The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe
Abstract
Three aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected officials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes. The article suggests that IRAs enjoy considerable insulation from elected politicians in terms of party politicization and tenure. The evidence for relations between IRAs and business regulatees is more mixed: the two have been relatively separate in terms of the professional origins and destinations of senior IRA staff and, in some countries, there has been considerable legal conflict between them. However, in an important and visible field such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little activity. The greatest changes introduced by IRAs have been in decision-making processes, which they have opened up, in contrast to closed processes before delegation.
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Cites
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Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis
Maggetti, M. (2007) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x · Cited by 275
Historical institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: A research agenda
Lockwood, M., Kuzemko, C., Mitchell, C., & Hoggett, R. (2017) · Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space · doi:10.1177/0263774x16660561 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Thatcher, M.
- Venue
- Journal of European Public Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 954-972
- ISSN
- 1350-1763 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4429
- OpenAlex
- W2079909706
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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