The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians
Abstract
Much contemporary egalitarian theorizing is broadly divided between luck egalitarians, such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer, and relational egalitarians, such as John Rawls, Samuel Scheffler, Josh Cohen, and me. The two camps disagree about how to conceive of equality: as an equal distribution of non-relational goods among individuals, or as a kind of social relation between persons - an equality of authority, status, or standing (Anderson 1999). This disagreement generates a second, about when unequal distributions of non-relational goods are unjust. Luck egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it is accidental: when it is caused by morally arbitrary factors such as circumstances of birth. Relational egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it disadvantages people: when it reflects, embodies, or causes inequality of authority, status, or standing.
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Citations
Cites
What Is the Point of Equality?
Anderson, E. S. (1999) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233897 · Cited by 3,095
Self-citationThe Tanner Lectures on Human Values
Pierce, C., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1990) · Idealistic Studies · doi:10.5840/idstudies199020213 · Cited by 2,339
What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources
Dworkin, R. (2018) · The Notion of Equality · doi:10.4324/9781315199795-7 · Cited by 2,125
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory
Rawls, J. (1980) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025790 · Cited by 2,002
Cohen, G. A. (2008) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674029651 · Cited by 1,792
The second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4978 · Cited by 1,666
Freeman, S. (2007) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203086605 · Cited by 698
COHEN, J. (2001) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2001.00363.x · Cited by 209
How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?
Anderson, E. (2007) · Theoretical Inquiries in Law · doi:10.2202/1565-3404.1175 · Cited by 112
Self-citationWhat Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?
Titelbaum, M. G. (2008) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00140.x · Cited by 98
Cited by
Justice and Egalitarian Relations
Schemmel, C. (2021) · Justice and Egalitarian Relations · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0001 · Cited by 48
Anti-homeless Hostile Design as Wrongful Discrimination
Albertsen, A., & Knight, C. (2025) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123424000796 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Anderson, E.
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 36
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0229-7051 (ISSN-L)
- 2633-0490
- OpenAlex
- W1550817805
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 4.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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