The victim of gaslighting: reasons and self-trust-undermining reasons

    The victim who capitulates to the gaslighter and cedes her self-trust for any reasons other than legitimate epistemic ones, when not doing so is within her power, is violating a basic epistemic norm.

    “Namely, the victim who capitulates to the gaslighter and cedes her self-trust for any reasons other than legitimate epistemic ones, when not doing so is within her power, is violating what I suggest is a basic epistemic norm.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement

    The gaslighter's goal is to convince his victim that her thoughts, perceptions, memories, judgments, and evaluations of the situation are so unreliable that she should put little or no credence in their deliverances, and should instead see things as he sees them.

    “The gaslighter ' s goal is to convince his victim that her thoughts, perceptions, memories, judgments, and evaluations of the situation are so unreliable that she should put little or no credence in their deliverances, and should instead see things as he sees them.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Gaslighting involves the attempt by one person, the gaslighter, to undermine his victim's self-trust: her conception of herself as an autonomous locus of experience, thought, and judgment.

    “The account on o ff er here suggests that Gaslighting involves (i) the attempt by one person, the gaslighter, to undermine his victim ' s self-trust: her conception of herself as an autonomous locus of experience, thought, and judgment;”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    The most distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it is not enough for the gaslighter simply to control his victim or have things go his way: it is essential to him that the victim herself actually come to agree with him.

    “The most distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it is not enough for the gaslighter simply to control his victim or have things go his way: it is essential to him that the victim herself actually come to agree with him.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 7. Conclusion: gaslighting and its epistemic dimensions

    Gaslighting involves the gaslighter's motivation to gain or maintain control of his victim specifically by means of getting her to internalize a view of herself that both neutralizes her ability to criticize him and ensures her consent to his way of viewing things.

    “that the gaslighter ' s (ii) motivation is to gain or maintain control of his victim speci fi cally by means of getting her to internalize a view of herself that both neutralizes her ability to criticize him and ensures her consent to his way of viewing things (speci fi cally with regard to issues relevant to the relationship, perhaps in general);”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 6. Epistemic self-trust, gaslighting, responsibility, and resistance

    There are cases of gaslighting where rational resistance of the sort described is simply not an option for the victim, and such cases are possible and likely quite frequent.

    “Nor do I deny that there are cases of gaslighting where rational resistance of the sort I have been describing here is simply not an option for the victim. Indeed, I think such cases are possible and likely quite frequent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § 4. The victim of gaslighting: epistemic self-trust and the epistemology of disagreement

    Gaslighting centrally involves the gaslighter attempting to gain concessions from his victim by reducing her, by her own lights, to an epistemic inferior or dependent.

    “I take this move to be a central element in gas-lighting: the gas-lighter attempts to gain concessions from his victim by reducing her, by her own lights, to an epistemic inferior or dependent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 5.2. A basic epistemic norm concerning the defeat-conditions for epistemic self-trust

    Our epistemic agency, while fundamental, is fragile such that we are all, in principle, susceptible to gaslighting.

    “but this just highlights the point that our epistemic agency, while fundamental, is also fragile such that we are all, in principle, susceptible to gaslighting.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
33 of 33
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The film cases (Gas Light and Pat and Mike) are genuine or paradigm examples of gaslighting.

    “Abramson begins her discussion by introducing a variety of cases that are plausibly considered gaslighting. I ' ll consider two of these here in order to frame the discussion.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Gaslighting is possible in many interpersonal contexts involving trust or authority, such as employee-employer relationships and relationships amongst peers of various sorts.

    “Gaslighting is not limited to intimate partners in a relationship. As characterized here, gaslighting is possible in many interpersonal contexts involving trust or authority, such as employee-employer relationships and relationships amongst peers of various sorts (friends, co-workers, fellow students, etc.).”
2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Carpenter A., 2018, Gaslighting America
  2. Clifford W. K., 1877, William K. Clifford: Lectures and Essays, 177
  3. Feldman R., 2003, Epistemology
  4. Stern R., 2007, The Gaslight Effect
  5. Taylor T. E., 2013, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly, 31, 10

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Spear, A. D.
Affiliations
Grand Valley State University (US)
Corresponding author
Spear, Andrew D.
Venue
Inquiry
Published
2019-04-25
Volume
66
Issue
1
Pages
68-91
ISSN
  • 0020-174X (ISSN-L)
  • 1502-3923
OpenAlex
W2940633879
Cited by
97
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 3
FWCI
11.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Inquiry (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • ScholarWorks - GVSU (Grand Valley State University) (submittedVersion)
  • Language arts journal of Michigan (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
gaslighting, epistemic injustice, peer disagreement, self-trust, Miranda Fricker

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