AI and Epistemic Agency: How AI Influences Belief Revision and Its Normative Implications
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“According to Coeckelbergh (2025) AI systems impact not only beliefs, but belief revision itself-the reconfiguring of mechanisms in which people adopt, reject, or modify claims to knowledge.”
From Epistemic authority and generative AI in learning spaces: rethinking knowledge in the algorithmic age (2025) · cites this paper as Coeckelbergh, 2025
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Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198 · cited 1×
“…elaborate the normative importance of increasing epistemic agency in a more political way is to use the term ‘epistemic justice’ (see, for example, Fricker 2007; Pohlhaus 2020) in a way that goes beyond the epistemology of testimony and applies more broadly to the silencing of knowledge, which…”
The filter bubble: how the new personalized web is changing what we read and how we think
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-0926 · Cited by 1,319
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2014) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 · Cited by 1,232
ECHO CHAMBERS AND EPISTEMIC BUBBLES
Nguyen, C. T. (2020) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32 · Cited by 1,115
Bias in data‐driven artificial intelligence systems—An introductory survey
Ntoutsi, E., Fafalios, P., Gadiraju, U., Iosifidis, V., Nejdl, W., Vidal, M., Ruggieri, S., Turini, F., Papadopoulos, S., Krasanakis, E., et al. (2020) · WIREs Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery · doi:10.1002/widm.1356 · Cited by 1,043 · cited 1×
“In the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) literature there is increasing attention to knowledge-related issues such as explainability (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi 2017), bias (Ntoutsi et al. 2020), and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020).”
Coeckelbergh, M. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00146-8 · Cited by 475 · cited 1×
“This is not only a problem for accepting responsibility for our actions, but also makes it more difficult, if not impossible, to act responsibly towards others (Coeckelbergh 2020).”
Self-citationTransparent, explainable, and accountable AI for robotics
Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., & Floridi, L. (2017) · Science Robotics · doi:10.1126/scirobotics.aan6080 · Cited by 413 · cited 1×
“In the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) literature there is increasing attention to knowledge-related issues such as explainability (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi 2017), bias (Ntoutsi et al. 2020), and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020).”
Epistemic Agency Under Oppression
Pohlhaus, G. (2020) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2020.1780149 · Cited by 115 · cited 1×
“…normative importance of increasing epistemic agency in a more political way is to use the term ‘epistemic justice’ (see, for example, Fricker 2007; Pohlhaus 2020) in a way that goes beyond the epistemology of testimony and applies more broadly to the silencing of knowledge, which leads to…”
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Cited by
Jose, B., Cleetus, A., Joseph, B., Joseph, L., Jose, B., & John, A. K. (2025) · Frontiers in Education · doi:10.3389/feduc.2025.1647687 · Cited by 63
Aydeniz, M. (2026) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.70230 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Coeckelbergh, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna
- ORCID
- Coeckelbergh, Mark
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2025-03-18
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-71
- ISSN
- 0269-1728
- 1464-5297
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 8
- Language
- en
- Funders
- University of Vienna
- Austrian Science Fund
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- Coeckelbergh, M. (2026). AI and Epistemic Agency: How AI Influences Belief Revision and Its Normative Implications. Social Epistemology. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2025.2466164
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