Introduction: Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers
Abstract
“… from the military point of view, time is in our favour, and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6–12 months' time, than to accept the present challenge....
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This introduction to a special issue of *Diplomacy & Statecraft* argues that Neville Chamberlain's appeasement was not a sudden aberration but one of several competing options in British grand strategy, and that the historiographical debate since 1940 has remained polemical and analytically sterile. It frames the issue's five thematic contributions around four overarching problems: grand strategy, ideology, intelligence, and the Anglo-French relationship.
Key findings
- Chamberlain's appeasement was one of two "key lines of operations or pillars" of British strategy toward Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, alongside rearmament, and remained central to British grand strategy for "eighteen crucial months" after May 1937.
- Unlike earlier British uses of appeasement—which the author describes as tactical instruments serving the balance of power, citing P. M. Kennedy and Zara Steiner on the 1920s—Chamberlain's variant was a strategic pillar resting on bilateral agreements and measured rearmament, aimed at securing peace until rearmament was complete (Chamberlain's "danger period" running to 1942).
- The policy failed on both counts: the March 1939 occupation of the rump of Czechoslovakia destroyed appeasement, and the September 1939 attack on Poland exposed rearmament's failure to deter German aggression.
- The author identifies four issues as central to rethinking appeasement—grand strategy, ideology, intelligence (including whether it was accepted uncritically, doctored, or ignored), and the problem of France as a "wilful ally"—and argues the traditional-revisionist polemic reduces to "I'm right; you're wrong."
Methods
- Design: historiographical and conceptual introduction to a special issue, not an empirical study; it synthesizes the state of the appeasement debate from the 1940 *Guilty Men* polemic through A. J. P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War* (1961) and later revisionism.
- Sources: secondary literature and published memoirs (Churchill, Avon, Bryant/Alanbrooke, Hankey, Chatfield, Simon, Templewood), plus archival references such as Ismay's September 1938 note (CAB 21/544) and the 1967/1968 changes in public records access.
- Framing: the five contributions by McKercher, Strang, Ferris, Thomas, and Aster are presented as a thematic approach intended to move beyond case-study and bilateral-relationship accounts.
Limitations
- The paper states no limitations of its own; it is an editorial introduction and offers no new primary research or systematic evidence.
- Evident from the text: the argument is programmatic and asserts the analytical sterility of existing approaches without demonstrating it; the substantive claims are delegated to the chapters it introduces, and the author's own position (he has published on Vansittart and alliance diplomacy) is not treated as a possible source of bias.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 14 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5
The differing perception of threat over almost half a dozen years before 1939 is crucial in both how and why appeasement became the guiding principle in British foreign policy by the late 1930s.
“and this differing perception of threat over almost a half dozen years before 1939 is also crucial in both how and why 'appeasement' became the guiding principle in British foreign policy by the late 1930s.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 1
The Czech crisis destroyed Chamberlain's appeasement policy.
“Whilst the Czech crisis destroyed Chamberlain's appeasement policy”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2
The Second World War memoirs of Churchill and a range of his political advisors and military commanders criticised Chamberlain's government and distanced themselves and their records from it.
“The subsequent publication of the Second World War memoirs of Sir Winston Churchill, Chamberlain's prime ministerial successor, and a range of his political advisors and military commanders criticised Chamberlain's government and distanced themselves and their political and military records from it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4] See W. S. Churchill, The Second World War , 6 volumes (1948-1953). Cf. D. Reynolds, in Command of History. Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (New York, 2005), p. xx-xx. Then, for examples of Churchill's ministers and commanders, see Earl of Avon, Facing the Dictators (1962); A. Bryant, The Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of FieldMarshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1957); Triumph in the West, 1943-1946. Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke (1959); Baron Hankey, Polit
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 1
Chamberlain and his Conservative-dominated Cabinet sought to ensure British security through bilateral agreements with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy to resolve points of contention.
“Chamberlain and his Conservative-dominated Cabinet sought to ensure British security through bilateral agreements with both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy to resolve points of contention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5
In the equation of grand strategy, ideology, and intelligence, France's desire to oppose Nazi German expansion has a special place in how British appeasement developed after the mid-1930s.
“And in this equation of grand strategy, ideology, and intelligence, the desire of France to oppose Nazi German expansion has a special place in how British 'appeasement' developed after the mid-1930s.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 2
Appeasement did not transcend time and circumstance in unaltered form.
“It did not, however, transcend time and circumstance in unaltered form.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2
Appeasement as a policy, if not always in name, had long been practised by British diplomatists when confronting particular external problems before the latter half of the 1930s.
“Importantly, 'appeasement' as a policy, if not always in name, had long been practised by British diplomatists when confronting particular external problems before the latter half of the 1930s.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [8] P. M. Kennedy, 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939,' British Journal of International Studies , Vol. 2 (1976), p. 195-215. source
- Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2
Appeasement was not so much a strategic axiom but rather a particular diplomatic arrow within a larger quiver of approaches that was occasionally drawn and used.
“Appeasement was not so much a strategic axiom but rather a particular diplomatic arrow within a larger quiver of approaches that was occasionally drawn and used.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [8] P. M. Kennedy, 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939,' British Journal of International Studies , Vol. 2 (1976), p. 195-215. source
- Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 1
Germany's war against Poland exposed the failure of British rearmament to deter German aggression.
“Germany's war against Poland exposed the failure of the other element of the Prime Minister's strategy in that British rearmament failed to deter German aggression.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 2
The appeasement foreign policy of the late 1930s was one of the two key pillars of Britain's strategy for dealing with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, aimed to secure British peace and security together with British rearmament.
“But the appeasement foreign policy of the late 1930s was one of the two key lines of operations or pillars of Britain's strategy for dealing with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, a policy that aimed to secure, together with British rearmament, British peace and security.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 6
Coupled with the passage of the Thirty-Year Rule for access to British government archives in 1967, a new generation of international historians began to reassess the crises of the 1930s.
“Coupled with the passage of the 'Thirty-Year Rule' for access to British government archives in 1967, a new generation of international historians began to reassess the crises of the 1930s.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] The leading historian in this regard is D. Cameron Watt. Beginning in the late 1950s, he began to look dispassionately at the nature of both Britain's power in the 1930s, in general, and its foreign policy, in particular. For example, see his 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement,' Journal of Modern History , Vol. 28 (1956); 'Gli accordi mediterranei anglo-italiani del 16 aprile 1938,' Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali , Vol. 26 (1959); 'German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note,' Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 1 (1966). The apotheosis
Not checked in the free run.
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 19
- May combine two claims. 7
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 4It is axiomatic that, far more than in domestic affairs, the formal process of making and executing foreign policy within any government is the preserve of a small group of individuals: Cabinet ministers, civil service and military advisors, and a limited number of opposition politicians and others seeking to influence diplomacy.
“It is axiomatic that far more than in domestic affairs, the formal process of making and executing of foreign policy within any government is the preserve of a small group of individuals-Cabinet ministers, their civil service and military advisors, and, beyond, a limited number of opposition politicians and others seeking to influence the diplomacy of the state.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [13] D. C. Watt, 'The Nature of the Foreign-Policy-Making Élite in Britain,' in idem., Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (1965), p. 1-15.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 4Successive prime ministers MacDonald, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were politically responsible for policy in the 1930s, but they did not act alone.
“Whilst successive prime ministers, James Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain were certainly politically responsible for policy in the 1930s, they did not act alone.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2Since the latter third of the nineteenth century, appeasement had been a consistent, although not necessarily overweening, element of British foreign policy.
“In fact, an argument has been made that, since the latter third of the nineteenth century, 'appeasement' had been a consistent-although not necessarily an overweening-element of British foreign policy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [8] P. M. Kennedy, 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939,' British Journal of International Studies , Vol. 2 (1976), p. 195-215. source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5British strategic thinking did not suddenly throw up the notion of appeasement when Neville Chamberlain rose to the premiership in the late Spring of 1937.
“British strategic thinking did not just suddenly throw up the notion of 'appeasement' when Neville Chamberlain rose to the premiership in the late Spring of 1937.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 4Although the RIIA, WLIPF, and LNU never ceased fulfilling their mandates to prevent another war of 1914-1918 proportions, the general public was moved to interest themselves in foreign and defence policy questions only in moments of crisis.
“But although the RIIA, the WLIPF, and the LNU never ceased in fulfilling their mandates to ensure another war of 1914-1918 proportions did not break out again, the general public was moved to interest themselves in foreign and defence policy questions only in moments of crisis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] C. Krull and B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-1934: Some Preliminary Observation,' Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 13 (2002), p. 103-136. source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5Intelligence assessments that informed policy-making in Britain in the 1930s are no longer the hidden dimension of British external policymaking and implementation.
“By the same token, the intelligence assessments that informed policy-making in Britain in the 1930s are no longer the 'hidden dimension' of British external policymaking and implementation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 1Chamberlain's appeasement policy reflected both the British electorate's desire for peace and Britain's need for time to build military capabilities to fight the two European totalitarian Powers.
“it certainly reflected both the desire of the British electorate for peace and the fact that, as the quote from Ismay above suggests, Britain needed time to build its military capabilities to fight against the two European totalitarian Powers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [1]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 4The responsibility of those below the prime ministers flowed from the strength of the arguments they made concerning national strategy, the assessment of intelligence reports, and whether Britain could rely on support from potential allies like France, all suffused by ideological debates.
“In this sense, the responsibility of those below the prime ministers flowed from the strength of the arguments that they made concerning national strategy, the assessment of intelligence reports, and the issue of whether Britain could rely on support from potential allies like France, all suffused by the ideological debates of the time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2Revisionist studies about appeasement began to appear by the late 1950s following pioneering work by a new generation of historians, helped by access to public archival holdings after the 1968 Public Records Act.
“Although the advent of revisionist studies about appeasement began to appear by the late 1950s following pioneering work by a new generation of historians-helped by access to a massive amount of public archival holdings following the passage of the 1968 Public Records Act-the tone of the controversy has not abated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] The leading historian in this regard is D. Cameron Watt. Beginning in the late 1950s, he began to look dispassionately at the nature of both Britain's power in the 1930s, in general, and its foreign policy, in particular. For example, see his 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement,' Journal of Modern History , Vol. 28 (1956); 'Gli accordi mediterranei anglo-italiani del 16 aprile 1938,' Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali , Vol. 26 (1959); 'German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note,' Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 1 (1966). The apotheosis
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 1British strategy in the late 1930s, built around Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy concept of appeasement of the European totalitarian Powers, remains as controversial at present as it was when the first anti-appeasement tract appeared in the Summer of 1940.
“British strategy in the late 1930s built around Neville Chamberlain's foreign policy concept of the 'appeasement' of the European totalitarian Powers remains as controversial at present as it was when the first antiappeasement tract appeared in the Summer of 1940.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2Appeasement in the older sense was a small component of a larger strategy pursued by particular British governments, whose principal objective was maintenance of the balance of power.
“Appeasement in this sense was a small component of a larger strategy pursued by particular British governments in these periods, which had as its principal objective the maintenance of the balance of power.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11] For Austen Chamberlain, see M. L. Roi and B. J. C. McKercher, ''Ideal' and 'Punch-Bag': Conflicting Views of the Balance of Power and Their Influence on Interwar British Foreign Policy,' Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 12 (2001), p. 47-78.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5French leaders were as divided as their British counterparts on how to respond to Hitler and Mussolini.
“French leaders were as divided as their British counterparts on the question of how to respond to Hitler and Mussolini.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2These memoirs and quick historical analyses added to the argument about an ineffectual and myopic pre-war British leadership and its foreign policy failures brought on by weak and misguided appeasement.
“With other memoirs and quick historical analyses, these books only added to the argument about an ineffectual and myopic pre-war British leadership and its foreign policy failures brought on by the weak and misguided policy of appeasement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4] See W. S. Churchill, The Second World War , 6 volumes (1948-1953). Cf. D. Reynolds, in Command of History. Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (New York, 2005), p. xx-xx. Then, for examples of Churchill's ministers and commanders, see Earl of Avon, Facing the Dictators (1962); A. Bryant, The Turn of the Tide: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of FieldMarshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1957); Triumph in the West, 1943-1946. Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke (1959); Baron Hankey, Polit
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 1Chamberlain and his Conservative-dominated Cabinet rejected both the traditional British strategic goal of maintaining the balance of power in Europe and newer competing prescriptions such as collective security under the League of Nations.
“Rejecting both the traditional British strategic goal of maintaining the balance of power in Europe as well as newer and competing strategic prescriptions like the pursuit of collective security under the aegis of the League of Nations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5Ideology was important in determining the attitudes and policy options of British relations towards Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Bolshevik Russia, and touched all facets of thinking in Britain in both government and the public sphere.
“By the same token, the issue of ideology-important in determining the attitudes and policy options of not only British relations towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy but, also, of Bolshevik Russia-touched all facets of thinking in Britain in both government and the public sphere.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 4Foreign policy-making in the 1930s was a complex issue, resulting from debates within ministries and bodies and then Cabinet sifting of policy alternatives.
“Foreign policy-making in the 1930s, how and why policy developed as it did and how it was given practical form, was a complex issue.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 1For Chamberlain and his supporters, there were limits to which concessions could be made to German and Italian ambitions.
“Yet, for Chamberlain and his supporters, there were limits to which concessions could be made to German and Italian ambitions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 4The maxim that foreign policy-making is the preserve of a small group is especially the case for Britain in the 1930s.
“This maxim is especially the case for Britain in the 1930s.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2Within the scholarly community, new issues have produced different avenues of enquiry that continue to animate the historiography of appeasement.
“The other is within the scholarly community, the advent of new issues have produced different avenues of enquiry that continue to animate the historiography”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7] Cf. P. Finney, 'The Romance of Decline: The Historiography of Appeasement and British National Identity,' Electronic Journal of International History , (2000); F. McDonough, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 1Chamberlain's appeasement policy rested on several questionable assumptions about the goals and aspirations of Britain's potential adversaries.
“While this policy rested on several questionable assumptions about the goals and aspirations of Britain's potential adversaries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 2Zara Steiner has suggested that in the 1920s, during Austen Chamberlain's tenure as British foreign secretary, British foreign policy sought to appease Weimar Germany over reparations and minor infractions of the Versailles Treaty concerning the disarmament of German ground forces.
“Similarly, Zara Steiner has suggested that in the 1920s, during the almost five years when Austen Chamberlain was British foreign secretary, British foreign policy sought to appease Weimar Germany over issues relating to reparations and minor infractions of the Versailles Treaty concerning the disarmament of German ground forces.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [9] Z. Steiner, The Lights That Failed (Oxford, 2005). source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 5The brand of appeasement that Chamberlain championed stood as but one of a number of alternatives in British grand strategy.
“Indeed, the brand of 'appeasement' that he championed stood as but one of a number of alternatives in British grand strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Michael Roi · p. 4In an age of mass democracy, the influence of British electors on Members of Parliament and Cabinet ministers could not be ignored in the calculations of all British political parties.
“And in an age of mass democracy inaugurated by the price that the British people paid in blood and treasure to fight a total war, the influence of British electors on Members of Parliament and Cabinet ministers could not be ignored in the calculations of all British political parties.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Michael Roi · p. 2Under the Chamberlain ministry, appeasement remained a central part of British grand strategy for eighteen crucial months, during which the strategic situation in Europe increasingly shifted to Britain's disadvantage.
“Under the Chamberlain ministry, it remained a central part of British grand strategy for eighteen crucial months, a period during which the strategic situation in Europe increasingly shifted to Britain's disadvantage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Michael Roi · p. 6As Professor Aster argues, the revisionist view of appeasement has only made more determined the critics of British foreign policy in the 1930s.
“Yet, as Professor Aster argues in his chapter in this issue, the revisionist view of appeasement has only made more determined the critics of British foreign policy in the 1930s.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [3] 'Cato,' Guilty Men (1940). 'Cato' was the pseudonym for the three Fleet Street journalists who wrote the book: Michael Foot, Frank Owen, and Peter Howard. The course of the historiographical debate can be followed in Professor Aster's chapter, below.
Not checked in the free run.
The paper relies on this without support.
The four over-arching issues of grand strategy, ideology, intelligence, and France were central to how and why British external policies in the late 1930s evolved.
“the four over-arching issues that were central to how and why British external policies in the late 1930s evolved as they did.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The traditional-revisionist polemic based on specific incidents or bilateral relationships is analytically sterile.
“this limited approach, polemical in nature, is analytically sterile.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The appeasement debate remains sufficiently unresolved to warrant a major reassessment.
“consensus is lacking amongst international historians about the issue.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Personality and policy are fundamental to each of the analyses in the volume.
“Of course, fundamental to each of the analyses is the issue of personality and policy.”
The paper relies on this without support.
For the Chamberlain government, appeasement was a rational policy course.
“For the Chamberlain government, which took office in May 1937, 'appeasement' was a rational policy course.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Conflicting names for the women's peace organisation
MinorThe main text calls the organisation the Women's League of International Peace and Freedom, while a note names it the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The differing word order also changes the initials.
“the Women's League of International Peace and Freedom [WLIPF]”
“Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.”
Conflicting dates for the British retreat across the Channel
MinorThe paper places the Dunkirk military disaster in May-June 1940, but later describes British forces retreating back across the Channel in the late summer of 1940.
“the military disaster at Dunkirk in May-June 1940”
“British forces retreat back across the Channel in the late Summer of 1940”
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- [3]'Cato,' Guilty Men (1940). 'Cato' was the pseudonym for the three Fleet Street journalists who wrote the book: Michael Foot, Frank Owen, and Peter Howard. The course of the historiographical debate can be followed in Professor Aster's chapter, below.
- [5]The leading historian in this regard is D. Cameron Watt. Beginning in the late 1950s, he began to look dispassionately at the nature of both Britain's power in the 1930s, in general, and its foreign policy, in particular. For example, see his 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement,' Journal of Modern History , Vol. 28 (1956); 'Gli accordi mediterranei anglo-italiani del 16 aprile 1938,' Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali , Vol. 26 (1959); 'German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note,' Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 1 (1966). The apotheosis of his work is How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938 -1939 (1989). A. J. P. Taylor's provocative The Origins of the Second World War (1961) raised more questions than answers about appeasement and its application, but he let others embroider on his ideas.
- [7]Cf. P. Finney, 'The Romance of Decline: The Historiography of Appeasement and British National Identity,' Electronic Journal of International History , (2000); F. McDonough, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the
- Politics of History Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War (1998); M. L. Roi, Alternative to Appeasement: Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy, 1934 -1937 (Westport, CT, 1997). Then see M. Hughes, 'The Foreign Secretary Goes to Court: John Simon and His Critics,' Twentieth Century British History , Vol. 14 (2003), p. 339-359.
- [10]For instance, G. L. Bernstein, 'Special Relationship and Appeasement: Liberal Policy Towards America in the Age of Palmerston,' Historical Journal , Vol. 41 (1998), 725-750; M. Hutt, 'La Pretendue Pacification de l'an III. Considerations Critiques sur la Situation en Bretagne à la Veille de Quiberon,' Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, Vol. 186 (1966), p. 485-521.
- [11]For Austen Chamberlain, see M. L. Roi and B. J. C. McKercher, ''Ideal' and 'Punch-Bag': Conflicting Views of the Balance of Power and Their Influence on Interwar British Foreign Policy,' Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 12 (2001), p. 47-78.
- [14]For instance, Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 'The Need for the Re-armament of Great Britain: Its Justification and Scope,' Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs , Vol. 15 (1936), p. 57-72, [with discussion, 72-79]. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. League of Nations or Holy Alliance?: Being the Draft of a League of Nations signed by the Allied and Associated Powers; together with suggestions offered by the . . . League (1919); A. B. Keith [League of Nations Union], The Place of the Empire in the League of Nations (1925).
- Authors
- Roi, M.
- Corresponding author
- Roi, Michael
- Venue
- Diplomacy & Statecraft
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-09-17
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 383-390
- ISSN
- 0959-2296 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-301X
- OpenAlex
- W2067305359
- Semantic Scholar
- 1f1372938fa3ed7862b3453b286cef695c6042f1
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Diplomacy and Statecraft (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › History and International Relations
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact
- Keywords
- appeasement, British foreign policy, appeasement debate, appeasement crisis
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-25.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-25.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
