The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy
Abstract
As dramatically evidenced by the global financial crisis, the interaction of domestic regulatory systems has significant international consequences. Nevertheless, these relationships have received only limited attention from international relations scholars. This special issue, therefore, provides a detailed examination of international market regulation – the processes through which the domestic regulatory activities of states and other actors set the effective rules of internationally-exposed markets. To this end, we borrow and extend on arguments developed by historical institutionalists in comparative politics and American political development. In particular, the contributions adapt two mechanisms – policy feedbacks and relative sequencing – to explain state and bureaucratic preferences over international market regulation as well as bargaining strength in relevant negotiations. In addition to contributing to central IPE debates about international economic governance, the individual contributions shed light on a number of important empirical domains such as corporate accounting, intellectual property, pharmaceuticals, hedge funds, and financial market standardization.
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Citations
Cites
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
Pierson, P. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586011 · Cited by 8,094 · cited 2×
“…generation of historical institutionalism invoked the notion of path dependence to understand the circumstances under which institutions will tend to reproduce themselves, and the circumstances under which they will break down so that new paths are chosen (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000, 2004).”
BackgroundDiplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis
Pierson, P. (2004) · doi:10.1515/9781400841080 · Cited by 4,957
Path dependence in historical sociology
Mahoney, J. (2000) · Theory and Society · doi:10.1023/a:1007113830879 · Cited by 3,469
HACKER, J. S. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001121 · Cited by 1,543
Katzenstein, P. J. (1976) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300003726 · Cited by 279
Cited by
Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00351 · Cited by 1,879
Self-citationFailing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration
Jones, E., Kelemen, R. D., & Meunier, S. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015617966 · Cited by 559
From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation
Lall, R. (2012) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2011.603669 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L.
- Venue
- Review of International Political Economy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-10
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 609-638
- ISSN
- 0969-2290 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4526
- OpenAlex
- W2017386402
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 16.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2010). Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy. Review of International Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692291003723672
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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