The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 16 of the 101 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality
Open accessAbstract
Across four studies in the US and Sweden, disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in individualizing moral foundations (harm, fairness).
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CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
Across four studies in the U.S. and Sweden, disbelievers consistently endorsed the binding moral foundations less than believers, while showing little or no difference on individualizing moral foundations, Liberty/oppression, or moralization of epistemic rationality. The paper argues that this pattern is partly explained by lower exposure to credibility-enhancing displays (CREDs), lower existential threat, and more analytic cognitive style among disbelievers.
## Key findings
- In Study 1A, irreligiosity was associated with substantially weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations, with the relationship explaining R² = .32; controlling for political orientation reduced but did not remove it (R² = .17).
- In Study 1B, the same association replicated and remained after controlling for socially desirable responding (R² = .22), and still held with political orientation controlled (R² = .11). Religiosity was unrelated to Liberty/oppression and amoral tendencies in both 1A and 1B.
- In Study 2, disbelief vs. belief was associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations (R² = .125), and this remained after controlling for political orientation (R² = .097). Disbelief explained less than 1% of variance in individualizing foundations, Liberty/oppression, and moralization of epistemic rationality.
- In Study 3, less exposure to CREDs predicted higher likelihood of disbelief (OR = 2.92), and a more analytic cognitive style also predicted disbelief (OR = .67); mentalizing was not reliably related to disbelief. Disbelief was again linked to weaker binding foundations (R² = .112) and more consequentialist thinking (R² = .035), with the consequentialism link remaining after political controls (R² = .031).
- Mediation results in Study 2 showed that the indirect effect of country of residence on binding foundations was significant through CREDs (.350, 95% CI .304 to .400) and through BDW (.047, 95% CI .024 to .070); in Study 3, indirect effects through CREDs (.190), ACS (.044), and mentalizing (.039) explained the U.S.–Sweden difference in binding foundations.
- For consequentialist thinking in Study 3, indirect effects through CREDs (-.008), ACS (-.005), and mentalizing (-.006) were significant, but the direct country effect remained significant (-.059), indicating only partial explanation.
## Methods
- Four online survey studies were conducted: two U.S. MTurk samples (Studies 1A and 1B; N = 179 and N = 250) and two larger cross-national samples from the U.S. and Sweden (Study 2: final N = 2,131; Study 3: N = 2,062 recruited, with equal believer/disbeliever quotas by country).
- Main measures included religiosity or direct belief/disbelief, the MFQ30-based moral foundations measures, Liberty/oppression, amorality, moralized rationality, CRED exposure, existential threat (BDW), analytic cognitive style (CRT), mentalizing (EQ-Short), and in Study 3 consequentialist thinking.
- Analyses used hierarchical regression/logistic regression and bootstrapped mediation (PROCESS, 5,000 resamples), with controls such as age, gender, education, political orientation, and social desirability where available.
## Limitations
- The paper states that the studies relied exclusively on self-reported moral values and principles, so behavioral consequences were not directly measured.
- The paper states that the data were cross-sectional, so it cannot support causal conclusions about the proposed antecedents of disbelief or morality.
- The paper notes that the countries studied, while contrasting in religiosity, are still relatively similar (U.S. and Sweden are both WEIRD), so results may not generalize to non-WEIRD cultures; this is explicitly stated in the discussion.
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12 Valid · 1 Not valid · 29 Not checked · 179 Own results and interpretations
Some cited sources support this claim and some don’t — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Thus, it seems implausible that mentalizing deficits serve as a reliable antecedent of religious disbelief.”
§ The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality > Introduction > Antecedents of religious disbelief
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [29] DLR Maij, 2017, Mentalizing skills do not differentiate believers from non-believers, but credibility enhancing displays do, PLoS One source
The General discussion (page unavailable) reports mixed evidence, with mentalizing measures making only a small contribution to predicting religious belief and no difference in belief strength between Dutch participants with and without strong mentalizing deficiencies. It also acknowledges an exception—a curvilinear association in the US sample—so the citing sentence’s cautious wording, “seems implausible” and “reliable,” fits the findings. The study does not directly establish whether deficits precede disbelief. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Disputedcites [44] A Norenzayan, 2012, Mentalizing deficits constrain belief in a personal God, PLoS One sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The General Discussion says mentalizing deficits are “one pathway among several to disbelief” and describes the findings as robust across methodological checks. It cautions that the correlational studies cannot establish causation, but does not conclude that mentalizing deficits are an unreliable antecedent. (LLM, conf=0.84)
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- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Psychologists have recently started to examine why people have such antipathy toward atheists, and the findings strongly suggest that prejudice against atheists is driven by distrust [4–8].”
§ The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality > Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [4] B Beit-Hallahmi, 2010
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [5] WM Gervais, 2013, In Godlessness we distrust: Using social psychology to solve the puzzle of anti-atheist prejudice, Soc Personal Psychol Compass source
- Supportedcites [6] WM Gervais, 2014, Everything is permitted? People intuitively judge immorality as representative of atheists, PLoS One source
The “Religion and Morality: Reality and Perception” section identifies distrust as a key component of anti-atheist prejudice. “Moving Forward” also proposes that intuitions about atheist immorality can lead to distrust, supporting the citing sentence’s broad, hedged characterization. (LLM, conf=0.87)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] WM Gervais, 2011, Do you believe in atheists? Distrust is central to anti-atheist prejudice, J Pers Soc Psychol source
- Supportedcites [8] WM Gervais, 2017, Global evidence of extreme intuitive prejudice against atheists, Nat Hum Behav source
The introductory passage says anti-atheist prejudice stems in part from intuitions about religion’s role in morality and describes the study as quantifying moral distrust of atheists. The concluding passage also characterizes its findings as widespread intuitive moral suspicion and distrust of atheists. This supports the citing sentence’s suggested link between prejudice and distrust. (LLM, conf=0.88)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Not matched
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“In summary, there appear to be at least three plausible contributors to religious disbelief: a lack of exposure to CREDs in the community while growing up, living under conditions of low existential threat, and a reliance on an analytic (vs. intuitive) cognitive style should all increase the likelihood of becoming a disbeliever.”
§ The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality > Introduction > Antecedents of religious disbelief
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [27] A Norenzayan, 2013, The origins of religious disbelief, Trends Cogn Sci source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] JA Lanman, 2012, The importance of religious displays for belief acquisition and secularization, J Contemp Relig source
- Supportedcites [29] DLR Maij, 2017, Mentalizing skills do not differentiate believers from non-believers, but credibility enhancing displays do, PLoS One source
The Introduction says exposure to credible displays of religious belief increases the likelihood of adopting supernatural beliefs, while other displays can decrease it. Study 2’s Discussion reports that parents’ credibility-enhancing displays predict whether people believe. Together, these support the proposed link between fewer religious CREDs during upbringing and a greater likelihood of disbelief. (LLM, conf=0.86)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Specifically, weaker religious belief is associated with viewing reliance on logic and evidence when forming and evaluating beliefs as a moral good [64].”
§ The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality > Introduction > Beyond the moral foundations: Consequentialist thinking and moralized rationality
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [64] T Ståhl, 2016, Moralized rationality: Relying on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of belief can be seen as a moral issue, PLoS One source
Study 5 Results report that moralized rationality was negatively related to religiosity; Table 3 gives a correlation of −.17 between the two measures. The paper defines moralized rationality as viewing reliance on logic and evidence in forming and evaluating beliefs as a moral matter. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Notably, this finding is inconsistent with previous work that has relied on more restricted U.S. samples [64].”
§ The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality > Discussion
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [64] T Ståhl, 2016, Moralized rationality: Relying on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of belief can be seen as a moral issue, PLoS One source
The General Discussion (page unavailable) reports that atheists endorsed moralized rationality more strongly than religiously affiliated participants, with Cohen’s d = .42. Study 2’s Method describes recruitment of U.S. residents through Mechanical Turk. The comparison with the citing paper’s two-country finding is the citing authors’ interpretation, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Consistentχ²(1) = 69.27reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(1) = 69.27, p < .001”
- Consistentχ²(1) = 13.66reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(1) = 13.66, p < .001”
- Consistentχ²(1) = 42.53reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(1) = 42.53, p < .001”
- Consistentχ²(1) = 14.43reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ2(1) = 14.43, p < .001”
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Citations
Cites
(2013) · Cited by 44,563
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015141 · Cited by 4,560
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0021847 · Cited by 2,666 · cited 3×
“Due to space limitations only the items from the first half of the MFQ30 were included, along with the equivalent questions from the Liberty/oppression scale.”
MethodInfluentialCyberostracism: effects of being ignored over the Internet
Williams, K. D., Cheung, C. K. T., & Choi, W. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.748 · Cited by 2,276
Sacred and secular religion and politics worldwide
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004) · Cited by 2,257
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4 · Cited by 1,716 · cited 3×
“To address this question, I rely on the conceptualization PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246593 February 24, 2021 4 / 25 of the moral domain provided by Moral Foundations Theory [45, 46].”
InfluentialYoung, K. (2016) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315008189 · Cited by 1,589
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.308 · Cited by 1,412 · cited 1×
“For example, manipulations of mortality salience increase ingroup favoritism [51] and nationalistic bias [52].”
Background
Cited by
MoralBench: Moral Evaluation of LLMs
Ji, J., Chen, Y., Jin, M., Xu, W., Hua, W., & Zhang, Y. (2025) · ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter · doi:10.1145/3748239.3748246 · Cited by 148
“Recently, moral foundations theory has extended beyond traditional contexts, reaching into the domain of artificial intelligence, specifically in the assessment of LLMs.”
Ståhl, T., & van Prooijen, J. (2021) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2021.110914 · Cited by 12
Self-citation“Breaking Free”: A Grounded Theory Study of Atheist Women in the United States
Abbott, D. M., & Anaya, E. J. (2022) · Psychology of Women Quarterly · doi:10.1177/03616843221115338 · Cited by 8
“Atheists are often perceived as immoral (Gervais, 2014) and untrustworthy (Gervais et al., 2011), despite the absence of evidence to support such stereotypes (Ståhl, 2021).”
BackgroundStåhl, T., & Turner, J. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0258228 · Cited by 6
“Studies have also demonstrated that both of these measures are positively associated with belief in science, and negatively related to a number of epistemically suspect beliefs [4,6,7,21].”
BackgroundSelf-citationLongtime nemeses or cordial allies? How individuals mentally relate science and religion.
Zein, R. A., Altenmüller, M. S., & Gollwitzer, M. (2024) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000492 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Ståhl, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ståhl, Tomas
- ORCID
- Ståhl, Tomas
- Venue
- PLOS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2021-02-24
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- e0246593
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7904147
- OpenAlex
- W3133094892
- Semantic Scholar
- 0835f1aefb398ea51abcba6d3c4988349d0b2ce3
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 1.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Understanding Unbelief Programme
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Religion and Society Interactions
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
- Keywords
- atheism, moral foundations, binding moral foundations, individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality, consequentialism, existential risk, analytic cognitive style, moral values, cross-cultural comparison, United States, Sweden
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Morals, Motivation
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