The nature of epistemic feelings
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called “epistemic feelings.” This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.
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Citations
Cites
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“They do so by means of their valence, i.e., the subjective sense of positivity or negativity arising from the experience (Carver, 2003; Efklides, 2006; Russell, 2003).”
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“This is the direct-access model of metacogntion (Brown & McNeill, 1966; Hart, 1965; Nelson & Narens, 1990).”
BackgroundMethodTen Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
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Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409 · cited 2×
“The transparency thesis claims that experience is transparent about its object: the object constitutes the experience and the subject cannot attend to anything but the object (Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000).”
BackgroundNiedenthal, P. M. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1136930 · Cited by 1,406 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, the facial expression adopted by the subject has an important influence in the felt experience of fluency or difficulty on a given task (Laird, 1974; Niedenthal, 2007; Stepper & Strack, 1993).”
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Cited by
Learning to Feel Like a Scientist
JABER, L. Z., & HAMMER, D. (2016) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.21202 · Cited by 225
Toward a Metacognitive Account of Cognitive Offloading
Dunn, T. L., & Risko, E. F. (2016) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12273 · Cited by 122
Scaffolded Memory and Metacognitive Feelings
Arango-Muñoz, S. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0124-1 · Cited by 69
Self-citationKnowing by heart: Visceral feedback shapes recognition memory judgments.
Fiacconi, C. M., Peter, E. L., Owais, S., & Köhler, S. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000164 · Cited by 54
Through the Newsfeed Glass: Rethinking Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers
Figà Talamanca, G., & Arfini, S. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00494-z · Cited by 41
“Epistemic feelings are elements of the emotional spectrum (Arango-Muñoz, 2014) with meta-cognitive functions and which affect cognitive abilities, states, and decision making (Sousa, 2009; Evans, 2008; Terpe, 2016).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Arango-Muñoz, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2013-01-11
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 193-211
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2043984023
- Cited by
- 154
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 48.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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