AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy
Open accessAbstract
Advancements in machine learning have fuelled the popularity of using AI decision algorithms in procedures such as bail hearings, medical diagnoses and recruitment. Academic articles, policy texts, and popularizing books alike warn that such algorithms tend to be opaque : they do not provide explanations for their outcomes. Building on a causal account of transparency and opacity as well as recent work on the value of causal explanation, I formulate a moral concern for opaque algorithms that is yet to receive a systematic treatment in the literature: when such algorithms are used in life-changing decisions, they can obstruct us from effectively shaping our lives according to our goals and preferences, thus undermining our autonomy. I argue that this concern deserves closer attention as it furnishes the call for transparency in algorithmic decision-making with both new tools and new challenges.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that opaque AI decision algorithms can undermine personal autonomy by hiding the causal pathways through which affected parties could shape life-changing outcomes, even when the algorithms are reliable, fair, accountable, and negotiable. It develops a causal account of transparency/opacity and uses it to motivate transparency demands, while also identifying practical and legal obstacles.
Key findings
- Opacity and transparency are characterized causally: an AI system is opaque to someone to the extent they cannot grasp the causal explanations of its outcomes, and transparent to the extent they can.
- Because causal explanations enable prediction and control, opaque algorithms in life-changing decisions can obstruct people from effectively shaping their lives according to their goals and preferences, thereby threatening autonomy.
- This autonomy threat is distinct from other worries: an opaque algorithm could in principle be reliable, fair, trusted, accountable, and negotiable, yet still hide salient ways of affecting its outcomes.
- The paper notes that a meta-study of over 100 XAI texts lists 28 desiderata but does not mention opacity undermining affected parties’ ability to influence outcomes, and a review of 34 AI ethics documents similarly focuses on users rather than affected parties.
- Current legal instruments are inadequate: the GDPR does not provide a right to explanation of individual decisions, and the European Commission’s AI Act proposal would demand transparency toward users but not affected parties.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis; no empirical sample, dataset, or formal experiment is reported.
- The paper builds a causal account of transparency and opacity from interventionist accounts of causal explanation (e.g., Woodward, Pearl, Spirtes et al.) and connects it to autonomy and responsibility.
- It analyzes XAI literature, policy and legal texts (e.g., EU HLEG guidelines, GDPR, AI Act, ECHR), and uses hypothetical examples such as the GOV-1 government-job algorithm.
Limitations
- Stated: a detailed comparison of the paper’s use of “autonomy” with standard accounts in the literature is postponed to another occasion.
- Stated: whether forensic/glass-box approaches can reliably provide accurate explanations that fit affected parties’ practical perspectives is an outstanding empirical question, and whether a “fitting” translation can be legally entrenched remains open.
- Evident from the text: the argument is normative and conceptual rather than empirically tested; the central GOV-1 case is hypothetical, and the legal discussion is selective rather than a comprehensive doctrinal analysis.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 66 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationreasoning
There is a distinct concern with opaque algorithms that has not received systematic treatment: opacity can undermine users' autonomy by hiding salient pathways of affecting the algorithm's outcomes.
“I argue that there is a distinct concern with opaque algorithms that has not received a systematic treatment in the literature: opacity can undermine the users' autonomy by hiding salient pathways of affecting the algorithm's outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even when an opaque algorithm fulfills its task excellently and its results are treated as negotiable, its opacity can threaten the autonomy of affected parties.
“Even in cases where an opaque algorithm fulfills its task excellently, and its results are treated as negotiable, its opacity can threaten the autonomy of the parties affected by its outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Motivating the demand for transparency with its relevance to autonomy would not require a double standard of the kind Zerilli et al. (2019) worry about.
“Given that such a threat to our autonomy can occur regardless of whether the decision algorithm is executed by an AI system or by a human, motivating the demand for transparency with its relevance to autonomy would not require a double standard of the kind Zerilli et al. (2019) worry about.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zerilli et al., 2019 source
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- Premisecitation
For many current AI algorithms, information about causal factors is exceedingly likely to be encoded implicitly rather than explicitly.
“For many current AI algorithms, it is exceedingly likely that such information is encoded implicitly rather than explicitly”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Burrell, 2016 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
Opaque decision algorithms hide effective strategies of affecting and predicting their outcomes from affected parties.
“In effect, opaque decision algorithms hide effective strategies of affecting and predicting their outcomes from the affected parties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Premisereasoning
Opacity and transparency are matters of degree.
“A third point worth elaborating on is that opacity and transparency are matters of degree.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Demanding full transparency of AI decision algorithms holds them to a higher standard than we apply to non-AI decision makers or mechanisms.
“By demanding full transparency of AI decision algorithms, we seem to be holding them to a higher standard than we apply to non-AI decision makers or mechanisms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Transparent decision algorithms can enable us to undertake action and affect future outcomes.
“Conversely, transparent decision algorithms can enable us to undertake action and affect future outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In the XAI literature, the action-enabling potential of transparent decision algorithms often goes unmentioned.
“In the XAI literature, this action-enabling potential of transparent decision algorithms often goes unmentioned.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Langer et al., 2021 source
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- cites Fjeld et al., 2020
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- Premisecitation
We are particularly interested in causal explanations because they provide us with reliable means to affect and predict our surroundings.
“Philosophical and empirical research has converged on the thesis that we are particularly interested in causal explanations because they provide us with reliable means to affect and predict our surroundings”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationnone given
The demand for transparency translates into a demand for causal explanations.
“Starting from our account, the demand for transparency translates into a demand for causal explanations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Our ability to reliably affect and predict the outcomes of decision algorithms can carry substantial moral weight.
“Our ability to reliably affect and predict the outcomes of decision algorithms can carry substantial moral weight.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Many AI decision algorithms are opaque even when they are reliable: they may deliver correct results but do not provide users or affected parties insight into how they produced those results.
“Many of these AI decision algorithms are opaque even when they are reliable: they might deliver the right results, but they do not provide users or affected parties any insight as to how they came to produce those results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Burrell, 2016 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
In principle, an opaque decision algorithm could be sufficiently reliable, fair, and trusted.
“In principle, an opaque decision algorithm could be sufficiently reliable, fair, and trusted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The autonomy worry comes with significant backing from moral philosophy.
“Second, the autonomy worry comes with significant backing from moral philosophy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kant, 1993
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- cites Mill, 1999
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- Interpretationnone given
Withholding explanations of decisions amounts to withholding information about how to affect these decisions.
“More generally, withholding explanations of decisions amounts to withholding information about how to affect these decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even if an opaque algorithm manages to tick all other boxes, it can still threaten our autonomy.
“The upshot is that even if an opaque algorithm manages to tick all the other boxes, it can still threaten our autonomy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Opaque algorithms can undermine our autonomy, even when they respect other requirements such as reliability, fairness, accountability, and negotiability.
“In short, opaque algorithms can undermine our autonomy, even when they respect other requirements such as reliability, fairness, accountability, and negotiability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When opaque algorithms are used in life-changing decisions, they obstruct us from effectively shaping our lives according to our preferences.
“When opaque algorithms are used in life-changing decisions, they thus obstruct us from effectively shaping our lives according to our preferences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Resolving other worries concerning transparency does not automatically resolve the autonomy worry.
“First, resolving the other worries concerning transparency does not automatically resolve the autonomy worry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Our ability to shape our lives according to our plans and desires and to pursue our goals through deliberate actions is severely undermined when we are denied information about what factors into life-changing decisions.
“Our ability to shape our lives according to our plans and desires and to pursue our goals through deliberate actions, i.e., our ability to be autonomous agents, is severely undermined when we are denied information about what factors into lifechanging decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When it comes to pivotal decisions, not being privy to what factors into these decisions undermines one's ability to effectively shape one's life.
“When it comes to pivotal decisions, such as whether I get a certain job, whether I am allowed into certain college, or whether I get an enormous insurance premium, my not being privy to what factors into these decisions undermines my ability to effectively shape my life.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Strategies for attaining transparency in input-output correlations are available.
“By contrast, strategies for attaining transparency in input-output correlations are available.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Tubella et al., 2019
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- cites Guidotti et al., 2018 source
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- cites Ustun et al., 2019
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- Interpretationreasoning
In order to increase or maintain our autonomy, we want to know which changes in the input robustly correlate with certain changes in the output.
“In order to increase or maintain our autonomy, we want to know which changes in the input robustly correlate with certain changes in the output.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Knowledge of higher-level regularities does not presuppose knowledge of the finer details of the system.
“It is well-received in both the philosophical and the computer science literature that knowledge of such higher-level regularities does not presuppose knowledge of the finer details of the system”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Even authors whose accounts would not appear to mesh well with our usage acknowledge that cases like GOV-1 need to be taken into account.
“Second, even authors whose accounts would not appear to mesh well with our usage here acknowledge that cases like GOV-1 need to be taken into account.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Christman, 1991 source
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- Premisecitation
Responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided.
“This is because responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent's intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisenone given
Not knowing how to achieve a goal makes it less likely that you achieve it.
“Generally speaking, not knowing how to achieve a goal makes it less likely that you achieve it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even if we set aside connection with trust, fairness, reliability, accountability, negotiability, and a primitive preference for explanation, demands for transparency can still be grounded in a requirement to respect personal autonomy.
“Even if we set aside the above-mentioned connection with trust, fairness, reliability, accountability, negotiability, and a primitive preference for explanation, demands for transparency can still be grounded in a requirement to respect personal autonomy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When opaque algorithms undermine our autonomy, they also undermine our responsibility for the outcome.
“When opaque algorithms undermine our autonomy, they also undermine our responsibility for the outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There is no fixed level that provides the right level of transparency.
“The upshot is that there is no fixed level that provides the right level of transparency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Input-output difference-making transparency is easier to achieve than full physical, design or algorithmic transparency.
“The good news is that such input-output difference-making transparency is easier to achieve than full physical, design or algorithmic transparency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
If AI algorithms are protected by proprietary laws, developers and deployers can maintain that demands to disclose the workings of the algorithms conflict with their right to intellectual property.
“First of all, if the AI algorithms in use are under protection of proprietary laws, the developers and deployers can maintain that any demand to disclose the workings of the algorithms conflicts with their right to intellectual property.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If we dismiss forensic approaches in general just because they are at risk of getting things wrong, we would be holding AI decision algorithms to a far higher transparency standard than we hold any other kind of explanation.
“If we are to dismiss forensic approaches in general just because they are at risk of getting things wrong, we would be holding AI decision algorithms to a far higher transparency standard than we hold any other kind of explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The GDPR's watered-down right to information appears to apply only when the decision is based solely on automated algorithms (Art. 22(1)).
“Moreover, even this watered down right appears to apply only when the decision is based solely on automated algorithms (Art.22(1)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Art.22(1)
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- Premisereasoning
Forensic approaches omit details about the actual process leading up to the outcome when providing potential explanations.
“First of all, these approaches all omit details about the actual process leading up to the outcome when providing potential explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The current formulations of transparency demands in recent AI regulation will not suffice to respect the autonomy of affected parties, because they do not provide them with a right to explanation.
“However, the current formulations of these demands will not suffice to respect the autonomy of affected parties, as they do not provide the them with a right to explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Even a minimal involvement of a human agent in the process can relieve users of any obligation to provide information about the algorithm.
“Which means that even a minimal involvement of a human agent in the process can relieve the users of any obligation to provide information about the algorithm (cf., Wachter et al., 2017, p. 78).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wachter et al., 2017, p. 78
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- Premisecitation
Standard causal extraction algorithms can be used to acquire causal information on the basis of correlational data gathered via glass-boxing.
“Standard causal extraction algorithms, such as those developed by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2000), can be used to acquire causal information on the basis of the correlational data gathered via glass-boxing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Pearl, 2000
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- cites Spirtes et al., 2000
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- Interpretationreasoning
Making the case that the relevant causal knowledge can be acquired without the detailed knowledge protected by proprietary laws is likely to be an uphill battle.
“But making the case that the relevant causal knowledge can be acquired without the detailed knowledge that is defended by proprietary laws is likely to be an uphill battle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The risk of omitting crucial details and focusing on irrelevancies is not unique to complex algorithms.
“While this is a real risk, it is worth noting that this risk is by no means unique to complex algorithms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Loewer, 2007
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- cites Ney, 2009 source
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- Interpretationcitation
The causal account of transparency and opacity naturally fits the technical approach of causal extraction algorithms.
“As Woodward (2003) bases his account of causal explanation on the structural equation models provided by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2000), the causal account of transparency and opacity we proposed in Section 3 naturally fits this technical approach.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Woodward, 2003
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- cites Pearl, 2000
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- cites Spirtes et al., 2000
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- Interpretationreasoning
Any outcome will have many explanations that are of no practical use to the affected parties.
“Any outcome will have many explanations that are of no practical use to the affected parties.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Insofar as forensic strategies can provide robust patterns of correlations between inputs and outputs, they can help safeguard user autonomy.
“Insofar as these strategies can in fact provide us with robust patterns of correlations between inputs and outputs, they can help safeguard user autonomy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If it must be shown for each demand for an explanation that the required explanation would not conflict with trade secrets, affected parties are likely to be de facto disenfranchised with regard to their right to explanation.
“If it has to be shown for each demand for an explanation that the required explanation would not be in conflict with trade secrets, the affected parties are likely to find themselves de facto disenfranchised with regard to their right to explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Arguments for the right to autonomy based on the US Constitution and the ECHR tend to go via related notions, such as dignity (ECHR, Art. 1) and privacy (ECHR, Art. 2).
“Instead, arguments for the right to autonomy based on these texts tend to go via related notions, such as dignity (ECHR, Art.1) and privacy (ECHR, Art.2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites ECHR, Art.1
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- cites ECHR, Art.2
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- Premisecitation
The only obligation of the AI act towards affected parties would be to inform them that an AI decision algorithm has been used to reach a conclusion.
“The only obligation towards the affected parties would be to inform them of the fact that an AI decision algorithm has been used to reach a conclusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fink (2021)
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- Interpretationreasoning
These legal documents do not guarantee transparency towards affected parties whose lives are affected by the outcomes of automatized decision procedures.
“While the call for transparency has inspired the notion to play a central role in legal documents focusing on AI, these documents do not guarantee transparency towards affected parties whose lives are affected by the outcomes of automatized decision procedures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
There are several legal cases where a plaintiff's reliance on the right to good governance as spelled out in Art. 41 is deemed illegitimate because the governmental decisions in question were not considered to count as implementations of Union Law.
“There are several legal cases where a plaintiff's reliance on the right to good governance as spelled out in Art.41 is deemed illegitimate because the governmental decisions in question were not considered to count as implementations of Union Law.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raad van State, 2017
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- Premisecitation
The European Court for Human Rights has relied on the notion of personal autonomy in several rulings.
“For example, the European Court for Human Rights has relied on the notion of personal autonomy in several rulings, 24”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Koffeman (2010)
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- Interpretationcitation
The kinds of explanations that can sustain our ability to effectively pursue our life plans would not be protected by the GDPR alone.
“Suffice it to say that the kinds of explanations that can sustain our ability to effectively pursue our life plans would not be protected by the GDPR alone.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Even when it concerns governmental decisions, Art. 41(2c) of the Charter provides only a limited right to explanation.
“So, even when it concerns governmental decisions, Art.41(2c) of the charter provides only a limited right to explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The AI act does little to legally entrench our autonomy in the face of decision algorithms that are entirely opaque to us.
“The AI act thus does little to legally entrench our autonomy in the face of decision algorithms that are entirely opaque to us.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The AI act proposal, if accepted, would only demand transparency towards the users of AI, not towards the affected parties.
“However, as argued by Fink (2021), the proposal, if accepted, would only demand transparency towards the users of AI, and not towards the affected parties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fink (2021)
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- Premisenone given
The notion of personal autonomy plays a central role in a variety of legal frameworks.
“There are at least some promising signs to be found here, as the notion of personal autonomy plays a central role in a variety of legal frameworks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Article 41(2c) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights concerns the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
“Fink (2021) points out that article 41.(2c) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights concerns exactly the obligation of the administration to”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fink (2021)
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- Premisecitation
The European Commission's AI act proposes to impose transparency requirements on algorithms with outcomes that have significant impacts on affected parties, such as decisions on legal status, access to education or contractual relations.
“More recently, the European Commission's AI act proposes to impose transparency requirements on precisely those algorithms with outcomes that have significant impacts on the affected parties, such as decisions on legal status, access to education or contractual relations (Annex III).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Annex III
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- Premisecitation
The jurisprudence at the ECHR is equivocal on how much weight is to be attached to autonomy.
“Consequently, the jurisprudence at the ECHR is equivocal on how much weight is to be attached to autonomy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Koffeman (2010)
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- Interpretationcitation
Making criteria used in life-changing decisions accessible to affected parties might similarly change the reliability of those same criteria.
“Making criteria used in lifechanging decisions accessible to affected parties might similarly change the reliability of those same criteria.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Resolving previous concerns about opacity will not automatically address the threat to the autonomy of the affected parties.
“On the other hand, it appears that resolving previous concerns about opacity will not automatically address the threat to the autonomy of the affected parties, and the kinds of explanations required to respect our autonomy can be hard to come by.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Forcing experts to make their reasons for certain judgments accessible and understandable for non-experts risks forcing them to limit their reasons to the kind of reasons that non-experts are sensitive to.
“Forcing experts to make their reasons for certain judgments accessible and understandable for non-experts, risks forcing them to limit their reasons to the kind of reasons that non-experts are sensitive to.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Providing information about the robust correlations that allow us to affect the outcomes of decision algorithms might increase the advantage of those who have easier access to the difference-making features.
“First, providing information of the robust correlations that allow us to affect the outcomes of decision algorithms might increase the advantage of those who have easier access to the difference-making features.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weller, 2019
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- Interpretationreasoning
This would in effect make it impossible to invoke reasons that require advanced expertise to appreciate.
“This would in effect make it impossible to invoke reasons that require advanced expertise to appreciate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Otherwise reliable indicators can become unreliable once it is publicly known that they are used as indicators.
“Second, it is a well-received truism that otherwise reliable indicators can become unreliable once it is publicly known that they are used as indicators (Campbell, 1979;Goodhart, 1984).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Campbell, 1979 source
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- cites Goodhart, 1984
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- Interpretationreasoning
Opaque decision algorithms can undermine the autonomy of the affected parties by hiding salient pathways of affecting their outcomes.
“Even so, our central argument goes through even if (i)-(iii) turns out to be false: opaque decision algorithms can undermine our autonomy by hiding salient pathways of affecting their outcomes.”
- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
“Building on recent work about the value of explanation, I have argued that a lack of transparency can also undermine the autonomy of the affected parties.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
- Premisecitation
Transparency can improperly limit the kinds of reasons that feature in decision-making.
“Third, building on work by O'Neill (2002), Nguyen (forthcoming) recently argued that transparency can improperly limit the kinds of reasons that feature in decision-making.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites O'Neill (2002)
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- cites Nguyen (forthcoming)
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- Premisecitation
The demands on AI decisions in 'non-high risk' contexts are limited to mere guidelines adopted on a voluntary basis.
“Note though, that the demands on AI decisions in”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI act
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- Interpretationreasoning
Transparency carries moral weight as a means for supporting user autonomy.
“I have argued that transparency carries moral weight as a means for supporting user autonomy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 38
- May combine two claims. 19
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe right degree of transparency will often require that we grasp hypothetical causal explanations.
“As will become apparent in the examples to follow, the right degree of transparency will often require that we grasp such hypothetical causal explanations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAddressing the threat opacity poses to autonomy will require a certain degree of transparency in decision-making.
“Consequently, this threat can remain even if other worries about opaque algorithms are successfully resolved and addressing this threat will require a certain degree of transparency in decision-making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationLanger et al. (2021) list twenty-eight desiderata found in the literature but make no mention of how opacity can undermine the ability of affected parties to effectively influence outcomes according to their goals.
“For example, a recent meta-study of over 100 texts on XAI by Langer et al. (2021), lists twenty-eight desiderata found in the literature but makes no mention of how opacity can undermine the ability of affected parties to effectively influence the outcomes according to their goals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Langer et al., 2021
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningCausal explanation can be available before the fact in hypothetical form, and events that never occurred can be causally explained in a similar way.
“Causal explanation can be available before the fact in hypothetical form, and events that never occurred can be causally explained in a similar way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFjeld et al. (2020) review thirty-four AI ethics documents, and similar remarks apply: no mention is made of opacity undermining the ability to influence outcomes.
“Similar remarks apply to a recent review of thirty-four AI ethics documents published by civil society, the private sector, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and multi-stakeholder organizations by Fjeld et al. (2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fjeld et al., 2020
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InterpretationreasoningAn adequate standard of transparency for AI systems would demand only restricted access to the workings of the system.
“An adequate standard of transparency for AI systems would thus similarly demand only restricted access to the workings of the system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningNot all causal explanations will help us understand the outcome, nor will all causal explanations be of interest to us.
“Crucially, not all causal explanations will help us understand the outcome, nor will all causal explanations be of interest to us.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAutonomy is taken to be some brand of self-determination, and self-determination requires long-term control over one's life and plans.
“First, autonomy is taken to be some brand of self-determination and there is growing attention for the fact that self-determination requires a long-term control over one's life and plans”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites MacIntyre, 1983
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- cites Raz, 1986
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- cites Bratman, 2000
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Interpretationnone givenUndermining autonomy undermines responsibility.
“Third, undermining autonomy undermines responsibility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningOpacity and a lack of knowledge about how to manipulate are definitionally inseparable.
“According to the causal account proposed above, opacity and a lack of knowledge about how to manipulate are definitionally inseparable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningOur lack of knowledge of how to affect the outcomes is integral to an AI system being opaque to us.
“By contrast, our lack of knowledge of how to affect the outcomes is integral to an AI system being opaque to us.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe outcomes of an opaque algorithm could be treated as negotiable by allowing users to double-check them using another decision algorithm.
“The outcomes could even be treated as negotiable by allowing users to double-check the outcomes using another decision algorithm, be it a human or an artificial one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThere is nothing in principle that stands in the way of an algorithm fulfilling its function perfectly without the relevant stakeholders having knowledge of what produces its outcomes.
“but there is nothing that in principle stands in the way of an algorithm fulfilling its function perfectly without the relevant stakeholders having knowledge of what produces its outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe importance of autonomy is picked up in AI ethics and legal theory.
“The importance of autonomy is picked up in other discussions within AI ethics (e.g., Kim et al., 2021), and legal theory as well (e.g., Marshall, 2008;McLean, 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Kim et al., 2021
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- cites Marshall, 2008
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- cites McLean, 2009
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAutonomy takes center stage in several ethical theories.
“Autonomy takes center stage in several ethical theories.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kant, 1993
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mill, 1999
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAttaining full physical, algorithmic, or design transparency is extraordinarily difficult, and demanding it might be in tension with copyright laws.
“Attaining either of these is taken to be extraordinarily difficult as well, and demanding it might even be in tension with copyright laws”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIt is unlikely that knowledge of robust correlations will require full physical details or design details, but it is also unlikely that the required explanation will always be found at the intentional level.
“It is unlikely that knowledge of such robust correlations will require full physical details or design details, but it is also unlikely that the required explanation will always be found at the intentional level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOpacity can undermine autonomy and autonomy has moral value.
“In conclusion, it appears that opacity can undermine autonomy and autonomy has moral value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe GDPR fails to provide affected parties with a right to explanation of individual decisions, and instead delivers only a vague right to be informed of whether an AI is used and what 'logic' underlies the algorithm.
“Wachter et al. (2017) point out that the GDPR fails to provide affected parties with a right to explanation of individual decisions, but instead delivers a rather vague right to be informed of (i) whether an AI is used, and (ii) what”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wachter et al. (2017)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenFor 'forensic' strategies that explain black box outcomes without opening the black box to safeguard autonomy, they need to reliably provide accurate explanations that fit the needs and practical perspective of the affected parties.
“In order for these”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThere is a real risk that the details omitted by forensic approaches are crucial to the true causal story of how the decision was produced.
“Such neglect of detail is necessary to provide explanations that are understandable for human agents, and, so the worry goes, there is a real risk that the omitted details are in fact crucial to the true causal story of how the decision was in fact produced”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rudin, 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA right to an explanation will not suffice; the explanation needs to fit the explanatory needs and perspective of the affected party.
“The upshot is that the right to an explanation will not suffice.The explanation needs to fit the explanatory needs and perspective of the affected party.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIn the worst case, lack of detail may make for mistaken explanations altogether, taking mere correlation for causation.
“In the worst case, this lack of detail may make for mistaken explanations altogether, taking mere correlation for causation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationExternal auditing mechanisms could help enforce the right of redress and justify accusations of bias, but they would not provide explanations and thus would not provide affected parties with action-enabling information.
“Wachter et al. (2017, p. 98) make note of this challenge and suggest that external auditing mechanisms can be employed in such cases, but while such mechanisms could help to enforce the right of redress and to justify accusations of bias, they would not provide explanations, and thus not provide affected parties with action-enabling information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wachter et al. (2017, p. 98)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThere are ongoing attempts to provide explanations of black box outcomes without 'opening' black boxes.
“There are ongoing attempts to make provide explanations of black box outcomes without”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenNeither the US Constitution nor the ECHR explicitly mention autonomy.
“Neither the US Constitution or the ECHR explicitly mention autonomy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf respecting personal autonomy requires providing adequate explanations for potentially life-changing decisions, then the right to personal autonomy requires a right to explanation.
“If respecting personal autonomy requires providing adequate explanations for potentially life-changing decisions, then the right to personal autonomy requires a right to explanation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Respecting personal autonomy requires providing adequate explanations for potentially life-changing decisions.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe link between transparency and autonomy provides a promising extra tool for legally entrenching a right to explanation.
“The link between transparency and autonomy provides a promising extra tool for legally entrenching a right to explanation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationSome legal scholars maintain that the right to personal autonomy is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the US Constitution.
“and some legal scholars maintain that the very right to personal autonomy is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (e.g., Marshall, 1 3 2008) and the US Constitution (e.g., McLean, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Marshall, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- cites McLean, 2009
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe articles in the Charter are explicitly restricted to cases where the administration is 'implementing Union Law' (Art. 51), which puts a further burden on affected parties to argue that the governmental decision they demand explained counts as an implementation of Union Law.
“Moreover, the articles in the charter are explicitly restricted to cases where the administration are”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Art.51
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationreasoningArticle 41(2c) focuses on a right to good administration, where 'administration' refers to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and is therefore of no help to those seeking reasons for decisions made by insurance companies, banks, or private educational facilities.
“However, this article focuses on a right to good administration, where”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningEven if transparency has a distinct moral value in serving autonomy, it should not be pursued at all costs.
“Even if transparency has a distinct moral value in serving autonomy, it should not be pursued at all costs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThere is still plenty of legislative work to be done before we can feel safe that a right to explanation is legally protected.
“Even so, there is still plenty of legislative work to be done before we can feel safe that such a right is legally protected.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOther concerns with AI opacity, such as assessing reliability and fairness, will require us to open the black box.
“This is not to say that other concerns with AI opacity, such as assessing reliability and fairness will not require us to open the black box.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenPrevious research indicated that transparency is conducive to negotiability and accountability, helps fine-tune reliability and avoid bias, and that we are more likely to trust the results of algorithms if we understand what causes their outcomes.
“Previous research indicated that transparency is conducive to negotiability and accountability, helps fine-tune reliability and avoid bias, and that we are more likely to trust the results of algorithms if we understand what causes their outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf we only use transparent algorithms, we might come to see that some unexpected or intractable reasons feature in the production of the decision, and in the long run this might incite us to use less reliable mechanisms that only employ reasons and inferences tractable to us.
“If we only use transparent algorithms, we might come to see that some unexpected or simply intractable reasons feature in the production of the decision.In the long run, this might incite us to use less reliable mechanisms that only employ reasons and inferences that are tractable to us.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe AI act document explicitly distinguishes between users and affected persons (p. 30).
“This is despite the fact that the document explicitly distinguishes between users and affected persons (p.30).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThere are several reasons to demand that impactful decision algorithms are transparent, regardless of whether they are implemented by humans or AI systems.
“There are several reasons to demand that impactful decision algorithms are transparent.This is true regardless of whether they are implemented by humans or AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe kinds of explanations required to respect our autonomy can be hard to come by.
“On the other hand, it appears that resolving previous concerns about opacity will not automatically address the threat to the autonomy of the affected parties, and the kinds of explanations required to respect our autonomy can be hard to come by.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRespecting our autonomy might not require us to open the black box, but it does require us to take into account the perspectives of rational planning agents with life-goals and dreams.
“It might not require us to open the black box, but it does require us to take into account the perspectives of rational planning agents with life-goals and dreams.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationreasoningAffected parties must be able to convincingly argue that the decisions affecting them count as 'high risk', which risks putting an undue burden of proof on victims who do not have the means to litigate in grey area cases.
“This means that affected parties must be able to convincingly argue that the decisions affecting them count as”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningSuch knowledge can play an integral part in planning and shaping our lives as rational, self-determining agents.
“Such knowledge can play an integral part in planning and shaping our lives as rational, self-determining agents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenOne of the oft-cited reasons for using automated decision algorithms is that they appear to discover patterns that are not readily appreciable by human observers.
“In fact, one of the oft-cited reasons for using automated decision algorithms is that they appear to discover patterns that are not readily appreciable by human observers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenExtraction algorithms require a certain causal structure to the data set in order to be successful.
“Admittedly, such extraction algorithms require a certain causal structure to the data set in order to be successful.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIf the broad consensus that autonomy carries moral weight is correct, then transparency is worth demanding.
“If the broad consensus that autonomy carries moral weight is correct, this means transparency is worth demanding.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Autonomy carries moral weight.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningNguyen's arguments about transparency limiting reasons appear to transfer quite easily to the automatized decision-making case.
“While Nguyen does not focus on automatized decision-making, his arguments appear to transfer quite easily to the automatized case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIn both the human and the AI case, we are interested in knowing the robust patterns of correlation that allow us to reliably affect and predict their outcomes.
“In both the human and the AI case, we are interested in knowing the robust patterns of correlation that allow us to reliably affect and predict their outcomes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe texts reviewed by Langer et al. (2021) focused on the autonomy of the users but made no mention of the autonomy of the affected parties.
“This oversight is reminiscent of the general oversight in the texts reviewed byLanger et al. (2021), which focused on the autonomy of the users, but made no mention of the autonomy of the affected parties (see Section 3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Langer et al. (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Understanding a decision-making process requires a certain amount of transparency.
“I am assuming here that understanding a decision-making process requires a certain amount of transparency”
The paper relies on this without support.
Autonomy carries moral weight.
“If the broad consensus that autonomy carries moral weight is correct, this means transparency is worth demanding.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Respecting personal autonomy requires providing adequate explanations for potentially life-changing decisions.
“If respecting personal autonomy requires providing adequate explanations for potentially life-changing decisions, then the right to personal autonomy requires a right to explanation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
For each individual case, the inputs cause the outputs, and not vice versa.
“We know, for example, that for each individual case, the inputs cause the outputs, and not vice versa.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Widespread use of RLHF fine-tuned LLMs can lead to linguistic use being flattened on the characteristic style of such systems, making linguistic usage less diverse, less authentic, and less adequate for capturing the expressive practices and needs of different communities.
“Widespread use of RLHF fine-tuned LLMs can in addition lead to linguistic use being flattened on the characteristic style of such systems, making linguistic usage less diverse, less authentic, and less adequate for capturing the expressive practices and needs of different communities (which in their turn bring yet other risks to their autonomy, cf. Fricker 2010; Vaassen 2022).”
From Helpful, harmless, honest? Sociotechnical limits of AI alignment and safety through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (2025) · cites this paper as Vaassen 2022
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredLegal and ethical challenges concerning data privacy and patient consent are highlighted by authors of [28], who stress the importance of robust legal frameworks adaptable to evolving AI.
“The legal and ethical challenges, particularly concerning data privacy and patient consent, are highlighted by the authors of [28], who stress the importance of robust legal frameworks that are adaptable and responsive to the evolving nature of AI applications.”
From Balancing Privacy and Progress: A Review of Privacy Challenges, Systemic Oversight, and Patient Perceptions in AI-Driven Healthcare (2024) · cites this paper as [28]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
GDPR and AI Act citation years are reversed
MinorSection 4.2 cites the GDPR as the 2021 document and the AI Act as the 2016 document. The reference list identifies the GDPR as the 2016 document and the AI Act as the 2021 document.
“Focusing on the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Council of the European Union, 2021) and the European Commission's AI act (Council of the European Union, 2016)”
“17. Council of the European Union. (2016). General Data Protection Regulation. https:// gdpr-info. eu/. Accessed 21 April 2022 Council of the European Union. (2021). European Council AI Act.”
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Björnsson, G., & Persson, K. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00603.x · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Is explainable artificial intelligence intrinsically valuable?
Colaner, N. R. (2021) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-021-01184-2 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law?
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Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
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“This is because responsibility for an outcome requires a reliable causal connection between the agent’s intention to reach or avoid the outcome and the outcome in fact being reached or avoided (cf. Björnsson and Persson, 2012, 2013; Grinfeld et al., 2020; Usher, 2020).”
BackgroundPeople Prefer Moral Discretion to Algorithms: Algorithm Aversion Beyond Intransparency
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Portable Causal Dependence: A Tale of Consilience
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
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“To mitigate the violation of user autonomy and preclude social manipulations, organisations need to explore and employ different methods that would ensure transparency in AI deployment, as AI algorithms tend to be opaque to the public (Vaassen, 2022).”
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Transparency of artificial intelligence/machine learning-enabled medical devices
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“…flattened on the characteristic style of such systems, making linguistic usage less diverse, less authentic, and less adequate for capturing the expressive practices and needs of different communities (which in their turn bring yet other risks to their autonomy, cf. Fricker 2010; Vaassen 2022).”
- Authors
- Vaassen, B.
- Affiliations
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- Corresponding author
- Vaassen, Bram
- ORCID
- Vaassen, Bram
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2022-09-22
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4296638419
- Semantic Scholar
- 0aa23f751523de433205baebce2a33e7af965198
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 79
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 12
- FWCI
- 15.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- DiVA at Umeå University (Umeå University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (FOR 2495)
- Vetenskapsrådet (2019-6381)
- Umea University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Keywords
- algorithmic opacity, individual autonomy, algorithmic transparency, causal explanation, algorithmic decision-making, algorithmic fairness
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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