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Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory

Vineberg, Susan · 1996 · Canadian Journal of Philosophy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In his recent book The Advancement of Science,Philip Kitcher endorses eliminative induction, or the view that confirmation of hypotheses proceeds by the elimination of alternatives. My intention here is to critically examine Kitcher's eliminativist view of confirmation, and his rejection of the widely held Bayesian position, according to which an hypothesis H is confirmed by evidence E just in case the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the simple unconditional probability of H [i.e. p(H/E) > p(H)]. Here, I will maintain that while there are aspects of the eliminative approach which Bayesianism must incorporate, as has been argued by John Earman, the eliminativism advocated by Kitcher is unsatisfactory. In addition, I will suggest that Kitcher's reasons for rejecting Bayesian confirmation theory are unconvincing and depend on an overly restrictive version of the position and that indeed Bayesianism has resources needed by an eliminativist account of confirmation.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/00455091.1996.10717453

Cites

14 of 14 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kitcher, 1993, The Advancement of Science

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Vineberg, S.
Affiliations
Wayne State University (US)
Corresponding author
Vineberg, Susan
Venue
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Published
1996-06
Volume
26
Issue
2
Pages
257-266
ISSN
  • 0045-5091 (ISSN-L)
  • 1911-0820
OpenAlex
W781043912
Cited by
17
References
14
Citations by year
2022: 13 · 2021: 1 · 2013: 1
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
eliminative induction, Bayesian confirmation theory, Philip Kitcher, eliminativism, conditional probability

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717453
The paper
Vineberg, S. (1996). Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717453

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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