The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology
Abstract
This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social media platforms, not just to individual epistemic practices.
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Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121 · Cited by 7,731
Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.2.211 · Cited by 6,767
Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaa1160 · Cited by 3,245
The bias blind spot: perceptions of bias in self versus others
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167202286008 · Cited by 1,289
Lackey, J. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001 · Cited by 688
Elga, A. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x · Cited by 660
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
Hills, A. (2009) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/648610 · Cited by 648
Testimony: A Philosophical Study.
Fumerton, R., & Coady, C. A. J. (1995) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185834 · Cited by 545
Medina, J. (2011) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2010.534568 · Cited by 378
Cited by
On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models
Bommasani, R., Hudson, D. A., Adeli, E., Altman, R., Arora, S., von Arx, S., Bernstein, M. S., Bohg, J., Bosselut, A., Brunskill, E., et al. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2108.07258 · Cited by 2,676
Gelfert, A. (2018) · Informal Logic · doi:10.22329/il.v38i1.5068 · Cited by 471
Fake news, social media and marketing: A systematic review
Domenico, G. D., Sit, J., Ishizaka, A., & Nunan, D. (2021) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.11.037 · Cited by 431
Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence
Coeckelbergh, M. (2023) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00239-4 · Cited by 115
Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy
Herzog, L. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197681718.001.0001 · Cited by 80
Metadata
- Authors
- Rini, R.
- Venue
- Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2017
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2S
- Pages
- E-43-E-64
- ISSN
- 1054-6863 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3249
- OpenAlex
- W2756889350
- Cited by
- 540
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 60.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.