Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In his recent book The Advancement of Science,Philip Kitcher endorses eliminative induction, or the view that confirmation of hypotheses proceeds by the elimination of alternatives. My intention here is to critically examine Kitcher's eliminativist view of confirmation, and his rejection of the widely held Bayesian position, according to which an hypothesis H is confirmed by evidence E just in case the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the simple unconditional probability of H [i.e. p(H/E) > p(H)]. Here, I will maintain that while there are aspects of the eliminative approach which Bayesianism must incorporate, as has been argued by John Earman, the eliminativism advocated by Kitcher is unsatisfactory. In addition, I will suggest that Kitcher's reasons for rejecting Bayesian confirmation theory are unconvincing and depend on an overly restrictive version of the position and that indeed Bayesianism has resources needed by an eliminativist account of confirmation.
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“Variants of this method are widely recognized, as with eliminative induction in Bayesian analysis (Vineberg 1996) and J.S. Mill's (1974, 397-98) method of residues.”
From Understanding Process Tracing (2011) · cites this paper as Vineberg 1996
In the citing paper
“Put simply, when the investigator has eliminated all plausible alternatives, the remaining scenario must be the correct one.”
From Understanding Process Tracing (2011) · cites this paper as Vineberg 1996
Citations
Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kitcher, 1993, The Advancement of Science
Cited by
Collier, D. (2011) · PS: Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096511001429 · Cited by 2,238
Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.001.0001 · Cited by 96
Meta-empirical support for eliminative reasoning
McCoy, C. D. (2021) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.002 · Cited by 17
The Construction of Atom Models: Eliminative Inductivism and its Relation to Falsificationism
Weinert, F. (2000) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1023/a:1011315710119 · Cited by 9
Learning from Experience: A Philosophical Perspective
Landes, E. (2013) · Lux Scholarship And Creativity At Lawrence University (Lawrence University)
Metadata
- Authors
- Vineberg, S.
- Affiliations
- Wayne State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Vineberg, Susan
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1996-06
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 257-266
- ISSN
- 0045-5091 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-0820
- OpenAlex
- W781043912
- Cited by
- 17
- References
- 14
- Citations by year
- 2022: 13 · 2021: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- eliminative induction, Bayesian confirmation theory, Philip Kitcher, eliminativism, conditional probability
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- The paper
- Vineberg, S. (1996). Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717453
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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