The DOI matches its Crossref record; 96 of the 96 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware
Abstract
Humans are cognitive misers because their basic tendency is to default to processing mechanisms of low computational expense. Such a tendency leads to suboptimal outcomes in certain types of hostile environments. The theoretical inferences made from correct and incorrect responding on heuristics and biases tasks have been overly simplified, however. The framework developed here traces the complexities inherent in these tasks by identifying five processing states that are possible in most heuristics and biases tasks. The framework also identifies three possible processing defects: inadequately learned mindware; failure to detect the necessity of overriding the miserly response; and failure to sustain the override process once initiated. An important insight gained from using the framework is that degree of mindware instantiation is strongly related to the probability of successful detection and override. Thus, errors on such tasks cannot be unambiguously attributed to miserly processing – and correct responses are not necessarily the result of computationally expensive cognition.
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“Furthermore, people are cognitive misers [see Stanovich (2018)]”
From Can Damasio's Somatic Marker Hypothesis Explain More Than Its Originator Will Admit? (2021) · cites this paper as Stanovich (2018)
Citations
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Cited by
Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing
De Neys, W., & Pennycook, G. (2019) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721419855658 · Cited by 248
“It is possible that this group has not managed to automatize the application of the necessary logical knowledge (Stanovich, 2018).”
BackgroundAdvancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
De Neys, W. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x2200142x · Cited by 180
“As I stressed above (R2), both Stanovich (2018) and Evans (2019) have integrated non-exclusivity in their recent publications.”
BackgroundBago, B., & De Neys, W. (2019) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2018.1507949 · Cited by 180
“But it underscores the need for any viable dual process model to fully recognise and embrace the potential of System 1 (e.g., De Neys, 2017; Stanovich, 2018; Thompson, Pennycook, Trippas, & Evans, 2018, for related suggestions).”
BackgroundEvans, J. S. B. T. (2019) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2019.1623071 · Cited by 180
“In addition, the progressive accumulation of culturally transmitted mindware, such as scientific knowledge, greatly advances the power of Type 2 thinking in modern societies (Stanovich, 2018).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialBad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People
Levy, N. L. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001 · Cited by 295
Metadata
- Authors
- Stanovich, K. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Stanovich, Keith E.
- ORCID
- Stanovich, Keith E.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2018-04-27
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 423-444
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2800542281
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 96
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 23.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Thinking & Reasoning (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- cognitive miserliness, heuristics and biases, mindware, processing defects
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- Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.