Why don't we perceive our brain states?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The major part of this paper is devoted to the issue of how to bridge the gap between perception and action. First, the traditional view of the perception-action relationship is addressed. This view assumes that there are two different and incommensurate coding systems for afferent and efferent patterns (sensory and motor coding). Next, a different view is proposed that invokes the common coding of afferent and efferent patterns. One of the implications of this view is that actions can be controlled and guided by representations of distal events. There is some support for this view from two different sources: the first is nineteenth-century psychology of the will. the other comes from more recent experimental evidence. Some findings from experiments on sensorimotor synchronisation and on the Simon effect are discussed with reference to the notion of distal focusing in action control. In conclusion, the issue raised in the title is addressed. As a tentative answer it is suggested that the reason why our percepts refer to distal events (rather than proximal stimulus patterns or central excitation patterns) is related to the needs of action control. This consideration is discussed within the framework of the common coding approach.
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In the citing paper
“That is, action planning and perception typically involves distal events, since this is the only format that allows for commensurate coding and thus for efficient planning of action (see Prinz, 1992).”
From Principles derived from the study of simple skills do not generalize to complex skill learning (2002) · cites this paper as Prinz, 1992
In the citing paper
“According to this view, efferent and afferent codes can be generated and maintained in a commensurate way only at a distant level of representation.”
From Principles derived from the study of simple skills do not generalize to complex skill learning (2002) · cites this paper as Prinz, 1992
In the citing paper
“MNS properties are consistent with the PAM and common-coding theory, whereby congruent internal representations are activated during the observation of the actions of others via a simulation mechanism, which facilitates the observer's ability to empathise with, and ultimately understand, the emotional and mental world of the observed other.”
From Is the Putative Mirror Neuron System Associated with Empathy? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (2021) · cites this paper as Prinz, 1992
Citations
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Cited by
Empathy: its ultimate and proximate bases
Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000018 · Cited by 4,126
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000103 · Cited by 3,091
Self-citationThe representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery
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Principles derived from the study of simple skills do not generalize to complex skill learning
Wulf, G., & Shea, C. H. (2002) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196276 · Cited by 829
Metadata
- Authors
- Prinz, W.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Prinz, Wolfgang
- ORCID
- Prinz, Wolfgang
- Venue
- European Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1992-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-20
- ISSN
- 0954-1446 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0635
- OpenAlex
- W2080863459
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 9.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The European Journal of Cognitive Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- perception and action, common coding, action control, Simon effect, psychology of will, percepts
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- Prinz, W. (1992). Why don't we perceive our brain states? European Journal of Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09541449208406240
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.