The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets
Open accessAbstract
In its capacity as debt issuer, the state has played a growing role in financial life over the last 30 years. To examine this role and connect it to shadow banking, the paper develops the concept of the ‘repo trinity’, which captures a set of policy objectives that central banks outlined after the 1998 Russian crisis, the first systemic crisis of collateral-based finance. The repo trinity connected financial stability with liquid government bond markets and free repo markets. It further reinforced the dominance of the US government bond market as institutional template for states adjusting to a world of independent central banks, market-based financing and global competition for liquidity. Central banks and the Financial Stability Board recognized the impossible nature of the trinity after 2008, attributing cyclical leverage (financial instability) and elusive liquidity in collateral markets to deregulated repo markets, markets systemic to shadow banking. The new approach triggered radical changes in crisis central banking but has not powered significant regulatory interventions in the absence of an alternative mode of organizing government bond markets.
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Cites
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Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity
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Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016 · Cited by 1,705
Austerity: The History of a Dangerous IdeaPreprint
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Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity
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Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation
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Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea
Birch, K. (2014) · Journal of Cultural Economy · doi:10.1080/17530350.2014.888366 · Cited by 588
Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets
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Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation
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Cited by
Braun, B. (2020) · Socio-Economic Review · doi:10.1093/ser/mwy008 · Cited by 399
Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE's missing macroeconomy
Blyth, M., & Matthijs, M. (2017) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2017.1308417 · Cited by 290
The Politics of Uncertainty: Challenges of Transformation
Scoones, I., & Stirling, A. (2020) · doi:10.4324/9781003023845 · Cited by 158
Metadata
- Authors
- Gabor, D.
- Venue
- Review of International Political Economy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2016-08-04
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 967-1000
- ISSN
- 0969-2290 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4526
- OpenAlex
- W2476397627
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 27.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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