State consciousness and creature consciousness: A real distinction
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct properties. Conscious creatures can have, at one time, both conscious and unconscious mental states. This raises the question of what distinguishes the conscious from unconscious mental states of a subject: a question about what state consciousness consists in. Whilst the state/creature distinction may not be of use in explaining every aspect of a subject's consciousness, it does provide a key part of the explanandum for theories of consciousness and mind. The state/creature consciousness distinction is a real one and should not be dropped from our psychological taxonomy.
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Cites
Rowan, J. (1997) · Self & Society · doi:10.1080/03060497.1997.11085777 · Cited by 1,034 · cited 1×
“…that there is an important distinction to be drawn between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states (e.g. Block, 1997; Carruthers, 1996; Dretske, 1993; Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 1997; van Gulick 1996).”
Background(2020) · The Mind · doi:10.7551/mitpress/12143.003.0004 · Cited by 714
The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates
Luby, B. J. (1998) · Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1002/(sici)1520-6696(199823)34:4<408::aid-jhbs19>3.0.co;2-i · Cited by 632
The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates
Luby, B. J. (1998) · Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1002/(sici)1520-6696(199823)34:4<433::aid-jhbs38>3.0.co;2-v · Cited by 628
Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology
Carruthers, P. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511583360 · Cited by 554
DRETSKE, F. (1993) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/102.406.263 · Cited by 287
Consciousness and the state/transitive/creature distinction
McBride, R. (1999) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/095150899105864 · Cited by 12 · cited 2×
“McBride (1999) has argued that whilst there is a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness there is no parallel ontological distinction.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- VAN GULICK R., 1996, Conscious experience
Cited by
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
“In discussing this research we will emphasize consciousness as a subjective experience, as opposed to the condition of an organism simply being awake and responsive to sensory stimulation (45, 46).”
BackgroundThe neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?
Hohwy, J. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.006 · Cited by 157
Gallace, A., & Spence, C. J. (2010) · PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness · Cited by 68
Functions of consciousness: conceptual clarification
Niikawa, T., Miyahara, K., Hamada, H. T., & Nishida, S. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac006 · Cited by 34
“While McBride (1999) claims that the distinction is merely grammatical and there is no corresponding ontological difference in consciousness, Manson (2000) disputes this, stating that each is a distinct aspect of consciousness.”
Consciousness and information integration
Brogaard, B. “., Chomanski, B., & Gatzia, D. E. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02613-3 · Cited by 14
“Creature consciousness is commonly taken to be distinct from state consciousness (Dretske 1993; Carruthers 1996, 2000; Lycan 1996; Block 1997; Rosenthal 1997; Manson 2000).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Manson, N.
- Corresponding author
- Manson, Neil
- ORCID
- Manson, Neil
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2000-09
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 405-410
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2014105037
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- state consciousness, mental states, consciousness, unconscious mental states, theory of consciousness, mind, ontological distinction
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- Manson, N. (2000). State consciousness and creature consciousness: A real distinction. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080050128196
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