The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking
Abstract
One hundred and three participants solved conflict and non-conflict versions of four reasoning tasks using a two-response procedure: a base rate task, a causal reasoning task, a denominator neglect task, and a categorical syllogisms task. Participants were asked to give their first, intuitive answer, to make a Feeling of Rightness (FOR) judgment, and then were given as much time as needed to rethink their answer. They also completed a standardized measure of IQ and the actively open-minded thinking questionnaire. The FORs of both high- and low-capacity reasoners were responsive to conflict, such that FORs were lower for conflict relative to non-conflict problems. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, high-capacity reasoners made a greater distinction between conflict and non-conflict items on measures of Type 2 thinking, namely, rethinking time and probability of changing answers. In contrast to the quality hypothesis, however, this rethinking time did not advantage the ability of the high-capacity group to produce normative answers, except for the base rate task. Indeed, we observed that the correlation between capacity and the probability of normative answers emerged at the initial response, rather than after rethinking.
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Cites
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Rationality and the Reflective Mind
Stanovich, K. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001 · Cited by 1,041
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2007) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780600780796 · Cited by 356
Cited by
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Meta-Reasoning: Monitoring and Control of Thinking and Reasoning
Ackerman, R., & Thompson, V. A. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.004 · Cited by 400
Self-citationBaron, J., Scott, S., Fincher, K., & Emlen Metz, S. (2015) · Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.003 · Cited by 346
Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014 · Cited by 346
Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware
Stanovich, K. E. (2018) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, V. A., & Johnson, S. C.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2014-01-03
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 215-244
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2041986995
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 10.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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