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The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality

Open access
Ståhl, Tomas · 2021 · PLOS ONE

Abstract

Across four studies in the US and Sweden, disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in individualizing moral foundations (harm, fairness).

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

Across four studies in the U.S. and Sweden, disbelievers consistently endorsed the binding moral foundations less than believers, while showing little or no difference on individualizing moral foundations, Liberty/oppression, or moralization of epistemic rationality. The paper argues that this pattern is partly explained by lower exposure to credibility-enhancing displays (CREDs), lower existential threat, and more analytic cognitive style among disbelievers.

## Key findings

  • In Study 1A, irreligiosity was associated with substantially weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations, with the relationship explaining R² = .32; controlling for political orientation reduced but did not remove it (R² = .17).
  • In Study 1B, the same association replicated and remained after controlling for socially desirable responding (R² = .22), and still held with political orientation controlled (R² = .11). Religiosity was unrelated to Liberty/oppression and amoral tendencies in both 1A and 1B.
  • In Study 2, disbelief vs. belief was associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations (R² = .125), and this remained after controlling for political orientation (R² = .097). Disbelief explained less than 1% of variance in individualizing foundations, Liberty/oppression, and moralization of epistemic rationality.
  • In Study 3, less exposure to CREDs predicted higher likelihood of disbelief (OR = 2.92), and a more analytic cognitive style also predicted disbelief (OR = .67); mentalizing was not reliably related to disbelief. Disbelief was again linked to weaker binding foundations (R² = .112) and more consequentialist thinking (R² = .035), with the consequentialism link remaining after political controls (R² = .031).
  • Mediation results in Study 2 showed that the indirect effect of country of residence on binding foundations was significant through CREDs (.350, 95% CI .304 to .400) and through BDW (.047, 95% CI .024 to .070); in Study 3, indirect effects through CREDs (.190), ACS (.044), and mentalizing (.039) explained the U.S.–Sweden difference in binding foundations.
  • For consequentialist thinking in Study 3, indirect effects through CREDs (-.008), ACS (-.005), and mentalizing (-.006) were significant, but the direct country effect remained significant (-.059), indicating only partial explanation.

## Methods

  • Four online survey studies were conducted: two U.S. MTurk samples (Studies 1A and 1B; N = 179 and N = 250) and two larger cross-national samples from the U.S. and Sweden (Study 2: final N = 2,131; Study 3: N = 2,062 recruited, with equal believer/disbeliever quotas by country).
  • Main measures included religiosity or direct belief/disbelief, the MFQ30-based moral foundations measures, Liberty/oppression, amorality, moralized rationality, CRED exposure, existential threat (BDW), analytic cognitive style (CRT), mentalizing (EQ-Short), and in Study 3 consequentialist thinking.
  • Analyses used hierarchical regression/logistic regression and bootstrapped mediation (PROCESS, 5,000 resamples), with controls such as age, gender, education, political orientation, and social desirability where available.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that the studies relied exclusively on self-reported moral values and principles, so behavioral consequences were not directly measured.
  • The paper states that the data were cross-sectional, so it cannot support causal conclusions about the proposed antecedents of disbelief or morality.
  • The paper notes that the countries studied, while contrasting in religiosity, are still relatively similar (U.S. and Sweden are both WEIRD), so results may not generalize to non-WEIRD cultures; this is explicitly stated in the discussion.

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  • Consistentχ²(1) = 69.27reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2(1) = 69.27, p < .001”

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    “χ2(1) = 13.66, p < .001”

  • Consistentχ²(1) = 42.53reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2(1) = 42.53, p < .001”

  • Consistentχ²(1) = 14.43reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2(1) = 14.43, p < .001”

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Metadata

Authors
Ståhl, T.
Affiliations
University of Illinois Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Ståhl, Tomas
Venue
PLOS ONE
Published
2021-02-24
Volume
16
Issue
2
Pages
e0246593
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3133094892
Cited by
35
References
89
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2
FWCI
1.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Understanding Unbelief Programme
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Religion and Society Interactions
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
Keywords
atheism, moral foundations, binding moral foundations, individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality, consequentialism, existential risk, analytic cognitive style, moral values, cross-cultural comparison, United States, Sweden
MeSH terms
Cognition, Humans, Morals, Motivation

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1371/journal.pone.0246593
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Ståhl, T. (2021). The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246593

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