Many Reasons or Just One: How Response Mode Affects Reasoning in the Conjunction Problem
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction “fallacy” recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode—whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks—and propose two precise cognitive algorithms for ranking probabilities. Our framework allows us to make novel predictions about when and why people adhere to class inclusion. Evidence obtained in several studies supports these predictions and demonstrates that the proposed ranking algorithms can account for about three-quarters of participants' inferences in the Linda problem.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 1×
“We propose a specific variant of the cue-wise strategy based on this evidence and work by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) on one-reason decision making in choice problems.”
MethodConfirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Cited by
Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00350 · Cited by 448
“Hertwig and Chase (1998) offered a similar interpretation of target items in the presence of filler items.”
BackgroundThe Role of Representative Design in an Ecological Approach to Cognition.
Dhami, M. K., Hertwig, R., & Hoffrage, U. (2004) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.6.959 · Cited by 408
Wedell, D. H., & Moro, R. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.08.003 · Cited by 79
Linda is not a bearded lady: configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors
Nilsson, H., Winman, A., Juslin, P., & Hansson, G. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0017351 · Cited by 64
Exploring the conjunction fallacy within a category learning framework
Nilsson, H. (2008) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.615 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Chase, R. H. V. M.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1998-11
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 319-352
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2121859745
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 1.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.