Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“For example, according to the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), young people who frequently engage with technology may more easily recall information encountered online when forming impressions of others.”
From Using Social Media for Social Comparison and Feedback-Seeking: Gender and Popularity Moderate Associations with Depressive Symptoms (2015) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman 1973
In the citing paper
“Except for an overall limited processing capacity, human cognitive information processing shows systematic distortions. These are manifested in many cognitive biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).”
From Human- versus Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman, 1973
In the citing paper
“One way of coping with this situation is using the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), that is, relying on information that can be recalled, usually information to which the person was exposed very recently.”
From The four horsemen of fear: An integrated model of understanding fear experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) · doi:10.36131/cn20200202 · cites this paper as Tversky & Kahneman, 1973
In the citing paper
“Measures in accordance with (b), which are intended to maintain an awareness of the automation bias, seem out of place: it introduces a concrete psychological aspect that sticks out from the more technical and operational aspects outlined in the other provisions, especially considering that automation bias is just one of many relevant biases (e.g., hindsight bias, confidence bias [36, 66]), heuris”
From On the Quest for Effectiveness in Human Oversight: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2024) · cites this paper as [83]
In the citing paper
“One naive theory that links one's recall experience to characteristics of the external world holds that the more exemplars exist, the easier it is to bring some to mind.”
From Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making (2004) · cites this paper as Tversky and Kahneman's (1973)
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Citations
Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202 · cited 1×
“Similarly, both naive and sophisticated subjects evaluate the likelihood that an individual will engage in an occupation by the degree to which he appears representative of the stereotype of that occupation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).”
Self-citationSubjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,851
Self-citationAttribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior
JONES, E. E. (1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,760
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
Self-citationAvailability versus accessibility of information in memory for words
Tulving, E., & Pearlstone, Z. (1966) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(66)80048-8 · Cited by 1,523
(1972) · Cited by 1,126
Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs.
Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1969) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0027592 · Cited by 989
Genesis of popular but erroneous psychodiagnostic observations.
Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1967) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0024670 · Cited by 847
Recognition and retrieval processes in free recall.
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1972) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0033773 · Cited by 820
Underwood, B. J. (1969) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0028143 · Cited by 686
Cited by
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
“For example, the common erroneous belief that there are more words in an English text that begin with r than words in which r is the third letter was not shaken by monetary payoffs for accuracy (6).”
InfluentialSelf-citationJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Self-citationTelling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317
“The tools that people employ when asked to make judgments about causality are analogous to the "representativeness heuristic" described by Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).”
MethodThe case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
“In several studies, incentives or admonitions to be accurate did not eliminate bias ( Fischhoff, 1977 ; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972a ; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984 ; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 ).”
BackgroundSocial psychology of intergroup relations
Tajfel, H. (1982) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245 · Cited by 7,949
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Affiliations
- Oregon Research Institute (US)
- Venue
- Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1973-09
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 207-232
- ISSN
- 0010-0285 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035782089
- Semantic Scholar
- 4140e7481c2599604b14fcd04625274022583631
- Cited by
- 9,984
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 396 · 2025: 485 · 2024: 472 · 2023: 360 · 2022: 450 · 2021: 493 · 2020: 538 · 2019: 509 · 2018: 429 · 2017: 420 · 2016: 347 · 2015: 373 · 2014: 342 · 2013: 310 · 2012: 297
- FWCI
- 16.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Cognitive Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Keywords
- availability heuristic, frequency judgment, probability judgment, illusory correlation, cognitive biases, word frequency, repeated events, subjective probability
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9
- The paper
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.