The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence
Abstract
Why do voters vote for undemocratic politicians in a democracy? My chief contention is that affective polarization has become a primary factor driving support for undemocratic politicians. Once partisan identification turns into a salient identity in the hierarchy of group affiliations, it has the potential to widen inter-party distances. Such a political environment fosters positive beliefs of their preferred party and negative beliefs of the other party, which promote political cynicism, intolerance and increase partisan loyalty. As a result, crossing party lines becomes costly, even when incumbents violate democratic principles or incumbents’ economic policies do not appeal to supporters’ interests. This tradeoff enables undemocratic politicians to evade electoral sanctions for undemocratic behaviour. I created an extended version of Reiljan’s affective polarization application. The new dataset covers affective polarization scores of 53 countries calculated over 170 national election surveys. I find that increasing affective polarization is highly correlated with democratic backsliding, less accountability, less freedom, fewer rights, and less deliberation in democracies. However, ideological polarization has shown no correlation.
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Orhan (2022) shows a significant relationship across 53 countries and more than 170 election surveys such that higher levels of country-level affective polarization lead to more democratic backsliding.
“For instance, Orhan (2022) shows a significant relationship across 53 countries and more than 170 election surveys such that higher levels of country-level affective polarization lead to more democratic backsliding.”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Orhan (2022)
Orhan's (2022) analysis, based on data from 53 countries between 1996 and 2020, found that affective polarization deteriorated democracy and accountability.
“The analysis, which was based on data from 53 countries between 1996 and 2020, found that affective polarization deteriorated democracy and accountability.”
From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Orhan (2022)
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References 84 · Cited by 198
- Authors
- Orhan, Y. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee (US)
- Corresponding author
- Orhan, Yunus Emre
- ORCID
- Orhan, Yunus Emre
- Venue
- Democratization
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2022-04-19
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 714-735
- ISSN
- 1351-0347 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-890X
- OpenAlex
- W4224274293
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 84
- Citations by year
- 2026: 47 · 2025: 67 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 8
- FWCI
- 123.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Democratization (publishedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- affective polarization, democratic backsliding, political cynicism, party identification, electoral sanctions, incumbency, political intolerance, ideological polarization, democratic accountability, political freedom, political rights, political deliberation
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