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Why don't we perceive our brain states?

Prinz, Wolfgang · 1992 · European Journal of Cognitive Psychology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The major part of this paper is devoted to the issue of how to bridge the gap between perception and action. First, the traditional view of the perception-action relationship is addressed. This view assumes that there are two different and incommensurate coding systems for afferent and efferent patterns (sensory and motor coding). Next, a different view is proposed that invokes the common coding of afferent and efferent patterns. One of the implications of this view is that actions can be controlled and guided by representations of distal events. There is some support for this view from two different sources: the first is nineteenth-century psychology of the will. the other comes from more recent experimental evidence. Some findings from experiments on sensorimotor synchronisation and on the Simon effect are discussed with reference to the notion of distal focusing in action control. In conclusion, the issue raised in the title is addressed. As a tentative answer it is suggested that the reason why our percepts refer to distal events (rather than proximal stimulus patterns or central excitation patterns) is related to the needs of action control. This consideration is discussed within the framework of the common coding approach.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1080/09541449208406240

Cites

35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 35 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Brunswik E., 1952, International encyclopedia of united science, 1, 10
  2. Fraisse P., 1980, Anticipation et Comportement, 233
  3. Grice P., 1961, Studies in the way of words, 224
  4. Hommel B., 1990, Quellen der Interferenz beim Simon-Effekt. Dissertation
  5. Koffka K., 1925, Die Grundlagen der psychischcn Entwicklung. Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie
  6. Libeman A. M., 1985, Perception, 21, 1
  7. Lotze R. H., 1852, Medicinische Psychologic oder Physiologie der Seele
  8. Viviani P., 1990, Cognitive science in Europe: Issues and trends, 11
  9. Viviani P., Journal of Experimental Psychology

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Prinz, W.
Affiliations
Max Planck Society (DE)
Corresponding author
Prinz, Wolfgang
Venue
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology
Published
1992-01
Volume
4
Issue
1
Pages
1-20
ISSN
  • 0954-1446 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-0635
OpenAlex
W2080863459
Cited by
251
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 8
FWCI
9.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The European Journal of Cognitive Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
Keywords
perception and action, common coding, action control, Simon effect, psychology of will, percepts

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why don't we perceive our brain states? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09541449208406240
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Prinz, W. (1992). Why don't we perceive our brain states? European Journal of Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09541449208406240

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.