Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
Abstract
Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight-which we call fire-alarm oversight-over another form-police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals.
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Interest groups, advocacy organizations, and experts monitor the administrative state for abuses and watch for backsliding.
“Yet, just as interest groups, advocacy organizations, and experts monitor the administrative state for abuses (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984), so do they watch for backsliding.”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984
As a policy, justifications might enable the public to adopt a strategy more like fire alarm oversight rather than police patrol oversight: they can act when something is obviously wrong but do not need to put a lot of effort on continuous monitoring.
“As a policy, justifications might enable the public to adopt a strategy that, in the words of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), is more like fire alarm oversight rather than police patrol oversight: they can act when something is obviously wrong but do not need to put a lot of effort on continuous monitoring.”
From Artificial intelligence, transparency, and public decision-making: Why explanations are key when trying to produce perceived legitimacy (2020) · cites this paper as McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)
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“…mechanisms such as administrative procedures, which formalize processes and standards to be followed by bureaucrats ( McCubbins et al., 1987 ) as well as democratic oversight, which allows citizens to be engaged in monitoring and evaluating government actions ( McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984 ).”
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- Authors
- McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T.
- ORCID
- McCubbins, Mathew D.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-02
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 165
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2333983184
- Cited by
- 2,936
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 63 · 2025: 121 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 145 · 2022: 134 · 2021: 124 · 2020: 133 · 2019: 104 · 2018: 123 · 2017: 109 · 2016: 127 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 101 · 2013: 138 · 2012: 118
- FWCI
- 84.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- congressional oversight, legislative strategy, legislative behavior
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