Cited by 86Nuclear Issues and DefenseMilitary Strategy and TechnologyInternational Relations and Foreign Policy

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Maas, Matthijs M.·2019·Contemporary Security Policy

Abstract

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.

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Crossref · 10.1080/13523260.2019.1576464

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Authors
Maas, M. M.
Affiliations
University of Copenhagen (DK)
Corresponding author
Maas, Matthijs M.
Venue
Contemporary Security Policy
Published
2019-02-06
Volume
40
Issue
3
Pages
285-311
ISSN
  • 1352-3260 (ISSN-L)
  • 1743-8764
OpenAlex
W2911993872
Cited by
86
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 1
FWCI
35.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Contemporary Security Policy (publishedVersion)
  • Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Nuclear Issues and Defense
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Military Strategy and Technology
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
Keywords
artificial intelligence in warfare, arms control, nuclear weapons, arms race, strategic stability, normal accidents, meaningful human control, epistemic communities

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