Mental disorder and social deviance
Abstract
Social deviance refers to actions or behaviours that violate social norms. Since the declassification of homosexuality and development of DSM-III, one of the aims of a definition of mental disorder has been to make explicit the distinction between mental disorder and social deviance. It is well-recognized that psychiatric disorders frequently manifest as violations of social norms, and the validity of the distinction between disorder and deviance has been of great interest to philosophers of psychiatry. This article provides an overview of some of the major conceptual strategies that have been discussed as a means of discriminating between mental disorder and social deviance, and the extent to which these strategies can be said to be philosophically successful. Specifically, we review DSM's definition of mental disorder, notions of dysfunctions (commonsensical, clinical, naturalist), intrinsic and socially constituted distress, disability, 3E perspectives and functional norms, and ethical and political approaches to this question. Current philosophical strategies don't offer a distinct dividing line between disorder and deviance, but they help illuminate the relevant considerations involved. It may be concluded that the distinction between disorder and deviance is not simply discovered but also negotiated between competing values.
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In the DSM-5, the notion of dysfunction is more based on value judgments than scientific discovery.
“This is reflected in the DSM-5, where the notion of”
From Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life (2022) · cites this paper as Aftab & Rashed, 2020
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Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life
Chapman, R., & Carel, H. (2022) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12456 · Cited by 231 · see citing works
- Authors
- Aftab, A., & Rashed, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Ohio Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services (US)
- University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Aftab, Awais
- Venue
- International Review of Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2020-10-05
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 478-485
- ISSN
- 0954-0261 (ISSN-L)
- 1369-1627
- OpenAlex
- W3089601309
- Cited by
- 32
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 6.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Review of Psychiatry (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- BIROn (Birkbeck, University of London) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychology and Mental Health
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Deviance, and Social Control
- Keywords
- mental illness, social deviance, social norms, DSM-III, dysfunction, disability, psychiatric ethics, philosophy of psychiatry
- MeSH terms
- Mental Disorders, Homosexuality, Humans, Psychiatry, Social Behavior, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
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