The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis
Abstract
What if global governance mechanisms undermine the capacity of national banking regulators to deal with the deviant activities of their banks? Such was the case, this paper argues with respect to the Basel Accords and the regulation of the bank-based shadow-banking system. Securitization-activities by banks, driven by regulatory arbitrage have been an integral part of the shadow banking sector and a central transmission mechanism during the financial crisis. They have been identified as problematic by the international regulatory community since 1999, motivating reforms in Basel 2. This paper investigates why, nevertheless, regulatory loopholes that allowed banks to engage in these activities without core capital charges persisted in almost all Western jurisdictions pre-crisis. It lays emphasis on the global nature of the securitization business in conjunction with its national regulation, and shows that these national regulations on the fringes of global banking regulation were driven by competitiveness concerns. The Basel Accords were central in this dynamic, as they guaranteed the global nature of this market and gave national banking regulators the leeway to exempt securitization-activities from global regulation. Rather than eliminating competitive inequity concerns, the Basel Accords channelled them to its fringes, where they introduced a regulatory race to the bottom.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Systematic Process Analysis: when and how to use it
Hall, P. A. (2008) · European Political Science · doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210130 · Cited by 143 · cited 2×
“aims of national regulators with respect to regulations with the actual results (congruence analysis) and to verify the motivations and dynamics in interviews via process tracing (Hall, 2006).”
BackgroundResult
Cited by
Braun, B. (2020) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwy008 · Cited by 399
The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets
Gabor, D. (2016) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1207699 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Thiemann, M.
- Venue
- Review of International Political Economy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2014-02-05
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1203-1239
- ISSN
- 0969-2290 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4526
- OpenAlex
- W2046335498
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 17.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09692290.2013.860612
- The paper
- Thiemann, M. (2014). In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis. Review of International Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2013.860612
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.