“If you love me, keep my commandments”: Religiosity increases preference for rule-based moral arguments
Abstract
Two experiments demonstrated that religiosity affects the way people resolve moral dilemmas. Participants were presented a series of immoral actions and were asked to justify the wrongness of the action by appealing to either the violation of a rule (rule-based argument) or the negative consequences resulting from the action (outcome-based argument). In Study 1, it was shown both among British and American samples that religious individuals preferred rule-based moral arguments to consequentialist moral arguments more than nonreligious individuals, and covariance with political conservatism did not account for this effect. Study 2 replicated these results with revisions to the materials and extended measures. In this study, dimensions of religiosity—particularly Christian Orthodoxy—predicted rule-based morality independent of a personal need for structure, need for cognition, and right-wing authoritarianism. These results imply that religious individuals who are committed to orthodox religious teaching display a deontological style of morality for reasons that extend beyond a need for structure, cognitive simplicity, or submission to authority.
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Religious disbelief is associated with a more consequentialist view of morality.
“Multiple studies suggest that religious disbelief is associated with a more consequentialist view of morality. Specifically, disbelievers are more inclined to judge the appropriateness of actions based on their consequences relative to the consequences of inaction [57–59].”
From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [58]
The moral psychology literature suggests that disbelievers are more inclined than believers to form moral judgments on the basis of the consequences of specific actions compared to inaction.
“The moral psychology literature also suggests that disbelievers are more inclined than believers to form moral judgments on the basis of the consequences of specific actions compared to inaction [57–59].”
From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [58]
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References 57 · Cited by 48
- Authors
- Piazza, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Corresponding author
- Piazza, Jared
- ORCID
- Piazza, Jared
- Venue
- International Journal for the Psychology of Religion
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 285-302
- ISSN
- 1050-8619 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7582
- OpenAlex
- W2000411890
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 1.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Journal for the Psychology of Religion (publishedVersion)
- Lancaster EPrints (Lancaster University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Health › Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- religiosity, moral judgment, Christian orthodoxy, ethical dilemmas, need for structure, need for cognition, authoritarianism, political conservatism, cross-cultural comparison
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