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Cited by 147Economic Sanctions and International RelationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyPolitical Conflict and Governance

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure

Allen, Susan Hannah·2005·International Interactions
DOI 10.1080/03050620590950097
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Abstract

With an inconclusive track record, questions about the future utility of sanctions continue to plague policy makers and scholars. Drawing on previous episodes, both successful and failed sanctions tell us a great deal about economic coercion, but the causes of failure have been largely understudied. In order to further understanding of the coercive influence of sanctions, the analysis presented here delineates between the determinants of failure and success. To this end, a competing risks event history model is employed to test the impact that domestic politics have on sanctions success as well as sanctions failure, with strong results suggesting that political structures do affect the way states respond to economic coercion.

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Citations

Cites

  • The Logic of Political Survival

    Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×

    “As the economic fortunes of the state are likely tied to the selectorate’s evaluation of the leader’s performance ( Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 2003 ), his or her fate may be dependent on how the challenge of sanctions is met.”
    Background

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Metadata

Authors
Allen, S. H.
Affiliations
Texas Tech University (US)
Corresponding author
Allen, Susan Hannah
ORCID
Allen, Susan Hannah
Venue
International Interactions
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2005-03
Volume
31
Issue
2
Pages
117-138
ISSN
  • 0305-0629 (ISSN-L)
  • 1547-7444
DOI
10.1080/03050620590950097
OpenAlex
W2015189770
Cited by
147
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 5
FWCI
5.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • International Interactions (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Sanctions and International Relations
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
economic sanctions, economic coercion, domestic politics, political structure

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