The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Autonomy and Personal History
Abstract
Virtually any appraisal of a person’s welfare, integrity, or moral status, as well as the moral and political theories built on such appraisals, will rely crucially on the presumption that her preferences and values are in some important sense her own. In particular, the nature and value of political freedom is intimately connected with the presupposition that actions one is left free to do flow from desires and values that are truly an expression of the ‘self-government’ of the agent. However, we all know that no person is self-made in the sense of being a fully formed and intact ‘will’ blossoming out of nowhere. Our values and preferences are explained by essential reference to a variety of influences that have come to bear on our development throughout our personal histories. What is needed, then, is to establish an account of self-determination or autonomy that would help determine just when and if the values and preferences we find ourselves with deserve the centrality that moral and political theories place on them.
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“Second, even authors whose accounts would not appear to mesh well with our usage here acknowledge that cases like GOV-1 need to be taken into account.”
From AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy (2022) · cites this paper as Christman, 1991
Citations
Cites
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality
Elster, J. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171694 · Cited by 1,577
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions
Schoeman, F. D. (1988) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625411 · Cited by 357
Strawson, G. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247493.001.0001 · Cited by 331
Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics.
Potter, N., & Haworth, L. L. (1990) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215537 · Cited by 155
The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy.John Christman
Lippke, R. L. (1991) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/293348 · Cited by 150
Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy
Christman, J. P. (1988) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/293038 · Cited by 143
Self-citationPersonal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty
Young, R. L. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 126
Lindley, R. I. (1986) · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-18428-6 · Cited by 126
Haworth, L. L. (1986) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt211qz2c · Cited by 124
Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty
Atkinson, R. F. (1987) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1987.tb01237.x · Cited by 110
Dworkin, G., & Rodopi, E. (1981) · Grazer Philosophische Studien · doi:10.5840/gps198112/1333 · Cited by 100
Self-Deception and Self-Understanding
Kittay, E. F. (1988) · Idealistic Studies · doi:10.5840/idstudies198818111 · Cited by 57
Young, R. (1980) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lxxxix.356.565 · Cited by 48
Ross, S., & Haight, M. R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184893 · Cited by 47
AUTONOMY: A DEFENSE OF THE SPLIT‐LEVEL SELF
Christman, J. P. (1987) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1987.tb01623.x · Cited by 31
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Parent, 1974, Some Recent Work on the Concept of Liberty, American Philosophical Quarterly, 11, 149
- Dworkin, 1981, Science and Ethics, 212
- Fingarette, 1969, Self Deception
- Feinberg, 1973, Social Philosophy, 1
Cited by
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What Happens When Someone Acts?
Velleman, J. D. (1992) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/101.403.461 · Cited by 583
Friedman, M. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0195138503.001.0001 · Cited by 563
Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice
Anderson, J. H., & Honneth, A. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610325.008 · Cited by 448
Recent Work on Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M. (1999) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233206 · Cited by 398
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism
Christman, J. P., & Anderson, J. H. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610325.002 · Cited by 342
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Christman, J.
- Affiliations
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Corresponding author
- Christman, John
- ORCID
- Christman, John
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-03
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 0045-5091 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-0820
- OpenAlex
- W1508410088
- Cited by
- 422
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 13.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Ethics and bioethics in healthcare
- Keywords
- autonomy, self-determination, personal history, self-government, political freedom, moral status, values and preferences, moral agency
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